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ABSTRACT 
 
 Scholars from diverse perspectives have sought to understand the features and 
mechanisms that influence the design and implementation of public policy.  Some (realists) have 
emphasized the role that material interests have played while others (idealists) have emphasized 
the influence of subjective ideas on ‘how policy means’ (Yanow 1996).  Recently, observers in 
both camps have demonstrated curiosity in the influence of culture on policymaking and its 
consequences.  Regrettably, this shared concern has not resulted in much collaboration across 
epistemological divides.   
I argue that narrative analysis provides a way to bridge the divides by specifying an 
interpretive approach that identifies culture as encompassing both interests and ideas in 
policymaking processes.  I draw from the works of scholars in phenomenology, narratology, 
cultural sociology, disaster studies and public policy to illustrate a systematic approach to 
investigating and interpreting congressional hearings as narratives that reveal cultural taken-for-
granted assumptions about how the world should work (Loseke 2003).  I argue that examining 
narratives of political actors can empirically delineate both objective interests as well as 
subjective ideas.  In particular, I compare and contrast diverse stories about three U.S. oil spills 
(Santa Barbara, Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon) to illuminate taken-for-granted beliefs 
about our social and natural worlds.  With this emphasis, I aim to contribute to understandings of 
how culture works in policymaking, which also sheds light on how culture may influence the 
wider social order more generally.  I conclude with a discussion of potential implications 
regarding our shared natural resources. 
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PREFACE 
In what follows, I argue from a constructionist perspective that culture, conceptualized as 
widely held beliefs, is observable in the stories we tell.  With support from cultural studies across 
disciplines, I assert that in order to capture the way culture influences policymaking, analysts 
should examine the way actors make sense of objects and events such as oil spills.  Accordingly, 
this dissertation presents a narrative comparative analysis of narratives about three oil spills as 
told in congressional hearings.  I examine hearing testimonies for how they depict the setting or 
context, plot, characters and underlying morals which constitute cultural influence on storytelling.   
The first event I analyzed is the Santa Barbara oil spill that occurred in 1969.  The second 
is the Exxon Valdez oil spill that occurred in 1989.  And the last is the Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill that occurred in 2010.  While each event was separated by nearly 20 years respectively, I 
note enduring beliefs with regard to the moral importance of natural beauty, knowledge and 
learning, innovation and nationalism.  In the end I argue that these beliefs, while not obdurate and 
static “things” have influence over our practices.  With this awareness, I suggest that practices can 
change with thoughtful consideration of the beliefs we hold as sacrosanct. 
Beliefs are powerful.  In the popular imagination, the word belief conjures notions of 
“something believed or accepted as true”…something that is characterized by goodness or 
effectiveness.  Belief refers to “something that somebody believes in: a statement, principle, or 
doctrine that a person or group accepts as true.”  This last definition points to the concept more 
relevant to the present work – collective or widely held beliefs.  That is, collective beliefs are 
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statements, principles, or doctrines held true by groups of individuals.  But, what of my interest in 
widely held beliefs? 
Classic sociologist, Emile Durkheim (2008[1915]), thought that beliefs have power over 
individuals and groups.  He regarded “collective beliefs” as social facts that impose themselves on 
the expectations and conduct of individuals. He conceptualized “collective representations” as 
governing and coordinating “things.”  Durkheim considered himself to be a rational scientist who 
took on the study of social institutions with specific methodological rules and conceptions.  His 
call for precision in sociology is evidenced in his treatment of social facts and social processes as 
objects to be studied that are external to and impose constraints over individuals.  For Durkheim, 
social facts took on a life of their own, so to speak.   That is, collective beliefs cause social 
stratification, occupational specialization, bureaucratization, individual action, suicide and so on.   
Durkheim’s ideas contribute to the present work in that they provide the grounds for 
questioning the way beliefs might influence social processes such as policymaking.  However, 
Durkheim’s notion that collective beliefs are objective and causal has been challenged on the 
grounds that it is presumptive.  He posits a “reality” out there that is objective and external to 
individual minds and experiences.  Such a position paints the picture of a static, objective reality 
that is understood by all actors in the same way.  Durkheim’s analytical attention to macro social 
forces has the consequence of homogenizing individual subjects as spectators within an 
objectively shared reality.  Such consequence paved the way for a vast disciplinary rebuttal, 
which in my view provides even more support for exploring the potential links between beliefs 
and policymaking; beliefs and world making. 
Max Weber wrote against Durkheim’s deterministic view of society and turned the 
analytical emphasis around.  Indeed, Weber is often interpreted as having pushed back against the 
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tendency to view material reality, or “historical materialism” as the primary social force 
determining the wider social order.  Where Durkheim (and other materialists such as Marx) 
highlighted the power of social forces, Weber highlighted the power of subjective and inter-
subjective interpretations.  That is, Weber challenged the idea that a reality exists outside of 
individual experience and that any attempt to describe the causes of cultural phenomena or social 
processes was inherently value-laden and transitory.   
Weber questioned Durkheim’s idea that there can be an objective social science because 
he questioned the existence of “objective” analysis of social phenomena.  Given the vast diversity 
and variety of individuals, views, beliefs and socio-historical contexts, circumstances and 
conditions, the notion of a shared objective world for Weber was absurd.  For Weber, it is 
difficult to establish the causal power of social facts since the idea of social facts is subjectively 
defined.  That is they “possess no inherent criterion” (2012:117).  In his famous essay about 
objectivity in social science, Weber asks: “How is the causal explanation of an individual fact 
possible – for it is impossible to conceive of a description of even the smallest section of reality 
that could ever be exhaustive?” (2012:117)   Still, Weber inspires a systematic approach for the 
analysis of cultural phenomena.  Further, he suggests that analysts conceptualize social 
phenomena as “ideal types” with a caveat that we should expect our findings about what and how 
they are constituted to be overturned in our lifetimes.  Weber was a cautious and perhaps humble 
social historian. 
Albeit with different nuances, both Durkheim and Weber document the force or influence 
of widely held beliefs on the conduct and substance of social life.  While Durkheim might argue 
more forcefully for the causality of social facts, Weber notes the fleeting influence of “world 
images” on social practices.   Interestingly enough, despite their theoretical and methodological 
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differences, both scholars explore similar socio-cultural phenomena and institutions but from 
different vantage points.  Surprisingly, their works hint at shared conclusions.  Where Durkheim 
observes the organizing influence of collective conscience and collective representations that help 
to explain social phenomena such as suicide, Weber observes the organizing influence of a shared 
religious ethic in the origin of economic systems such as capitalism in the West.    
In sum, there is a long history of sociological work that suggests that beliefs matter.  But 
how?  I follow scholars who argue that widely held beliefs constitute culture and that culture both 
influences and is influenced by social processes.   I aim to document the influence of culture on 
social processes by examining a particular social process – policymaking.  I rely on the 
foundational work of Durkheim and Weber in my exploration of the way culture works in the 
social process of policymaking.  I follow the rules set by Durkheim that in order to observe 
widely held beliefs I must regard them as empirical things that can be observed.  However, I use 
the caution inspired by Weber to abstain from suggesting that social facts are indelible, 
permanent, fixed, and supported by unilateral agreement among diverse individuals.  I rely on 
Weber’s conception of ideal type to establish the focus of my analysis of how culture works in 
policymaking.  I argue that inductive interpretations of policy narratives told within congressional 
hearings can reveal taken-for-granted assumptions.  In my view, these assumptions are 
tantamount to what we might consider shared values and widely held beliefs.  Perhaps we can 
think of world images of social facts…or typifications of collective representations.  Either way, 
in this project, I argue that beliefs (however transitory) are powerful things. 
 5
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
I begin this work with a theoretical assumption that beliefs are powerful.  The notion that 
beliefs are powerful influences on social processes is well supported by the works of classic and 
contemporary sociologists (Snow and Benford 1988, Berger and Luckmann 1966, Boudon 2001, 
Borhek and Curtis 1975, Dixon 1980, Durkheim 2008[1915], Weber 2013[1946]).  I launch into 
this project with a keen interest in exploring how widely held beliefs influence social processes 
by focusing on a particular process, specifically – policymaking.  Further, I argue that by 
understanding the beliefs that are collectively held, we can approximate the influence of culture 
on policymaking in particular, and world making in general.   
Scholars from several disciplines have sought to understand the complex dimensions and 
mechanisms that shape policymaking, from understanding problem definition to policy design 
and implementation.  Researchers investigate social problems and their policy responses using a 
variety of perspectives to investigate what is constructed as problematic as well how it is 
constructed as problematic and with what implications.  While much work has been done to 
document the ways material interests and political power of actors and groups are linked to the 
design and implementation of public policy, scholars have called for more analytic attention to 
the ways culture or widely held beliefs about the social world bears influence as well (Burstein 
and Hirsh 2007, Heinz 1993, Miller 2008, Padamsee 2009, Sabatier 1987, Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1999, Wedeen 2002).  I hope to contribute to the discussion about cultural influence in 
policymaking by focusing on the question: How does culture work in public policymaking?  That 
is, how does culture, understood as a “historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in 
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symbols” (Geertz 1973:89) shape possibilities for policy responses to events and conditions 
deemed problematic?   Furthermore: How can a cultural analysis of policymaking inform our 
understanding of the wider social world in general?  More specifically, my research questions 
are: 
• Who constructs policy problems in congressional testimony?  What special 
interests do stories and storytellers represent? 
• How do storytellers define policy problems in policy narratives?  What symbols, 
images, metaphors, words, and rhetorical devices are used to construct an event or 
condition as problematic in congressional testimony?   
• How do storytellers construct the cause and consequences, as well as prescriptions 
or resolutions to problems?  What language is used in policy narratives to 
persuade audience members that something should be done about problematic 
events or conditions? 
• What is taken for granted, or assumed in stories that define policy problems and 
their resolutions?  
• How are assumptions within policy narratives linked with the wider social order?  
How does meaning making in policy stories contribute to and perpetuate the 
social order? 
Cultural analysis in public policy is challenged by disciplinary divisions.  Social 
observers such as Stone (1997) and Fischer (2003) have identified large theoretical and 
methodological debates that have been reified over time so as to prevent more holistic 
understanding of policymaking processes and potential social consequences.  Traditionally, 
research in public policy has applied a natural science model of investigation that puts the policy 
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problem as an objective thing under the microscope to determine its features and characteristics.   
Indeed, much of the work by traditional realist scholars has emphasized the influence of material 
interests and political power on the development of policy agendas, goals and solutions to policy 
problems.  Realists argue that scientific investigation must be predicated on a research model 
that begins with clearly defined hypotheses that must be falsified through systematic, deductive 
analytic techniques (Sabatier 1999, Jones and McBeth 2010).  This perspective’s epistemic 
orientation stems from the notion that there is a real world out there to be discovered and 
explained with rigorous, investigative tools.  Unfortunately, according to both Stone (1997) and 
Fischer (2003), this emphasis has obscured the ways that policy problems become taken-for-
granted as objective things in the first place.   
Over the last several decades, scholars have rebutted the a priori assumption among 
realists that policy problems are objective things.  Influenced by what has been referred to as the 
constructivist turn, the countering analysts (labeled as idealist by writers such as Fischer and 
Stone) placed analytic emphasis on the subjective, rhetorical, linguistic construction of 
policymaking processes (Fischer 2003, Hulsse and Spencer 2008).  Idealists insist that the 
assumption that there is a real problem to investigate is deterministic and blinds analysts to the 
ways ideas and meanings influence not only what is problematic, but how it is so constructed.    
The epistemological position of idealists is that we can know about our empirical world by 
examining the ways actors define, and make sense of social phenomena via language and 
communication.  Accordingly, these scholars have utilized interpretive research methods for 
investigating the ways policy problems are defined as well as the social consequences of the 
processes through which definition is accomplished.  With the interpretive lens, policy 
researchers have explored the underlying meanings, constructions and ideas that shape what we 
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understand as problematic and in need of intervention (Fischer 2003, Stone 1997 and Yanow 
1996, Brysk 1995). 
There are now decades of studies that exemplify the divergent theoretical and 
methodological perspectives on public policy.  However, due to what Schneider and Ingram 
(2007) argue are disciplinary and epistemological disagreements, collaboration across theoretical 
and methodological divides has been difficult.  I wish to sidestep the debate about what type of 
knowledge is more superior as there is considerable support across domains for multiple ways of 
knowing.  Instead, I follow researchers such as Padamsee (2009), Campbell (2002) and 
Steensland (2006) and others who are paving the way toward a middle ground.  I am interested in 
contributing to the dialogue about policy problem definition with a focus on how subjective ideas 
and material interests are linked.  In my view, the projects among diverse scholars are 
compatible, despite internal epistemological disagreements.  Both realists and idealists are eager 
to explore the way culture works in policymaking, but often get sidetracked by either attacking 
the opposing position or defending their own (See Shanahan, Jones and McBeth 2011).   
The shared curiosity in wider socio-cultural influences in policymaking presents an 
opportunity to observe and document the interplay between the realist emphasis on objective 
reality and the idealist emphasis on subjective meaning making.  Both the real and the ideal exist 
and are embedded in a wider cultural context.  Documenting the cultural influence on social 
processes of policymaking about tangible events is the goal of this dissertation.  In so doing, I 
attempt to answer Gubrium and Holstein’s (1997:101) call to illuminate the links between 
“representation and reality.”   Representations refer to the processes actors use to make sense of 
objects in their social world and reality refers to the tangible, objective events and actions that 
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actually happen. As this work attempts to show, understanding the cultural influences on 
policymaking can help to illuminate the ways culture works in social life more generally.   
To accomplish my goal, I begin my analysis with an interest in objectively real events – 
oil spills – and I investigate narrative constructions that attempt to make sense of these events.  
In policy literature, oil spills can be understood as “triggering events” (Button 2010) or “focusing 
events” (Birkland 1997, Kingdon 1995) or “exogenous shocks” (Drazen and Masson 1993) that 
initiate policymaking.  As True, Baumgartner and Jones (1999) have argued, events such as oil 
spills “punctuate the equilibrium” to initiate change in policy response.  From a sociological 
perspective, oil spills can be understood as a social or cultural object (Griswold 2013:11, 
Schudson 1989), which means something that can be either tangible or intangible that has 
“shared significance embodied in form.”  Arguably, placing emphasis on how actors make sense 
of cultural objects enables analysts to capture culture as a larger system that shapes and is shaped 
by material interests and practices as well as subjective ideas and meanings (Griswold 2013). In 
summary, a tangible policy problem such as an oil spill can be regarded as culturally significant; 
the significance of which is observable in the practices (such as storytelling) that make them 
meaningful.     
So, how can we observe culture in triggering events, cultural objects, or policy problems 
such as oil spills in order to explore its influence on social processes such as policymaking?  
Cultural sociologists proffer many methods for this investigation (see Spillman 2002), but 
narrative analysis is perhaps the most common (Griswold 2013, Smith 2005, Stone 1997, Jones 
and McBeth 2010).  Narratives are stories that are told with a purpose (Mitchell 1981).   
Narratives in policymaking are told to persuade, convince, defend, describe or to define a 
situation – to make sense of something that has gone wrong and suggest how to make it right 
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(Fischer 2003, Gubrium and Holstein 2009, Stone 1997).  The way policy narratives provide 
evidence of cultural influence is that they must appear to be “true” or to have “narrative 
verisimilitude” (Bruner 1991) or “narrative coherence” (Rideout 2013).  Policy stories must 
resonate with audience members.  In order for narratives to resonate with audience members, 
they must be intelligible, and coherent; they must make sense.   
In this work, I argue that widely held beliefs, or taken-for-granted assumptions constitute 
the scaffolding that provides for that coherence or verisimilitude.  Widely held beliefs hold 
stories together (Bruner 1991).  Descriptions of settings, characters, plots and morals in policy 
narratives offer empirical evidence for underlying taken-for-granted collective beliefs.   As such, 
I contend that narratives are analytically useful for observing the way culture or widely held 
beliefs work in social processes such as policymaking and by extension, world making. 
Learning more about how culture influences policymaking requires understanding the 
narratives, or the stories told about policy problems.  By focusing on policy problems or 
triggering events as cultural objects, we can explore the ways subjective processes of meaning 
making (representations) are linked to material interests, power and practices (reality) that are 
evident in event descriptions and definitions.  Considering the way interests and ideas are linked 
moves theoretical explanation beyond either interests or ideas, to both interests and ideas.  Such 
insight is productive not only for scholars focused on how to explain and predict the 
policymaking process, but also for those who investigate the ways that widely held beliefs or 
shared significance in policymaking reflects and perpetuates the wider social order.   
A focus on narratives in public policy can help to specify the dynamic interactions 
between culture and society; structure and agency.  In particular, narrative analysis is valuable 
for exploring processes of social construction and social change (or persistence), as well as for 
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showing the ways in which social order and action are shaped by the cultural context in which 
they emerge and are maintained (Loseke 2003, Smith 2005).    Especially in what Swidler (1986) 
refers to as “unsettled times,” cultural influence is observable in actors’ stories about exogenous 
shocks or disaster events that have the potential to make the wider social order visible.   
Conceptualizing oil spills as triggering events, or exogenous shocks, provides a 
productive starting point to delineate links between representation and reality that can illuminate 
taken-for-granted assumptions about the way the world should work.  Indeed, it has been said 
that by understanding how we make sense of oil spills can tell us a lot about ourselves as a 
society (Button 2010).  There is considerable controversy surrounding the production and 
extraction of oil as it brings into the foreground tensions between privately owned industrial 
resources and publicly held environmental resources; privatized profits and socialized risks. And, 
controversy is heightened when something goes wrong in the process of oil production and 
extraction.  In 1955, journalist Robert Engler wrote “Oil serves as one useful springboard for 
analyzing the problem of power in America.”  In my view, oil also serves as a useful site to 
examine the influence of cultural beliefs and meaning systems on the wider social order.  
Further, I argue that it offers great potential for exploring the ways interests and ideas are linked 
due to the way oil extraction and production is embedded in everyday life.   
Some scholars have explored questions related to how cultural ideas and contexts shape 
oil spill events as well as their legislative redress (Beamish 2002; 2001, Birkland and Lawrence 
2002; Button 2010; Gramling and Freudenburg 2006, 2012; Ladd 2012 and Morse 2012). 
However, most examinations of oil spill events privilege the explanation that oil spill policy is 
driven by powerful interests of oil companies (Molotch 1970, Gramling and Freudenberg 2012, 
Ladd 2012).   Indeed, as Gramling and Freudenburg (2006) (see also Ross 2001) have argued, oil 
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politics has a tendency to threaten democratic participation which further emphasizes power (or 
the lack thereof) in policy discussions about how to respond to “disaster” events.   
Regrettably, studies that highlight the power of the producer and economic interests 
obscure how such power and interest is embedded in, and shaped by widely held cultural beliefs 
and meaning systems.  Theoretical explanation continues to flow in one direction – that power 
shapes culture.  Less often do studies consider the ways that culture or widely held beliefs shape 
and reinforces power.  Understanding how conditions are constructed as problematic and in need 
of intervention requires addressing questions about how individuals shape and are shaped by our 
surrounding cultural contexts. 
Attention to the interplay between interests and ideas as they intersect in political 
testimony about oil spill events speaks to the broad relevance of this research.  First, from a 
practical standpoint, policy scholars can leverage insights from narrative analyses to aid decision 
makers in allocating and distributing resources.  Second, the study of narratives with a 
substantive focus on oil spills can delineate the links between structure and agency within 
political institutions.  Third, by highlighting the particular words, metaphors, ideas and images 
that are used to make sense of oil spills underlying cultural assumptions and widely held beliefs 
embedded in language are made visible. Finally, because of the link between perceived damage 
to the natural environment as a result of oil spillage and human practices (that sustain and 
perpetuate reliance on its extraction and use), my research contributes to conversations that 
attempt to understand the dynamic everyday interactions between humans and our natural world.  
By examining the stories told about putative triggering events that initiate policymaking, such as 
oil spills, not only can we learn more about cultural notions of how the world should work, but 
also what and whom people care about.  Policymaking is inherently normative in that it seeks to 
 13
make right what is deemed wrong (Stone 1997).  Further, we can see how narratives of policy 
problems delineate structural and cultural mechanisms in problem definition that can shed light 
on alternative possibilities.    
This research is organized as follows.   The next chapter begins with establishing the 
theoretical foundation upon which I build my argument for the use of narratives to explore 
cultural influence in policymaking.  In chapter three I explain my methodological approach and 
rationale for beginning with what policy scholars refer to as triggering or focusing events to 
explore how cultural mechanisms work in policymaking.  Additionally, I detail my systematic 
procedure for gathering and analyzing congressional hearing transcripts as policy narratives.  I 
specify how I document cultural mechanisms or widely held beliefs that help to show how 
culture works in policymaking.  In chapters four, five and six I provide a detailed analysis of 
congressional hearings that seek to define three similar events across time in the United States 
national context: The Santa Barbara Oil Spill 1969; Exxon Valdez 1989 and The Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill 2010.  Finally, I conclude with a theoretical discussion about how widely held 
beliefs in policy narratives are linked with the wider social order in general. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR EXAMINING NARRATIVES 
AS CULTURAL EVIDENCE IN POLICYMAKING 
 
Policy scholars are turning their interest to exploring the way culture, (conceptualized in 
this work as widely held beliefs), influences policymaking.  This interest has emerged in part as a 
response to the need for more sophisticated theorizing about what shapes policymaking 
processes.  In short, scholarship has been divided into camps – the “realists” that prioritize the 
influence of material interests and political power and the “idealists” that prioritize the influence 
of ideas or representations in setting policy agendas, defining policy problems and designing 
interventions (Fischer 2003).  This division has undermined efforts to theorize about the ways 
that interests and ideas are linked or held together by widely held cultural beliefs that are taken-
for-granted in policymaking studies and practices.  
The purpose of the present work is to contribute to the conversation that encourages 
collaboration between these seemingly opposed theoretical and methodological paradigms.  In 
this chapter, I summarize the works from both the realists and idealists to lay the theoretical 
foundation for pursuing an interpretive study of policy narratives to explicate cultural influences 
on policymaking.  Then, I specify the ways narrative analysis has been used and can be used to 
capture cultural influence.  Finally, I outline a framework for a systematic study of policy 
narratives that can reveal widely held beliefs about how the world should work.  Understanding 
these beliefs can shed light on their influence on the wider social order. 
In general, the study of public policy and policymaking is concerned with the creation of 
rules, laws, goals and standards by government officials as well as the distribution of resources, 
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benefits and burdens to members of society (Birkland 2010 [2001]).  Traditionally, public policy 
has been studied using the tools of the natural sciences model of research (Stone 1997, Fischer 
2003).  This so-called rational approach in policy studies has provided insight into policymaking 
processes such as agenda setting, policy adoption and implementation which has contributed a 
great deal to theories as well as to the practices of the policymaking process (Birkland 2010 
[2001], Burstein and Linton 2002). Traditional or realist approaches have highlighted the role of 
individual and group interests or “sides” (Stone 1997) to theoretically explain not only how 
policy gets made, but also to practically address and improve the policymaking process itself.   
Attention to individual and collective behavior in policymaking has contributed 
knowledge and understanding about how individuals use resources and power to influence 
policymaking within and across substantive policy arenas.  As a result, we have amassed an 
impressive body of literature that illustrates how political institutions enable and constrain 
policymaking activities, how “multiple streams” (Kingdon 1995) converge to create 
policymaking opportunities, how actors process and use information (Baumgartner and Jones 
1991), and how individuals unite around shared beliefs to form powerful “advocacy coalitions” 
(Sabatier 1987), “policy domains” (Van Horn, Baumer and Gormley 2001) or “policy regimes” 
(Jochim and May 2010) in efforts to address problematic issues and events, design solutions, and 
implement interventions.   
However, because the focus of policy studies has traditionally been guided by the goal to 
create linear theories of policymaking or to improve policymaking in practice, realist studies 
have conceptualized policy problems as “objective conditions.”  This tendency inevitably 
obscured the ways in which policy problems are subjectively defined.  This neglect has led 
interpretive or idealist scholars such as Edelman (1988), Fischer 2003, Hajer (1995), Roe (1994), 
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Schneider and Ingram (1993), Stone (1997), and Yanow (1996) to explore policymaking from an 
interpretive theoretical perspective.     
Emerging as a response to perceived limitations of the dominant natural science approach 
for explaining social life, the organizing ontology in the interpretive frame is that meaning is 
socially constructed (Berger and Luckmann 1966).  The works of Berger and Luckmann (1966) 
as well as Geertz (1973) were primary in developing the epistemological foundation that places 
analytic focus on language – words, symbols and stories – in the creation of knowledge about 
social and cultural phenomena.   The central goal is to understand how people construct meaning 
as well as the consequences of meanings that are constructed.  Interpretive perspectives view 
social phenomena such as policy problems as subjective and contingent; with meaning (as 
significance) accomplished through language.   
Accordingly, interpretive scholars across disciplines have focused on language as 
providing evidence about how socially constructed subjective meanings become “objective 
facticities,” which then become taken for granted as “reality” (Berger and Luckmann 1966).  In 
particular, social problems and their policy responses have been conceptualized as objects that 
are socially constructed.  Indeed, Blumer (1971) along with Spector and Kitsuse (2009 [1977]) 
argued that because policy problems are products of collective definition practices, regarding 
them as “objective conditions” is inherently flawed.   
Over the decades since these and other scholars changed course, social constructionists 
have examined how conditions and events become problems and hence targets for social 
intervention (Best 2001; Fischer 2003; Loseke 2003; Miller and Holstein 1993; Schneider and 
Ingram 1993, 2007; Spector and Kitsuse 2009 [1977]; and Stone 1997).  Scholars who 
investigate policy problems as subjective conditions have explored claims, claimsmakers and 
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claims making strategies with an effort to understand how some conditions and not others are 
accorded the status of social problems requiring intervention.   Loseke (2003) refers to the 
activities of claims making as social problems work.  The concept of social problems work leads 
scholars to investigate policymaking processes as the construction of problems inevitably leads 
to the construction of solutions. And arguably, solutions or policies have the potential to shape 
the wider social order though the allocation of benefits and burdens that enable or constrain the 
actions of individuals. 
Critically, researchers across disciplines have observed that constructions of social 
problems and their policy responses take a narrative form.  Claims to large audiences are 
packaged, according to Loseke (2003) as “formula stories.”  These are publicly circulating 
narratives that establish not only the type of problem being defined, but also the attribution of 
blame and responsibility.  Similar arguments are offered by policy scholars including Kaplan 
(1993, 1986), Stone (1989), Fischer (2003), Roe (1994) and Bacon (2012).  For example, Stone 
(1989) argues that policy problems are defined in “causal stories” that establish what or who 
caused the problem which simultaneously constructs liability and accountability.  Hajer (1995:4) 
argues that policymaking depends on how problems are defined and are limited by structural 
constraints in terms of what can be thought or imagined as well as what stories can be told and 
who can tell them. More recently, Bacon (2012) suggests that the policy problems are articulated 
in “public political narratives” that are like causal stories in that they are somewhat patterned.  
As Bacon (2012:768) puts it, “Narrative has a predictive aspect, identifying likely policy 
responses to unexpected events.”   
But, how can narratives provide evidence of culture or widely held beliefs?  So far, I have 
argued that the theoretical support for exploring narratives in public policy is located in 
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interpretive, constructivist studies of social problems.  In the next section, I review literature that 
provides more detail as to how narratives are defined and how they are used in social research 
and in public policy.  In sum, in the paragraphs that follow, I document the ways narratives have 
been analytically useful for understanding the most micro of social investigation such as 
individual sense making as well as the most macro social investigation such as collective world 
making.   
Narratives in Social Life and Public Policy 
Narratives are defined and described by many writers but are consistent with   Bruner’s 
(1991) description as accounts of events that occur over time.  Narratives are both particular and 
general in that they can be about a unique experience, but reference a more general type of story 
or script.  They are about people or characters engaged in events that have relevance for their 
worldviews, desires, and beliefs.  They are composed as texts and are most often offered to 
account for a “breach in the canonical script” (p. 11).  That is, narratives are warranted when a 
precipitating event brings about the need for explanation, justification, and rationalization.   As 
Genette, Ben-Ari and McHale (1990) argue factual narratives (as opposed to fictional) are 
recognizable stories that are evaluated on the basis of their believability or coherence.  Bruner 
(1991:13) points out narrative “verisimilitude” or plausibility depends on the extent to which the 
story “hangs together.”  This aspect brings into light the way that narratives are reflective as well 
as constitutive of cultural or widely shared beliefs.  The reason any narrative makes sense to 
audience members is because they are constituted by collectively shared understandings.  
Without shared understandings as scaffolding, stories do not make sense or hold together. 
While writers may not agree as to what particular texts or accounts count as narratives, 
they generally concur that narratives are stories about something that happens somewhere and as 
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such can tell us something about our collectively shared understandings (Clandinin 2007).  
Narratives establish sequence in that they have a beginning, middle and an end.  They are 
contextual, and establish temporality and spatiality in that narratives are about something that 
happens in a particular place and time.  Because narratives are offered to explain a breach or an 
existential shock, stories are inherently normative.    There is a moral to the story.  Narratives 
establish types of characters (innocent, guilty, hero, coward, victim, villain) in that they are about 
events that happen to people, places, and things.  Finally, stories build on each other or, as 
Bruner notes, are “accrual” (p. 18).  When distributed and shared, they can become collective 
representations in the Durkheimian sense.  It is this structural aspect of narrative that can help to 
explain why it may be difficult for political actors to change stories once they are taken-for-
granted as meaningful explanations for something that has gone wrong (see Jackson 2011).  
Hence, narratives can be explored for how interests and ideas persist across time and become like 
a cultural structure in themselves (Alexander and Smith 1993).  Indeed, Hill (2005) suggests that 
stories create and shape culture and meaning and likewise, culture and shared meanings create 
and shape stories.   
Narratives in Social Life 
Social scientists have documented the value of exploring narratives to understand social 
life.  There are many articles and books that have presented comprehensive reviews of the use of 
narratives to investigate social life at multiple levels (Abell 2004, Brown, Gabriel and Gherardi 
2009, Bruner 1987, 1991, 2010, Clandinin 2007, Ewick and Silbey 1995, Franzosi 1998, Loseke 
2007, Maines 1993, Mitchell 1981, Ochs and Capps 1996, Polletta, Chen, Gardner and Motes 
2011, Polkinghorne 1988).  At the most micro level of analysis, narratives include personal 
stories that make sense of everyday experiences or breaches and situations in social life (Bruner 
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1991, 2010, Patterson and Renwick Monroe 1998).  Individual narratives are analyzed to 
understand cognitive processes (Bruner 1991, Patterson and Renwick Monroe 1998, and 
Polkinghorne 1988) and the construction of selves and identities (Loseke 2007, Ochs and Capps 
1996, Williams and Stickley 2011).   
Narratives are also conceptualized as providing evidence of collective or group processes 
(Maines 1993, Ewick and Silbey 1995, and Polletta 1998).  For example, social movement 
scholars explore how narratives emerge in spontaneous group protest (Benford 2002, Davis 
2002, Polletta 1998, 2002) and how such narratives mobilize actors to participate in efforts to 
bring about social change.  For example, Polletta (1998) analyzes narratives of 1960s student sit-
ins in campus newspapers, speeches, and in organizational correspondence.  She observes that 
while stories emerge from many tellers, a coherent and attractive collective identity of “student 
activist” was developed which compelled participation by other students.    
Organizational scholars explore how stories shape and are shaped by the organizational 
and institutional contexts in which they are told (Brown, Gabriel and Gherardi 2009, Whittle, 
Mueller and Mangan 2009).  For example, Whittle and her colleagues (2009) examine stories 
constructed in a routine work setting and find that in an organization characterized by uncertainty 
and change, individuals construct selves in terms that are morally valued to help them to navigate 
and respond to such uncertainty.  This vein of narrative research reveals the influence of 
institutional rules and bureaucratic constraints on the types of stories that can be told and who 
can tell them (Ewick and Silbey 1995, 2003, Maines 1993, Polletta and Lee 2006, and Portillo 
2010).  Such narratives are conceptualized as “performances” (Law and Singleton 2000, Polletta 
et al. 2011) that are socially constructed and constrained by institutional expectations and 
regulations.   
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Regardless of the particular context in which stories are told or the purpose of their 
telling, all narratives can be viewed as “cultural productions” that “reflect or express existing 
ideologies” (Ewick and Silbey 1995: 212), (see also Bacon 2012, Campbell 2002, Hill 2005, 
Jacobs and Sobieraj 2007, Padamsee 2009, Polletta et al. 2011 and Steensland 2006).  Widely 
circulating stories transmit “transcultural messages about the nature of a shared reality” (White 
1981:2) that conveys expectations and explanations about “how the world works” (Stone 
1999:137).  For example Portillo (2010) interprets narratives of government officials and finds 
that the authority of women, minorities and younger individuals is questioned due to widely held 
beliefs regarding race, ethnicity, gender and age.  These shared understandings are linked to the 
wider social order in that they shape opportunities and constraints for individuals and groups 
within governmental organizations.   
 Scholars refer to such widely circulating narratives as public or master narratives (Fisher 
1984, Peelo 2005) and public discourses (Young 2009) or more recently political master 
narratives (Sandlin and Clark 2009), and public political narratives (Bacon 2012).  For 
Alexander and Smith (1993:156) these narratives are a kind of “cultural structure.” 
People, groups and nations understand their progress through time in terms of stories, 
plots which have beginnings, middles, and ends, heroes and antiheroes, epiphanies and 
denouncements, dramatic, comic and tragic forms.  This mythical dimension of even the 
most secular societies has been vastly underestimated in empirical social science and, 
until recently, in most cultural theory. 
 
At the cultural level, scholars examine narratives for how they reveal “covert underlying 
presuppositions that organize the worlds in which speakers live” (Hill 2005:157).  Theoretical 
concepts such as cultural or symbolic codes (Bourdieu 1977, Alexander and Smith 1993), 
cultural schemas (Quinn 2005), semiotic codes (Eco 1979), and emotion codes (Loseke 2009) 
and systems of signification (Barthes 1964) all refer to widely shared cultural meaning systems.  
These meaning systems are the basis to construct narratives read as coherent, believable and 
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important.  Cultural codes provide empirical evidence that can help to explain the phenomenon 
of cultural resonance in contexts characterized by widely diverse audience members.  
Documenting the existence and use of codes as shared meanings helps us to understand the 
influence of publicly circulating stories that resonate with broad and diverse audiences on 
individual and collective action. For example, observers show how President Bush encouraged 
audience support for war in response to the attacks of 9/11 by appealing to widely shared beliefs 
about human rights (Loseke 2009, Jackson 2011).  The master narrative about the war on terror 
was successful because it resonates with collectively shared emotions of anger and vengeance 
(Loseke 2009) and deeply embedded notions of what Jackson (2011:398) refers to as American 
“innocence, heroism, unity, good versus evil, divine calling, universal values, justice and 
historical myths of the American roles in World War II, and the Cold War.” 
Therefore narratives in social life can be understood not only as particular accounts that 
shed light on cognitive processes and sense making at the individual level, but also as collective 
processes that shape organizational and institutional contexts.  Finally, narratives are regarded as 
cultural texts that provide the scaffolding of sorts for understanding what is regarded as dramatic, 
funny, and tragic in society, what is valued and desired, as well as what is feared.  It is this 
potential of narratives that informs my work.  I depart from the tendency to view narratives as 
personal stories, with the implied analytical interest in how individual actors or groups create 
coherence, to seeing narratives as cultural artifacts that can be interpreted for how they reveal 
taken-for-granted beliefs that create and perpetuate social organization.  As Bruner (2010:45) 
notes, “[Narrative] not only shapes our way of communicating with each other and our ways of 
experiencing the world, but it also gives form to what we imagine, to our sense of what is 
possible” (emphasis original).   Thus, stories constitute worlds. 
 23
While I have summarized the use of narratives across levels of analysis, I do not mean to 
conflate micro with macro narrative research or suggest that personal stories work the same way 
as widely circulating cultural narratives.  The analytical difference is between examining 
storytelling versus stories told.  In analyses of storytelling, analysts focus on how actors narrate 
and make sense of their lived experience.  Whereas in analyses of stories told, the emphasis is on 
the images, words, and devices that are contained within stories that say something about the 
wider social context in which stories emerge. In short, narratives provide analytic utility for 
diverse research questions because they illuminate social processes such as sense making by 
individuals, groups and organizations as well as normative ideas, widely held beliefs, and taken- 
for-granted assumptions about how the world should work (Clandinin 2007).   My emphasis is 
on stories told for their potential to reveal widely held beliefs that provide for narrative 
coherence.   
In my view, this potential for narrative analysis (revealing taken-for-granted 
assumptions) has been underutilized in social science research.  Yet, the support for this 
application of narrative analysis is strong.  As Loseke (2007) argues, all narratives are reflexive 
such that cultural, collective, master, or public political narratives have the power to shape 
institutional, organizational and personal narratives (and reverse, the cultural are composed of 
organizational, institutional and individual narratives).  And in the words of Ewick and Silbey 
(1995: 211), “Even the most personal of narratives rely on and invoke collective narratives.”  So, 
narratives can be explored not only for how they are accomplished by individuals and groups, 
but for how they are possible given the beliefs that underlie their telling.   
Taken together, narrative scholars point to the potential to explore narratives (at all levels 
and in all contexts) for how they reveal widely held beliefs that shape the wider social order. 
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Given the analytic prospect that stories have for observing the dynamism between interests and 
ideas, practices and contexts, it is not surprising that scholars have turned to examining the 
importance and use of narratives in public policy. 
Narratives in Public Policy 
Policy narratives are particularly consequential in that they can become “hegemonic” in 
the maintenance of the wider social order (Ewick and Silbey 1995).  Stone (1997) points out that 
the policymaking process (constructions of rules, laws, goals and standards) are made 
meaningful and visible in policy stories.  Facts do not speak for themselves; they are, as Fischer 
(2003:169) notes, “embedded – explicitly or implicitly – in narrative accounts.”   Images of 
policy problems are defined and made sensible in policy narratives (Stone 1997, Hajer 1995, 
Fischer 2003).  The importance of these stories is in their power to shape interventions aimed at 
ameliorating a condition deemed problematic as well as their power to shape worlds.  The more 
general issue is that constructions of solutions are linked with constructions of problems.  
Importantly, what is constructed as the cause of the problem is what is constructed as the target 
for intervention. That is, when conditions are successfully constructed as problematic, policies to 
redress conditions are designed and implemented.  These policies are consequential in that they 
provide for the distribution of scarce resources; they allocate benefits and burdens in the material 
world (Schneider and Ingram 1993, Stone 1997). While subjectively defined through social 
practices of representation, policies ultimately have very real consequences. 
A focus on narratives in public policy can be viewed as a way to bridge the gap between 
what Gubrium and Holstein (1997:101) refer to as “representation and reality” (see also Fischer 
2003).  As Gubrium and Holstein (1997:101) argue, “Interpretation makes reality come alive for 
us; interpretive work at the border constitutes social reality, producing what we apprehend and 
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treat as meaningfully real.”  The interpretive position implies that policy problems are 
representations; stories that must first be interpreted in order to be responded to.  This leads 
scholars to focus on the stories that are told about policy problems in order to understand how 
they are shaped by material interests as well as by subjective ideas.     
In policy narratives, audience members are guided as to how to understand a condition, 
issue, or event as well as how to understand the characters within the condition, issue, or event.   
Policy stories are composed of rhetorical devices such as metaphors, numbers and typifications 
and synecdoche (Stone 1997) that seek to delineate what is problematic and what should be done 
about it.   Problem definition and redress is accomplished in stories that construct settings, plots 
and characters and morals or prescriptions for what should be done to respond to the particular 
policy issue.   Because the goal of policy narratives is often to define a problem and its 
resolution, they are inherently normative.  Consequently, actors and acts are made sense of in 
moral terms.  Actors are either deemed worthy of sympathy and help or of condemnation and 
punishment (Schneider and Ingram 1993).  Similarly, acts are constructed in terms of whether 
they are appropriate or inappropriate.  The criteria by which we assess problems and their 
solutions are not objectively known, but subjectively defined as Kaplan (1986) and others 
(Stallings 1995, Fischer 2003, Stone 1989) make clear.     
In public political master narratives, there are recognizable types of settings characters 
and plots that dominate policymaking.  For example, Stone (1997:138) argues that policy 
problems are defined according to predictable scripts.  She describes the “story of decline” script 
which includes plots such as “stymied progress,” or “change-is-only-an-illusion” and the second 
broad story line is the “story of helplessness and control.”  Summarily, the story of decline script 
and its variants begins with the assumption that things were going well until [insert problem] 
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happened and now policymakers must act to solve, resolve the problem.  The story of 
helplessness and control proceeds according to the assumption that policy actors knew the 
situation was bad and perceived beyond control, but now we must act to control the problem.  
Within these storylines, problems are dramas with heroes, victims and villains constructed with 
rhetorical devices such as symbols, numbers, metaphors, and synecdoche or typification.  Stone 
also asserts that “the horror story” (such as disaster narratives about environmental crises) is a 
common trope within policymaking that serves as the typification of a policy problem.   
Stone’s (1997:189-193) framework accounts for predictable causal explanations of policy 
problems in what she refers to as “causal stories.”  For example, if the problem is constructed as 
a result of purposeful human action with intended consequences the causal story is categorized as 
“intentional cause.” An example of intentional cause may include stories of oppressors and their 
victims or conspiracies that involve deliberate attempts to hide information or important 
evidence which results in negative consequences.  Problems constructed as caused by unguided 
human action with intended consequences are categorized as “mechanical cause” and may 
include scenarios in which human action (such as the design of a policy intervention) is guided, 
but the implementation of well-intentioned programs or protocols has negative consequences.  
As Stone summarizes, “problems might be understood as the result of humans acting like 
automatons” or human doing without thinking (1997:193).   
Causal stories that construct the problem as unintended consequences of purposeful 
human action are labeled “inadvertent causes.”  An example includes stories of unforeseen side 
effects of medication intended as positive health interventions.    Finally, causal stories construct 
policy problems as the result of unguided human action that leads to unintended consequences.  
These causal stories are categorized as “accidental” in Stone’s framework and include examples 
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such as earthquakes, hurricanes, bad weather, and/or “machines that run amok.”  Some problems, 
notes Stone, cannot be organized according to her typology, but fall into another category that 
she refers to as “complex causes” of which there are three broad scripts: complex systems, 
institutional processes, and historical social patterns.  Stone asserts that complex causal stories 
are constructed in order to deflect blame and responsibility, but this also complicates policy 
redress in that there are no clear individuals or organizations to hold accountable.   
In short, political actors use types of stories to advance or protect their individual and 
group interests.  Indeed, Stone argues that looking for cause provides a lens for the social 
construction of moral and fiscal responsibility by powerful actors.  Analysts of policy narratives 
can observe how actors construct problems, causes and solutions while also observing how 
constructions serve to perpetuate social inequalities.  But policy narratives offer even more 
analytical flexibility.  Extending Stone, causal stories can be interpreted for how they reveal 
underlying normative beliefs that hold stories together.  Indeed, policy narratives are, as Roe 
(1994:2) argues, “a force in themselves” in that they can become like a structure in the ways they 
are reified in debates about extreme events. In short, the content of stories told can be examined 
not only for how they illuminate strategies of policymakers, but also for how they reflect taken-
for-granted normative ideas about how the world should be organized.  Narrative studies in 
public policy teach us that contexts and settings, characters and plots are represented in moral 
terms that matter in policy discussions.  These moral ideas illuminate what is collectively 
deemed right, good and valued versus wrong, bad and devalued. 
Policy Narratives and Widely Held Beliefs 
The works of several scholars point to the potential for policy narratives to illuminate 
links between subjective ideas and material interests by highlighting the widely held, normative 
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beliefs that hold stories together.  That is, taken-for-granted assumptions provide the 
“scaffolding” that is necessary for stories to make sense.  Reviewing studies of policy narratives 
shows how the social construction of setting in which problems are defined (Alkon and Traugot 
2008, Jacobs and Sobieraj 2007), characters or types of individuals and organizations held 
responsible for the problem (Hartmann 2010, Schneider and Ingram 1993, Steensland 2006, 
Schutlz 2011), plots or types of problems become targets for policy interventions (Milligan and 
Binns 2007, Hartmann 2010, Smith 2005).  Stories also reveal normative, taken-for-granted ideas 
about how the world should work.  
Morally Valued Places 
Alkon and Traugot’s study (2008) shows that policy narratives in rural California debates 
about wine growing practices construct the moral worthiness attached to setting which lead to 
consequences in land use governance.  While authors were focused on how actors used 
narratives or stories as resources to persuade audience members to support or refute the 
regulation of wine growing practices, their study can also be read for how debates reflect widely 
held beliefs about types of places that are morally valued.    Indeed, scholars point out that while 
actors were in opposition about whether or not to regulate wine growing practices, they drew on 
similar “place meta narratives” to make their cases.  Both sides extolled the virtue of rural 
landscapes as the rationale to protect lands from the threat of environmental consequences 
related to wine growing practices.  Representations of rural California counties as aesthetically 
beautiful suggest a type of place that is morally worthy of protection from practices deemed 
problematic such as the application of insecticides to protect wine grapes.  Descriptions of 
geographic places are linked with moral notions of what should or should not be done there.  As 
authors argue (2008:98), “Meanings attributed to place have material effects.”   In this study, 
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authors illuminate widely held beliefs about the moral worthiness of rural landscapes.  
Inevitably, attaching normative meanings to places simultaneously attaches normative meanings 
to the people who reside there. 
Morally Valued People 
 
The construction of characters in policy stories is culturally informative, too, in that 
policy narratives construct types of people or organizations as morally deserving or undeserving 
of policy benefits or burdens (Jacobs and Sobieraj 2007, Smith 2005, Schneider and Ingram 
1993, Steensland 2006, Schultz 2011). In policy narratives, characters are often constructed in 
opposition.  As the work of Jacobs and Sobieraj (2007:7) illustrates, narrative constructions of 
characters (us and them, protagonists and antagonists, victims, villains) are often constructed into 
“binary relationships of similarity and difference.”   The villain or cause of the problem is often 
constructed as extremely bad and beyond redemption.  For examples, Schultz (2011) illustrates 
the way representations of types of people are linked to real punishments or rewards in 
policymaking. She examines policy narratives about child sex abuse and finds that characters are 
constructed as “monsters” unworthy of rehabilitation because they are inherently evil.  This 
construction reflects widely held beliefs about types of people who should be punished rather 
than helped.  It also reflects the tendency for narratives to reduce moral ambiguity with narrow 
constructions: people are either all good or all bad.   
Hyperbolic constructions of people as threats that cause policy problems paint a clear 
picture about who we should fear as the works of Hartmann (2010) and Loseke (2009) show.  
Hartmann argues that extreme rhetoric dominates policymaking, perhaps because it motivates 
audience members to feel a particular way about types of people.  In particular, in stories about 
climate change, “climate refugees” are constructed as an inevitable threat that merits extreme 
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interventions such as military defense.  Constructions or representations reflect underlying 
assumptions about types of people who are believed to be threatening.  As Hartmann argues, 
constructing climate refugees as part of the threat of climate change reveals “deep seated fears 
and stereotypes of the dark-skinned, over breeding, dangerous poor” (Hartman 2010:238).  The 
way such representations are linked with reality is that extremely negative constructions of 
characters can lead to support for military intervention. Indeed, Loseke (2009) shows how 
character constructions in political speeches encourage audience members to regard “terrorists” 
as less than human.  These studies reveal widely held beliefs about characters that we condemn 
and consider unworthy of sympathy, empathy, or compassion. 
Morally Valued Problems  
Some problems matter more than others.  In the policymaking arena, the problems that 
matter the most are those that are visible and extreme.  Scholars suggest that the policymaking 
process begins with the advent of “focusing events” (Kingdon 1995, Birkland 1998), or 
“triggering events” (Button 2010).  According to Birkland (1998:54), a focusing event is defined 
as “sudden; relatively uncommon; can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the 
possibility of potentially greater future harms; has harms that are concentrated in a particular 
geographical area or community of interests; and that is known to policy makers and the public 
simultaneously.” Using the examples such as earthquakes, hurricanes, oil spills and nuclear 
power events, Birkland examines the influence these events have on the mobilization of groups 
and policy communities.  From a narrative perspective, stories about these events can also tell us 
about ourselves (Button 2010).  Stories about focusing events are often told in hyperbolic 
language and characterized by “uncertainty, complexity and polarization” (Roe 1994).  
Characters and their actions are vividly polarized, plots are extreme and melodramatic.  Tales are 
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moral and emotional. What is considered sacred and profane is vividly expressed (Smith 2005).  
The notion that focusing events are so pivotal reveals widely held beliefs about what we consider 
to be problematic.  In short, we worry about problems we can see, that are constructed as sudden 
and shocking.   
Some analysts suggest that shocking plotlines have come to dominate policymaking 
(Smith 2005, Stone 1997).  For example, Smith (2005) argues that policy narratives are often 
told as “apocalyptic,” or “crisis narratives.”  Like moral descriptions of places, people and 
problems, crisis narratives are invoked to mobilize audience members to support serious political 
intervention such as for going to war.  Characters are represented in extremes – the super hero 
versus the super villain.  There is little room for negotiation with problem definition; extreme 
circumstances call for extreme measures.  Smith (2005:27) summarizes “In…apocalyptic 
narratives events are seen as unequivocally world-historical, and as in need of heroic 
interventions, for the object of struggle is the future destiny of the planet or civilization.”   
A potential consequence of the tendency in policy narratives to paint extreme pictures of 
policy problems is that tales can become “hegemonic” (Ewick and Silbey 1995).  Milligan and 
Binns (2007) investigate narratives about resource use and land governance in Nigeria and argue 
that “crisis narratives” are so embedded in popular discourse that they constrain alternative 
explanations of what is or can be deemed problematic.  Implicitly, representation of 
environmental catastrophe as caused by population growth and poor resource management by 
inhabitants inevitably constructs population growth as amoral and inhabitants as incompetent 
environmental stewards.  Authors argue that the content of “crisis narratives” is largely 
unquestioned, but has real implications for the region in terms of policies to mitigate population 
growth and remediate “dying landscapes.”  Examining the content of crisis narratives reveals 
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widely held beliefs about what is problematic as well as who is responsible which ultimately 
links to and legitimizes policy responses that seek to control events, people and places. 
The holism in the narrative approach effectively addresses what several writers 
(Alexander 2003; Benford 1997, 2002; Benford and Snow 2000; Béland 2009, Campbell 2002, 
Davis 2002; Del Rosso 2011; Hollander and Gordon 2006; Polletta 2002; Padamsee 2009; 
Steensland 2006 and Weinberg 2009) have called for – a need to capture social and ideational 
processes (Padamsee 2009) and contexts in which claimsmakers, claims, and claimsmaking 
strategies are embedded.  These and other researchers guide scholars to leverage the analytic 
utility of narratives to account for causal links and mechanisms between the subjective 
production of policy problems and the socio-cultural contexts that make them possible.   
Analyzing narratives in public policy has the potential for illuminating cultural influence 
in policymaking and also worldmaking.  Representations of setting, plots and characters are 
inherently normative in policy discussions.  Analysts can examine stories told in policymaking to 
comment on what is taken-for-granted and assumed to be True about what is right and wrong.  
Arguably, the affective and normative meanings that are attached to elements such as setting, 
characters, plots and resulting moral prescriptions illuminate widely held beliefs about what is 
understood as problematic and tragic; who is held responsible and worthy of benefits and/or 
burdens; and what should be done about it.  Embedded in plots and storylines are images of 
characters who act to advance interests within particular settings along with inherent moral 
evaluations.  Taken together, narrative analyses in public policy pave the way for the present 
study.  In what follows, I outline my approach for systematically observing the intersection of 
what is deemed problematic and real with symbolic representations in order to comment on the 
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taken-for-granted, widely held beliefs that hold policy stories together.  Highlighting beliefs 
embedded in policymaking can help us to understand their wider social influence more generally. 
Policy and Culture: Linking Representations and Reality 
  
Several observers have argued that interpretive studies of policy narratives fail to specify 
the mechanisms whereby culture works in shaping narratives of policy problems (Campbell 
2002; Jackson 2011; Jacobs and Sobieraj 2007; Padamsee 2009; Polletta et al. 2011; Shanahan, 
Jones and McBeth 2011; Steensland 2006; and Stryker and Wald 2009).   In particular, over 
emphasizing the influence of ideas or interests in policy narratives leaves questions about how 
cultural meaning systems and widely held beliefs (which incorporate both ideas and interests) 
work in policymaking.   In an attempt to bridge the gap between theoretical divides, I argue that 
by considering policy narratives as culturally informative, analysts can systematically investigate 
stories told about problematic events in policy arenas to grasp the underlying beliefs and 
assumptions that hold stories together.  In so doing, we can articulate some of the ways culture 
works in policymaking. 
There are several books and articles that document ways to conduct narrative analysis 
within public policy (Fischer 2003, Roe 1994, Stone 1997, Rideout 2013).  Of particular 
relevance to the present work is the work of Deborah Stone (1997).  With an emphasis on 
narrative structures (particularly settings, characters, plots, and morals), Stone (1997) establishes 
a framework for examining narratives in public policy. First, she shows how policy goals (values 
such as equity, efficiency, security, and liberty) do not conform to a simple and straightforward 
rule but are ambiguously defined.  Then, she delineates how policy issues and decisions are 
contingent as well and contends that there is no “universal technical language of problem 
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definition” (Stone 1997:134).  Rather, policy problems are represented as stories that specify 
interests, causes and decisions through literary devices and rhetorical strategies.    
Moreover, policy stories reflect the taken-for-granted ideas that constitute the cultural 
context in which they are told.  Inevitably, policy stories are vehicles for moral action – they are 
compelling and persuasive (Stone 1997, Fischer 2003) and often manifest in the distribution of 
benefits and burdens in society.  Thus from an analytical perspective, scholars are encouraged to 
focus on how policy narratives delineate taken-for-granted beliefs about policy problems in their 
explicit descriptions of context and setting, characters, plots, and moral prescriptions for redress 
of policy problems.  Scholars are encouraged to document cultural codes (Alexander and Smith 
1993) or “sacred values” and “world images” (Weber 1978) that can be understood as widely 
held normative beliefs about what is right or wrong, good or bad, beautiful or ugly, innocent or 
guilty.  These codes are illuminated in policy stories that are designed to persuade audience 
members to support political action.   
“Disastrous” Oil Spills as Cultural Objects 
“Disasters” are viewed as catalysts that initiate storytelling in policymaking arenas.  
Kingdon (1995) refers to such events as opening a “policy window” which can be understood as 
the opportunity to make right what has been deemed wrong.  That is, studies show that when 
events such as oil spills (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011) earthquakes (Stallings 1995), and 
hurricanes (Jones-DeWeever and Hartmann 2006, Tierney 2008) are constructed as large, 
damaging and deadly, people and policymakers are motivated to care about the problem (Button 
2010, Beamish 2002, Loseke 2003, Hajer 1995 and Roe 1994).  Accordingly, many students of 
disasters have explored narratives of disaster to understand what to do about them, how 
individuals and groups cope, or recover from them (Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2011, Tuohy and 
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Stephens 2012, Yaro, Jones and Todorovich and Roneros 2009).   Such work has been 
productive for understanding individual and group resilience to disasters and for revealing the 
consequences of constructing an event as disastrous only when it is large, visible and deadly.   
Yet, many scholars criticize the tendency to study disasters as isolated events to which 
individuals and groups respond, rather than examining the processes of constructing an event as 
a disaster and the implications (Tierney 2007, Erikson 1976, and Jones and Murphy 2009).  
Scholars argue that a single issue focus with attention to how people respond whether 
individually or politically obscures the vast social inequalities that contribute to the conditions 
that lead to disaster in the first place.  I follow these works that suggest focusing on disastrous 
events can be culturally informative.  In my view, understanding the influence of culture in 
policymaking and in social life more generally can shed light on the ways our taken-for-granted 
assumptions perpetuate and maintain social inequalities that are exacerbated when “disasters” 
happen.  
What is needed is to conceptualize disasters as “cultural objects” (Schudson 1989, 
Griswold 2013) that individuals and groups make sense of through processes of storytelling.  
Conceptualizing oil spills as cultural objects allows analysts to account not only for the 
subjective processes of sense making and representation, but also the ways in which 
representations become embedded in real social and institutional practices.  Stories about oil 
spills can tell us something about ourselves (Button 2010).  As Fischer (2003:167) argues, 
narrativism paves a path between “realism and constructionism.”  As a cultural object, an 
extreme, tragic event can be understood as both real and symbolic (Schudson 1989).  Indeed, 
Swidler (1986) argues, it is in moments of crisis that we can observe the influence of culture 
most vividly.  Tragic events or phenomenological shocks create what Swidler (1986) calls 
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“unsettled times” when the meaning of the world has changed and audience members seek 
understanding.  It is during times of crisis that members of the audience seek out explanations to 
get re-oriented (Loseke 2003).  Thus, I conceptualize oil spills as focusing events that initiate 
storytelling in policy arenas, and as cultural objects that tell us something about the taken-for-
granted. 
 Oil spills happen.  They are real events that create real harm and real destruction for 
individuals, groups, organizations, wildlife, and our natural and built environments.   And as 
many scholars have shown, oil spills provide a window to see the influence of material interests 
on policy making as well as taken for granted moral ideas about right and wrong (Button 2010, 
Molotch 1970, Gramling and Freudenberg 2012, Ladd 2012).  Some scholars explore oil spills as 
objective conditions in order to reveal the way they are linked with negative consequences across 
several dimensions including social disparities (Ritchie, Gill and Farnham 2013; Ritchie 2012; 
Arata, Picou, Johnson, and McNally 2000, Picou and Gill 1996; Dyer, Gill, and Picou 1992) 
individual mental health issues (Palinkas, Downs, Petterson and Russell 1993; Lee and 
Blanchard 2012; Sabucedo, Arce, Senra, Seone and Vazquez 2010; and  Osofsky, Osofsky, 
Wells and Weems 2014), community cohesion (Rodin, Downs, Petterson and Russell 1992) 
economic malaise (Fyke and Buzzanell 2013;  Suris-Reguerio, Garza-Gil, and Varela-Lafuente 
2007; Cohen, 1993), and environmental destruction (Omohundro 1982; Merchant 1990).   
These analyses often proceed from a critical perspective to show how oil spills result 
from willed human action and contribute to and exacerbate social inequalities and environmental 
injustices.  As such, studies regard the oil spill event as analytically useful in revealing the way 
powerful interests of capitalists, oil producers, and governments exploit natural resources that 
inevitably create harmful consequences for individuals, communities and environments.  For 
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example, Ritchie (2012) explores the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill to highlight the way disasters 
are linked with individual stress and collective trauma.  She finds that disasters create long term 
stress for individuals that lead to losses in social connections that weaken social bonds with 
others.  Arata et al (2000), on the other hand, explores individual responses to oil spills in order 
to document ways that individuals cope with oil spill disasters to identify psychological factors 
that are important to disaster recovery. 
 Other writers look at oil spill events to determine what caused the spill or disaster and 
who was deemed responsible (Thompson 2014; Reader and O’Connor 2014; Blanchard et al 
2014; Gramling and Freudenburg 1992; Furger and Brulle 1997). These studies have 
documented the ways that organizational incompetence, inadequate perceptions of risk, or 
failures to act lead to disasters such as oil spills and what can be done to mitigate or prevent them 
from happening in the future.  For example Thompson (2014) compares governmental responses 
to three different disasters (9/11 terrorist attacks, 2010 BP oil spill and the financial collapse of 
2008) to argue that individual actions and organizational structural defects are responsible for the 
failures of government or what he refers to as the “problem of many hands.”  With his study, he 
proposes a way for organizational process designers to structure complex tasks in such a way so 
as to tie disastrous failures to particular individual actions thereby providing for the assignment 
of individual blame.  Similarly Reader and O’Connor (2014) examine the commission report on 
the BP oil spill to identify particular behaviors that brought about the spill with a goal to 
eliminate missteps that lead to mishaps.   
 While studies of oil spills as objective conditions foreground the influence of material 
interests and power on policymaking, other studies highlight the subjective representations of oil 
spills to comment on the use of images, words and ideas that depict oil spills as problematic 
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conditions (Beamish 2000, Bernal 2011, Button 2010, Clayton, Koehn and Grover 2013, Daley 
and O’Neill 1991, Freudenberg and Gramling 2011, Ladd 2012, Molotch and Lester 1975, 
Morse 2012, Olien and Olien 2000, Sellnow 1993). These scholars interrogate the 
representations and meanings in oil spills to comment on social implications of subjective 
definitions and representations.   
For example, Morse (2012) explores representations of oil spills between 1967 and 1977 
in national newspapers and magazines to highlight the images used to represent the oil spill 
problem.  She argues that the visual narrative about oil in America shifted from stories of oil’s 
natural abundance and power to oil as evil and threatening to human life and natural 
environment.  In earlier representations, oil stories were accompanied by images of fires and 
explosions that she interpreted as conveying power and force.  In latter representations, she notes 
the consistent use of oil-soaked birds in narratives told which she interprets as a visible 
expression of oil-as-threat to human and natural life.   
Similarly Ladd (2012:105) argues that disasters such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
represents a Pandora’s Box morality tale that reveals the ills of corporate power and our shared 
dependence on fossil fuels. And others examine the construction of oil spills to argue that 
hyperbolic focus on visible spills reflects widely shared unease or what Button (2010) refers to 
as the “culture of uncertainty” or ignorance as the work of Beamish (2002) suggests.  In contrast 
with studies that construct oil spills as symbolic of corporate power and oil dependence, the work 
of historians Olien and Olien (2000) situates the oil industry as unfairly represented in media 
constructions.  They argue that the persistent muckraking of oil producers has instantiated the 
ideology that oil companies are the ultimate villain in energy policy and debates.    
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Interestingly, studies of oil spills from both orientations (objective and subjective) arrive 
at similar conclusions.  They tend to highlight what Sassatelli (2007) refers to as the “power of 
the producer” or the power of the powerful over the weakness of the weak.   While it is important 
to call attention to the processes that support and instantiate powerful interests especially when 
trying to grapple with persistent social inequalities, there remain questions about the preamble 
that must be made visible if we are to understand why the oil spill story in particular, or the 
disaster story in general seems to dominate the policymaking arena.  From the first major 
offshore oil spill in America (Santa Barbara oil spill 1969 to the most recent offshore disaster 
(Deepwater Horizon oil spill 2010), it is de ja vu all over again (Ladd 2012).    
Oil spill studies that tend to emphasize the hegemonic tale of how dominant interests run 
amok obscures the ways that producers and consumers, problems and practices are embedded in 
complex socio-cultural environments.  I take inspiration from previous studies to pursue an 
investigation that situates the oil spill as a triggering event or cultural object that is made sense of 
in policy narratives to illuminate what is taken-for-granted in objective and subjective 
explanations.  My analytical interest is not in oil spills as objectively real events or oil spills as 
symbolic representations of power and inequality, but in the way stories told about oil spills say 
something about our cultural, widely held beliefs that underlie our social organization.  
With my work, I shift the analytic emphasis from oil spill constructions and how they are 
linked with power and inequality to oil spill stories and how they reveal taken-for-granted 
assumptions about what and/or who is valuable and important; what and who should be 
protected; what and who should be held accountable in the wake of calamity.  By documenting 
widely held beliefs, we can gain insight into the conditions that permit or support the practices 
that lead to environmental catastrophes that become subject to policymaking with implications 
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for the wider social world.  A more nuanced analysis of policy narratives about oil spills moves 
knowledge about oil spills from the familiar tale of them against us, to highlighting the ways we 
all may be complicit in the problem.  
In summary, oil spills are regarded as analytically useful in exploring power dynamics in 
policymaking.  The focus has been on oil spills as evidence of problems in governmental 
intervention, impacts on individuals (psychological impacts, social impacts).  The tendency has 
been to see oil spills as evidence of powerful individuals exploiting the less powerful.  Scholars 
document the particular behaviors and actions of governments, industry actors, media and 
activists for how facts are obscured to maintain the power of producers.  Most of all, analysts see 
oil spill as catalyst, a problem that causes individual, social and environmental impacts and that 
they are reflective of the obdurate, unyielding power structure.   
Informed by work in disaster literatures, I conceptualize oil spills as stories that are by 
and large considered triggering events that cause, perpetuate and/or exacerbate social inequalities 
(Clarke 2006, Steinberg 2006, Tierney, Bevc and Kuligowski 2006, Tierney 2007).  But my 
emphasis is to regard oil spills and stories about them as cultural artifacts that can shed light on 
widely held beliefs, taken-for-granted assumptions that perpetuate social stratification practices 
and processes; widely held beliefs that are shared not only by corporations, scientists, media, 
activists and governments, but by the lay public.  You and me.  In short, this is the goal of my 
dissertation -- to systematically observe and document the way policy stories told about oil spills 
can elucidate what is taken-for-granted.  In the end, I show, that it is the taken-for-granted 
assumptions evident in policymaking narratives about oil spills that contribute to persistent social 
and natural inequalities writ large.  In this way, we can see how representations are linked with 
reality and offer an empirically-grounded account of the power of widely held beliefs. 
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Conclusion 
In the beginning of this chapter, I sought to lay the foundation for using narrative analysis 
to explore the cultural influence on policymaking.  I begin with a summary of literature that 
supports examining the social constructions of policy problems in general.  Many decades of 
scholarship endorse the rationale for observing linguistic constructions in sense making about 
problematic events in many domains including policymaking. Then, I turn my focus to the 
analytical potential for policy narrative constructions in particular for the way they illuminate the 
influence of contexts, characters, plots, and morals on the definitions and descriptions of 
problematic events that trigger policymaking processes.  In the end, I highlight the prospects for 
examining narratives about a particular type of event – the oil spill – for how stories can reveal 
the cultural influence of widely held beliefs on policymaking.    
The understanding of policymaking processes has been advanced by a focus on policy 
problems as objective conditions as well as subjective definitions.  Yet, studies, from seemingly 
divergent theoretical and methodological camps, tend to highlight the influence of powerful 
interests or the power of the producer in policymaking neglecting the way ideas and interests are 
linked by widely held cultural beliefs about the way the world should work.  The time has come 
for scholarship to move beyond emphasis on either interests or ideas to both interests and ideas.  
In my view, recent calls for bridging the gap between realist and idealist conceptions of social 
problems and their policy interventions is made possible by examining policy narratives about 
real events such as oil spills.  Such conceptualization contributes insight about how cultural 
contexts influence the stories that can and cannot be told about oil spills.  Conceptualizing oil 
spills as culturally informative leads to investigating how they are rendered meaningful in policy 
narratives.  We can observe not only how audience members are persuaded to think about 
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problems and the people affected by them, but how we are encouraged to feel.  Accordingly, we 
can observe the consequences of stories in that they designate what is plausible as well as what is 
possible in terms of policymaking and by extension world making (Griswold 2013).   
By placing analytic emphasis on oil spills as culturally informative triggering events, 
analysts can detail the ways stories about the event can reveal the interdependent linkages 
between subjective ideas and material interests and contribute explanation about the durability or 
persistence of cultural beliefs as they relate to policymaking in general, oil extraction and 
consumption practices in particular.  Documenting the ways policy narratives delineate social 
contexts/settings, characters, plotlines and implicit moral evaluations allows analysts to 
illuminate the ways normative and affective meanings work as cultural mechanisms that 
influence what is deemed problematic in society.  In sum, the flexibility that a narrative analysis 
provides is accounting not only for the subjective processes of representation, but material 
consequences embedded in the “real” social world.  In the next chapter, I detail my 
methodological approach for examining policy narratives about oil spills.   
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 
So far I have established the mandate for investigating culture in policymaking and have 
laid the theoretical foundation for how to accomplish this with narrative analysis.  This chapter 
focuses on the particular methods and data I used to conduct this study.  First I will briefly 
summarize the methodological concerns regarding the use of narratives in interpretive studies.  
Then I will respond to these concerns by specifying how I used narrative analysis to illuminate 
cultural influences in policymaking – a method informed by what can be called a narrative 
comparative approach (Abell 1987, 1984, 2001).  I depart from Abell’s focus on comparing 
narratives to explain action, however, and argue in support of narratives as providing evidence of 
shared beliefs and values.  First, I justify the selection of particular oil spills as cultural objects 
that are storied in policy narratives and then detail the particular stories about oil spills contained 
in oral testimony in United States Senate congressional hearings.  Finally, I will outline my 
inductive analytical approach that enabled me to observe and document taken-for-granted 
assumptions that underlie policy narratives about oil spills.   
Interpreting Policy Narratives 
While gaining increasing attention among policy analysts, interpretive methods for 
analyzing cultural influences within policy narratives are not well articulated (Atkinson and 
Delamont 2006, Sabatier 2000, Jones and McBeth 2010).  Notable exceptions are found in 
Quinn’s (2005) edited collection of methods that delineate ways for observing culture in 
narratives.  Techniques outlined in this collection include analyzing metaphors, key words 
(Quinn 2005), actions of characters and plots (Mathews 2005), and attending to “gaps, clashes, 
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and silences” within narratives (Hill 2005).  Additionally, Loseke’s (2012) work specifies ways 
for documenting the social context, explicit references to characters, symbolic codes and moral 
evaluations.   
Likewise, Smith (2005) and Abell (2009) lead scholars to employ comparative analysis 
that bridges realist and idealist approaches by looking for what can be regarded as social “laws” 
or causal mechanisms that can be observed with the interpretation of texts about similar cases 
across time.  As Abell (2009:47) argues, narrative analyses of a small number of cases can be 
simplified “by collapsing their detail” according to narrative structures.  To get at causal 
explanation or theoretical generalizations, analysts can ask: “Is there a common story (net of 
inessential detail) to be found in two or more narratives?” (Abell 2009:47).   
By guiding analysts to perform close and multiple readings, to document explicit context 
and character references, and to identify symbolic cultural codes, scholars point to a systematic, 
comparative and inductive approach for narrative analysis in policy studies.  Together these 
works speak to the need to foster precision that Atkinson and Delamont (2006) have argued is 
lacking in qualitative analyses of narratives.  My unique contribution to sociological 
methodology is to use an interpretive, comparative narrative analysis to illuminate normative, 
taken-for-granted assumptions in policy stories that also can shed light on their causal influence 
in social life more generally. In what follows, I discuss how I drew upon techniques in narrative 
analysis to systematically analyze policy narratives to see “culture” or  “the covert underlying 
presuppositions that organize the worlds in which speakers live” (Hill 2005:157).   
Narrative analyses in public policy have been critiqued for their lack of rigor and 
systematic empirical study (Atkinson and Delamont 2006, Jones and McBeth 2010, Sabatier 
2000).  As Jones and McBeth (2006:330-1) note: 
 45
[N]arrative remains a mysterious and elusive concept in policy theory, too associated 
with literary theory, too superfluous to underpin theory building and too nebulous to 
facilitate the empirical investigation of policy processes and outcomes. 
 
Atkinson and Delamont (2006) also imply that narrative analyses in social science lack precision 
and often fail to acknowledge the particular cultural, institutional and social contexts in which 
stories are told.   Finally, narrative studies are criticized for their lack of scope and 
generalizability due to the perceived “small N” limitations in social research (Abell 2009).  That 
is, a small number of cases or stories are viewed as providing exploratory rather than explanatory 
or causal evidence (Lieberson 1991).  I respond to these concerns by specifying an interpretive 
approach to narrative analysis in public policy that is systematic and rigorous, attentive to 
context, and is able to arrive at “big conclusions” regarding the causal influence of culture or 
widely held beliefs on social processes (Lieberson 1991).    
In short, my challenge was to specify how narrative analysis can illustrate the links 
between stories and cultural beliefs.  To accomplish the call for rigor, I began by selecting 
culturally significant events (oil spills) that are storied in public policy as my data for analysis 
using a systematic approach.  To attend to the importance of context, I focused on particular 
stories about oil spills – oral testimony in United States Senate Congressional hearings.  And to 
address the perceived limitations of qualitative, inductive analyses for arriving at “big 
conclusions,” I incorporated comparative research techniques (Smith 2005, Abell 2009, Weber 
1978).  I proceeded on the assumption that a small N of policy narratives can be closely read to 
capture “thick descriptions” (Geertz 1973) of oil spill events as storied in congressional hearings 
to illuminate the links between interests and ideas.   
I will now discuss the practical steps that I followed to accomplish the task of isolating 
my data for analysis.  First I outline how I selected my topic of study – oil spills.  Then I talk 
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about how I defined the sampling frame from which I selected particular stories for analysis – 
oral testimony in U.S. Senate Congressional Hearings.  Finally, I specify how I arrived at the 
particular oil spill hearings that constitute my narrative data.  After I established my topic, site of 
research and data, I detail my analytical approach.  In brief, I pursued a three-pronged strategy: 
1) Narrative analysis of each spill; 2) comparisons; and 3) examining links between 
representations and “realities.” 
Research Topic: Oil Spills as Cultural Objects 
Because I wanted to explore the role of culture in policymaking, I followed Swidler’s 
(1986) argument that culture is most visible when something goes wrong. According to Swidler, 
“unsettled times” are when something happens in the world that compels actors to re-orient 
themselves to the world.  I conceptualized unsettled times to be akin to the Schutzian idea of 
“shock to the lifeworld” that compels actors to make sense of anomalies in everyday life.   As I 
previously discussed in chapter two, within studies of public policy, shocks or unsettled times are 
conceptualized as “focusing events,” (Kingdon 1995), “triggering events,” (Birkland 1998), or 
“exogenous shocks” (Sabatier 1998)  that are defined as “sudden, attention-grabbing events” that 
trigger policy discussions and have the potential to bring about policy change (Kingdon 1995, 
Birkland 1998:53, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Events such as natural or man-made 
disasters, financial crises, planes flying into sky scrapers are all examples of focusing events.   
From a policy studies perspective, focusing events are often explored to understand 
policymaking processes to document the influence of individual behavior, social structures and 
institutional practices, social norms and ideas, and discourses (Schmidt 2010).  From a narrative 
perspective, focusing events can be understood as a canonical breach that requires explanation 
and sense making (Bruner 1991).  From a cultural sociological perspective focusing events can 
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be understood as cultural objects that are analytically useful for exploring links between culture 
and society (Griswold 2013).  
 To determine what objects would be the focus of my study, I referred to Weber’s 
(1978:23) concept of “ideal type.” Weber advised sociologists to be systematic in the selection of 
phenomena to provide “conceptual clarity” that enables the analyst to offer approximate 
explanations of said phenomenon.  So, my selection of an historical phenomenon had to be 
something that was culturally significant.   At the time I was developing my dissertation 
proposal, the BP Oil Spill had just happened.  Following Weber (1978), oil spills are historical 
phenomena.  Oil spills have occurred since actors in society coordinated their action to discover, 
extract, produce, and distribute the resource for energy production across the globe.  Weber’s 
(1978:23) work supports the notion that oil spills are “rational” concepts in that they can be 
considered “concrete realities” that are of importance to historians and sociologists alike.  Oil 
spills are phenomena that I can “carve out of social life” to approximate their “internal 
coherence.”  So, I centered on oil spills as my cultural object and then proceeded systematically 
to select the particular research site in which meaning making about oil spills was observable. 
Research Site: Congressional Hearings as Sense Making Venues 
As my interest is in policymaking as a social process of sense making, I turned my 
attention to congressional hearings as the site in which actors attempt to explain the causes and 
consequences of oil spill events.  Policy scholars agree that congressional hearings are important 
arenas for shaping knowledge about focusing events (Birkland 1998, Burstein and Hirsch 2007, 
Burstein and Bricher 1997, Diermeier and Feddersen 2000).  As Birkland (1998:59) argues “The 
Congress is a good institutional venue to study as its activities are consistently well documented 
and because at least some of its hundreds of members, motivated by desires to make good policy 
 48
or by constituency pressure, are likely to react to focusing events.”  Hearings are also a 
productive research site for investigating cultural influence on policymaking as it is in 
congressional hearings that policy issues and events are imbued with shared cultural significance 
as the works of many scholars make clear (Birkland 2006, Burstein 1991, Chock 1991, Chomsky 
1999[1988], Del Sesto 1980, Fisher, Leifeld and Iwaki 2013, Fischer and Forester 1993, Gamson 
and Lasch 1983, Gamson and Modigliani 1987, Guetzkow 2010, Jones and Baumgartner 2004, 
Oleszek 1989, Naples 1997, Sandel 2013, Sims and Brinkmann 2003).   
Oleszek (1989) points out that hearings are considered preliminary to the legislative 
process.  They are “fact-finding” instruments:  
Witnesses from the executive branch, concerned members of Congress, interest group 
spokesmen, academic experts, and knowledgeable citizens appear before the committee 
to give their opinions as to the merits or pitfalls of a given piece of legislation (Oleszek 
1989:97). 
 
According to Oleszek, hearings are rule bound sites in that witnesses are expected to 
provide written texts of their oral testimony prior to the hearing so that committee members have 
an opportunity to review what will be discussed and can prepare questions.  Legislators question 
witnesses according to seniority.  There are also time constraints that can limit the dialogue 
between witnesses and elected officials.  However, committees have some latitude to make 
adjustments to the protocols and can structure hearings to provide a forum for diverse views on 
issues or events under investigation.   
Given that congressional hearings are situated within the institutional context of the 
legislature, it is not surprising that scholars have isolated them for rhetorical, constructionist and 
narrative analysis.  Decades ago, Gamson and Lasch (1983) suggested that policymaking 
occurred “in a particular symbolic environment or culture.”  They sought to explore the cultural 
influence of policymaking by analyzing “symbolic devices” in congressional rhetoric about 
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social welfare.   Similarly, Naples (1997) analyzed congressional hearing testimony on welfare 
reform and argued that political support for reform was influenced by a shared cultural 
understanding about the ills of government “dependency.”   Other researchers note the 
evidentiary value in congressional hearing testimony for how testimony constructs cultural 
aspects such as “ideological networks” (Fisher, Leifeld and Iwaki 2013), “ideological 
assumptions” (Fischer and Forester 1993), and “moral reasoning” (Sandel 2013). 
As Del Sesto’s (1980) work suggests, congressional hearings are akin to “political 
stages” in which issues are represented in accordance with what is resonant or acceptable by the 
wider voting public.  That hearing testimony must resonate with audience members suggests that 
it (testimony) can be analyzed for widely shared meanings and belief systems, or what Alexander 
and Smith (1993) refer to as cultural or symbolic codes.  Congressional testimony is replete with 
rhetorical devices that are used to make sense of phenomenal events such as oil spills.  
Therefore, I focused my analysis of culture in policymaking by specifying congressional 
hearings as my research site. 
It also is important to specify and justify which particular oil spill hearings I explored.  
First, there are several types of congressional hearings: legislative, oversight, confirmation and 
investigative (ProQuest Library Guide).  Legislative hearings focus attention on legislative 
proposals; they evaluate a proposed bill and report back to the House or Senate for consideration. 
Oversight hearings concern the implementation of legislation and include appropriation hearings 
that provide detailed analyses regarding the Federal Government budget allocations.  
Confirmation hearings are specific to the Senate and focus on the assessment of individuals who 
have been nominated by the President for government service.   Of particular relevance to my 
work are investigative hearings which are held to investigate events and cover issues in which 
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public officials, and/or private individuals are accused of wrongdoing which may eventuate in 
legislative acts, and/or fines and penalties.   
Second, there are published and non-published hearings.  Published hearings are 
considered the “official record” of committee hearings proceedings.  Because the law does not 
require that hearings be published, some hearings are not available for public review.  The 
decision to publish a hearing is up to the particular committee or subcommittee.  Third, the rules 
and procedures that shape the conduct of hearings differ according to the chamber in which 
hearings are held: House vs. Senate.  Congressional scholar Oleszek (1989:24) points out the 
major differences between the chambers according to size, terms in office, procedural restraints, 
constituency, media coverage, power, prestige and partisanship.  For example, the Senate is 
smaller than the House.  Senators serve longer terms in office; have fewer procedural restraints 
and a broader constituency.  The Senate is less partisan than the House, is more prestigious and 
receives more media attention.  In Senate hearings, members have more freedom to express 
themselves compared to House hearings.   
Considering the variability in the ways that Senate hearings are conducted, there are 
potential limitations with respect to the data that I analyzed for my project.  Nevertheless, my 
project was not an investigation of how Congress conducts hearings, but on how dialogue within 
hearings can illuminate taken-for-granted assumptions about our social world.  As Oleszek 
(1989) asserts, hearings (limitations notwithstanding) are an important part of policymaking. 
“They [hearings] provide a permanent public record of the position of committee members and 
the various interested groups on a legislative proposal” (1989:99). 
With the support of abovementioned scholars, I considered congressional hearings to be a 
productive research site to see the dynamic interaction between interests and ideas in that 
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witnesses who are invited to hearings provide testimony that is influenced by particular interests 
(political, industrial, environmental, academic, lay individual, etc.).  Further, the testimony itself 
is constituted of symbolic ideas that I explored as representations of interests.    My next 
challenge was to specify the particular oil spill hearings and testimony that would constitute my 
data. 
Sampling Frame: Congressional Hearings about Oil Spills 
Because my research is inductive and qualitative, I had to isolate particular stories about 
particular spills.  First I proceeded systematically to identify particular oil spill events that were 
culturally significant.  Accordingly, I followed scholars such as Birkland (1998), Jones and 
Baumgartner (2004), Johnson et al. (2010), King et al. (2007) and Pettinicchio (2013) who 
suggest that congressional attention to the issue indicates its importance.  That is, the quantity or 
number of congressional hearings about a particular issue or event is indicative of its importance 
or significance not only to Congress, but to the public as well.  
To determine which oil spills garnered the most congressional attention, I began with a 
key word search of the ProQuest congressional database on the topic of “oil spills” to create my 
sampling frame.  This search yielded a total of 491 Senate and House hearings that occurred 
between February 15, 1922 and September 3, 2012.  I entered each hearing into an excel 
spreadsheet and captured the title of the hearing, the type of document (whether published, or 
unpublished), the date, the number of pages, and the summary of what was discussed in the 
hearing.   All hearings totaled approximately 200,000 pages which included oral testimony, 
written statements, supporting documents, articles, letters, etc.    
There are different views about the amount of data to analyze from a narrative 
perspective.  Van Eeten (2006) points out that reliance on specific policy narratives can limit the 
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generalizability of conclusions, but also suggests that this can be addressed by aggregating texts 
to provide a larger sample of views to be interpreted.  He further argues that highly aggregated 
texts make close readings difficult leading to somewhat thin analyses.  The requirement that 
interpretive questions centering on meaning require a thick description meant that I needed to 
drastically reduce these data to enable close readings (particular policy narratives) that could also 
provide for generalizability of conclusions (aggregated across time).   
I began by removing unpublished hearings because I wanted to analyze hearings that 
were considered the “official record” – published hearings that were made available for public 
review (Sevetson 2005).  Further, I eliminated hearings that were focused on appropriations or 
budgetary matters because as Birkland (1998:59) points out, “[Appropriation hearings] tend to 
cover routine budget matters and [we] hear from a very limited range of witnesses compared 
with other…hearings.”  After appropriation hearings were removed, 378 remained.    
With my frame narrowed to 378 hearings about oil spills, I then proceeded to isolate 
particular oil spill events to analyze as culturally informative phenomena.  To accomplish this, I 
aggregated hearings by year in my excel spreadsheet and noted spikes in hearing activity that 
corresponded with particular named oil spills: Santa Barbara Oil Spill 1969, Campeche Oil Spill 
1989, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill 1989, and Deepwater Horizon or BP Oil Spill 2010.  (See Figure 
1).   
It is important to note that while my sampling frame emerged from a key word search of 
“oil spills” not all hearings were specific to oil spills as focusing events.  For example, many 
hearings were legislative evaluations of bills proposed to control or prevent water pollution due 
to vessel traffic in navigable waters.  Furthermore, not all hearings that constituted the spikes in 
hearing activity are event-specific.  While many hearings that occurred between 1969 and 1970 
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discussed the Santa Barbara oil spill, there were some hearings focused on miscellaneous issues 
within oceanography, or the nation’s estuaries and port and harbor safety.  That said, I regarded 
the spikes in hearing activity about “oil spills” which also included hearings about oil-spill-
related issues to be a strong proxy for issue importance, or event focus. 
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Figure 1: Number of published, non-appropriations hearings about oil spills by year. 
 
Because I wanted to explore stories about oil spill events within the United States, 
cultural context, I eliminated the Campeche oil spill event (as it technically occurred in the 
Mexican jurisdiction of the Gulf of Mexico). Further, while there were several Senate and House 
hearings for each oil spill event, I decided to limit my selection to Senate hearings given the 
Senate’s broader representation, prestige, visibility, and freedom of expression (Oleszek 1989).   
Congressional scholar Oleszek (1989) summarizes key similarities and differences 
between the chambers of the legislative branch.  He points out that both chambers have equal 
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power and responsibility.  But that key differences include size (House is much larger than then 
Senate in membership), constituencies (senators have broader representation) and length of terms 
in office (House members serve shorter terms).  Oleszek suggests that these key differences 
impose constraints and opportunities on members.  Because of the larger size of the House, 
members are more constrained by procedural rules whereas senators have more freedom to 
express themselves as individuals.  Therefore, I elected to focus on Senate hearings based on 
theoretical assumptions of greater freedom of expression and political prestige. 
With so many potential hearings to choose from, I decided to apply a rule that would 
systematize my selection of particular hearings.  Following theoretical notions about narrative 
accrual that suggest that narrative explanations build on each other over time, I reasoned that the 
first hearing to investigate each event sets the stage for subsequent explanations (Bruner 1991). 
However, considering Weber’s (1978) caution about artificially bracketing aspects of social life, 
I acknowledge the all events have potentially, multiple narrative antecedents and getting the 
“first story” about a particular spill is perhaps, impossible.   
Notwithstanding potential limitations, I selected the first Senate hearing (by date) that 
specified as its purpose to investigate a particular oil spill event.  (See Table 1).  By narrowing 
my scope, I arrived at a total of 403 pages of oral testimony: Santa Barbara 1969 (206 pages), 
Exxon Valdez 1989 (92 pages) and Deepwater Horizon 2010 (105 pages).  Taking stories of 
similar events together and aggregating across time enabled me to observe as Bruner explains 
“culture,” “history,” “tradition,” or what I specify as widely held and shared beliefs about the 
world.  
It is important to mention that the Santa Barbara 1969 hearing differs from the others in 
that it is not referenced in the title of the hearing in table 1.  The Santa Barbara oil spill became 
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the focus of a legislative hearing already scheduled to evaluate bills to amend the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act.   The spill happened on January 28, 1969 and was still spilling when 
“Water Pollution – 1969 part 1” was held five days later on February 3.  A review of that hearing 
transcript shows that testimony focused on the merits and feasibility of bills S. 544 and S. 7.  
Only brief remarks by a few witnesses reference the Santa Barbara oil spill in progress at the 
time.  In contrast, the hearing titled “Water Pollution – 1969 part 2” that occurred on February 5, 
legislative evaluations were preempted to focus on “the oil spill off Santa Barbara, California 
coast.”  Kingdon (1995) might argue that the Santa Barbara oil spill was a focusing event that 
opened a policymaking “window.”   In other words, investigating the oil spill shifted the 
policymaking agenda from evaluating water pollution-related bills to explaining the oil spill 
event. 
Table 1 – Description of Hearings for Three Spills: Santa Barbara 1969; Exxon Valdez 
1989; and Deepwater Horizon 2010 
 
Title Document 
Type 
Date Committee Summary 
Water 
Pollution 
-- 1969. 
Part 2 
Hearings 
Published 
2/5/1969 Subcommittee 
on Air and 
Water 
Pollution and 
Committee on 
Public Works 
– Senate 
Focuses on oil spill off Santa Barbara, Calif, 
coast, effects of acid mine drainage pollution, and 
vessel sewage discharge sanitation devices 
standards. 
Exxon 
Oil Spill, 
Part 1 
Hearings 
Published 
4/6/1989 Committee on 
Commerce, 
Science, and 
Transportation 
– Senate 
Hearing to review the circumstances surrounding 
the Mar. 24, 1989 oil spill in Prince William 
Sound, Alaska, from the tanker Exxon Valdez, 
and to evaluate Federal and private cleanup 
efforts and responsibilities. 
Massive 
Oil Spill 
in the 
Gulf of 
Mexico 
Hearings 
Published 
5/11/2010 Committee on 
Energy and 
Natural 
Resources – 
Senate 
Hearing to investigate circumstances surrounding 
Apr. 20, 2010, explosion on and subsequent 
sinking of Deepwater Horizon mobile offshore 
drilling rig, and to examine oil and drilling 
companies’ response to Deepwater Horizon 
explosion and subsequent oil spill. 
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In summary, I systematically identified particular oil spill events as culturally significant 
through a careful process of elimination: Santa Barbara oil spill 1969, Exxon oil spill 1989 and 
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 2010.  I specified the institutional context of congressional 
hearings as my research site.  I narrowed my sampling frame to include only “official records” of 
events.  Finally, I used chronological ordering to determine which particular hearing to submit to 
inductive narrative analysis and my rule was to examine the first Senate hearing to investigate 
each spill. 
Narrative Analysis of Oil Spill Hearings 
Primarily, I relied on Charmaz (2006), Harrison and Cohen-Vogel (2012), Loseke (2012), 
Smith (2005) and Stone (1997) whose work informed my inductive analytic techniques. In short, 
I pursued a three pronged strategy: 1) narrative analysis of oil spill hearings, 2) comparison of 
stories within and between hearings and 3) examining links between representations and 
“realities.”  
After selecting the transcripts to analyze, I followed scholars like Charmaz (2006), 
Brummett (2010) and Loseke (2012), and performed “close readings” to get the gist of the stories 
about oil spills. Brummett (2010:7) defines close reading as “an attempt to understand shared 
meanings that are supported by words, images, objects, actions and messages.”  Following 
Charmaz (2006), I first read the transcripts multiple times in order to grasp the overall structure 
of the text.  For example, each hearing begins with an opening statement by the chairman of the 
committee followed by other opening statements.  Then the chairman asks invited witnesses to 
provide testimony.  In general, questions and answers follow testimony of witnesses.   
Then, I made notes as to the type of stories told within the hearings and who told them.  
They are about particular events such as the unanticipated explosion of an oil platform, an 
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unfortunate crash of an oil tanker, and a devastating blow out of an oil well that resulted in the 
death of several workers.  In my data, I explored the way these events were explained and I 
considered not only the symbolic representations (metaphoric comparisons to the Titanic or 
Hiroshima), but also the speaker (legislator, industry representative, academic expert) who was 
offering the explanations.   I highlighted the various types of speakers in each case including 
political figures, affected individuals, industry representatives, experts and environmental 
advocates and documented the rhetorical devices used to construct the oil spill problem.  
Fundamentally, I sought to answer my first set of research questions:  Who constructs policy 
stories about oil spills?  What special interests do they represent? 
Following my initial close readings, I followed Loseke’s (2012) approach and 
categorized my data according to narrative elements and asked questions like: What is the 
context/setting of the oil spill event?  What is the overall plot? Who are the major characters?  
What is the moral?  Who might evaluate this story as believable and important and why?    I read 
through testimony multiple times and jotted notes down in the hearing text and in field notes to 
answer general questions about how congressional testimony constructed oil spill events as 
problematic and in need of intervention.  In short, I sought to answer my second set of research 
questions: How do storytellers define policy problems, causes and solutions in policy narratives? 
Establishing Context and Setting 
For each event, I summarized background information about the oil spill and the 
institutional context in which stories are told.  I detailed who the speakers are, and what interests 
they represent.  Then, I read and re-read my data and categorized paragraph-by-paragraph 
specific descriptions of the oil spill event.  To establish the setting of the spill, I explored 
testimony for how it constructed the time and place in which the event occurred.  For example, if 
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a speaker’s testimony described the particular time and place in which the oil spill occurred 
and/or the historical moment or social context, I categorized the comment as an explicit 
description of setting.  Further, I considered testimony that described the particular place in 
which the oil spill occurred (Santa Barbara Channel, Prince William Sound) as explicit 
constructions of setting. 
Establishing Plot and Characters or “Causal Stories” 
After establishing setting, I considered the overall plot of the story and how the oil spill 
problem was defined and the policy proposals that are offered as prescriptions.  In this pass 
through my data, I highlighted the way political actors use cultural ideas to advance interests.  Of 
the text I asked, what type of problem is being described?  How big is the problem?  Who or 
what caused the problem?  Who or what was harmed by the problem?  And What should be 
done?  In accordance with Stone’s (1997) framework, I categorized explanations and 
descriptions of the event to document plotlines or “causal stories.”   
I applied Stone’s framework to organize the causal stories advanced by diverse and 
contesting speakers.  In my reporting, I selected quotes from multiple voices within the hearing 
that best illustrated the causal stories that emerged from the data and attempted to capture all of 
the stories constructed by diverse speakers for each case.  If a speaker’s testimony described 
particular people or characters involved, I categorized the comments as explicit descriptions of 
characters. My characters category is also where I placed statements that make references to 
specific individuals (such as political officials and industry representatives) as well as dis-
embodied types of individuals (such as technologists, lawyers, experts, and laypersons).  I paid 
close attention to how characters were described and noted the symbolic representations of 
victims (those deemed harmed by the event) and villains (those deemed responsible).   
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Finally, I read my data for how it answers the question: what should be done to fix or 
respond to the oil spill problem?  I categorized explicit statements that prescribe next steps and 
what should be done, actions that should be taken, people, organizations that should be held 
responsible.  Like analysts, Harrison and Cohen-Vogel (2012), I organize stories by storytellers 
(senators, industry representatives, environmental advocates, experts, etc.) to highlight the ways 
in which ideas and interests are linked in policy narratives.  
It is important to note the referencing protocol that I used to represent my data for each 
case.  In the Santa Barbara 1969 and Exxon Valdez 1989 cases, I refer to quotes by page number 
as each of these hearings was paginated in one continuous report.  However the Deepwater 
Horizon 2010 case was presented in two panels and were not paginated continuously.  Therefore, 
I use the protocol: (page number, panel a or b) to indicate the source of the quote. 
Comparison of Stories Within and Between Oil Spill Events 
 
After analyzing congressional testimony for how political actors construct stories about 
oil spills, I sought to address my research questions about taken-for-granted assumptions in 
stories told.  Following constructions of causal stories, I moved from documenting within each 
event to comparing descriptions between events in order to note underlying assumptions that 
hold stories together.  As has already been argued, comparative research is extolled for its power 
to provide validity in interpretive studies of social phenomenon (Weber 1978, Peterson 2005.)  
Further, scholars have argued that in order to understand the influence of culture on 
policymaking processes, analysts should examine and compare cases across time or place (Gupta 
2012, Padamsee 2009, Sabatier 1991, Jones and McBeth 2010, Fourcade 2011).   
According to Vaughan (2004, 2008) analogical comparisons between diverse stories 
across time enables analysts to construct theoretical explanations of social phenomena.  
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Specifically, she argues that analogical theorizing provides for the development of “theoretical 
explanations by cross case analysis that compares similar phenomena in different social forms 
that vary in size, complexity, and function” (Vaughan 2008:66).  Critically, comparisons allow 
analysts to observe not only similarities and differences between particular inputs and outputs, 
but also to grasp the influence of widely held beliefs and ideas on the wider social order as the 
works of Padamsee (2009), Griswold (2013) and Smith (2005) suggests.  Further, comparative 
research is also a way to build a bridge between methodological poles (Smith 2005, Mahoney 
2004).  It is systematic and analytically useful for observing social patterns as Fourcade (2011) 
argues.  Additionally, Smith (2005) asserts comparative research offers an approach that 
“engages with interpretation but does so in a way that is consistent with norms of what we might 
think of as hypothesis testing.”  Indeed, Mahoney (2004) states that comparative-historical 
methods offer tools to detect causal and descriptive inferences that are compatible with statistical 
research.  And Hodge (2006:273) argues that “comparison allows for the generation of many 
accounts seeking to explain policy development.”   
Summarily, generalizations produced from comparative analysis can reveal 
“conventional wisdoms” or widely accepted beliefs about the world (Hodge 2006).  Therefore, 
not only did I analyze within each oil spill hearing for how testimony made sense of the event, 
but I compared the rhetorical strategies used between cases.  For example, within each oil spill 
hearing there are different types of causal stories offered to explain the event.  State politicians 
from California construct a story that holds the Federal Government and the oil industry as 
greedy profiteers responsible for the oil spill while oil industry representatives construct a story 
that places blame on geological instability and a lack of knowledge about technologies.  Both 
stories contain symbolic representations constructed in normative terms.   
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Other normative representations are visible in constructions of settings, and characters.  I 
observed statements between events that describe the setting of the story as “beautiful” or 
“pristine,” as positive valuations of setting that were used to justify prescriptions to protect or 
mitigate the perceived damages constructed in testimony.    I also observed similar constructions 
of victims (wildlife, fishermen, residents, tourists) and villains (greedy oilmen, careless 
government).  Observing similarities in symbolic representations of settings, plots, characters 
and morals enabled me to make claims about the types of places that we should care about, the 
types of problems that we should care about and attend to as well as the prescriptions or types of 
actions that should be pursued to prevent oil spills from happening in the future, and/or to 
mitigate the damages incurred. 
While each spill was narrated in a particular place and time, by unique and powerful 
actors, the ideas, symbols and images that were used had to resonate with audiences in order to 
be deemed credible especially given the institutional context of congressional hearing which 
assumes stories are factual accounts (Stone 1997).  By considering oil spill stories together for 
how actors in different places and times construct the settings, plots, characters and normative 
ideas of right and wrong (or morals) about a similar, culturally significant phenomenal event – 
oil spill, I was able to observe taken-for-granted assumptions that constitute culture.  
Linking Representations and “Realities” 
Finally, I considered how taken-for-granted assumptions within diverse oil spill stories 
tell us something about the wider cultural context in which stories are told.  Via what Vaughan 
(2004) refers to as “analogical theorizing” I triangulated what I observed in my data with other 
empirical studies which enabled me to make universal, theoretical claims about the links between 
symbolic representations of oil spill events and the wider social order or “realities.”  Expressly, 
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representations of Santa Barbara coast as too pretty to drill is linked with prescriptions and 
subsequent moratoriums to protect the Santa Barbara coast from drilling.  Not only do I see 
evidence that links beauty with economic interest, but also taken-for-granted beliefs that nature 
can be recompensed with money (Fourcade 2011). 
I relied on Weber’s (1978) foundation for observing social patterns by comparing stories 
about oil spill events.  Despite the differences between events in terms of context, characters, and 
plots, I observed similarities with regard to symbolic constructions of settings, causal stories, 
victims and villains as well as normative ideas of right and wrong in prescriptions for redress 
about similar, culturally significant phenomenal events – oil spills.  Briefly, I interpreted similar 
taken-for-granted assumptions or underlying beliefs and morals about nature, knowledge and 
innovation.  For example, symbolic representations of settings as beautiful and pristine that 
should be protected from oil extraction and production simultaneously constructs possible 
settings as not beautiful and pristine that could be targeted for oil extraction and production.  
This reflects an underlying belief that nature can be compartmentalized and segmented into 
regions, areas, etc. according to aesthetic beauty or economic value.   
Further with regard to knowledge, I noted that all oil spills stories contain prescriptions 
for further study and investigation which I interpreted as constructing the belief in our ability to 
develop knowledge about nature and oil drilling processes so as to avoid future oil spills or clean 
up ones that do happen.    In keeping with taken-for-granted assumptions about knowledge are 
assumptions about types of people who have knowledge and those who do not.  I interpret 
symbolic representations of experts as linked with social hierarchies of types of people who can 
and cannot make knowledge.  Some actors possess knowledge and some do not.  Some actors are 
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expected to have knowledge given their social position, while other actors are exonerated for 
their lack of knowledge given their status as “lay person.”   
Finally, I observed that oil spill stories construct the belief that we can and must continue 
to develop oil for energy.  Many prescriptions propose changes to bureaucratic structures and oil 
development processes to “prevent” oil spills from happening in the future.  But there is no 
mention of constriction, or reducing oil consumption.  Theoretically, prescriptions for 
technological advancements to improve oil drilling processes are linked with underlying beliefs 
in the moral value of production and consumption more generally (Vaughan 2004).  
 In summary, a systematic narrative comparison of oil spill stories allowed me to observe 
links between interests and ideas that I argue makes cultural influence in public policymaking 
visible.  Taking narrative elements together, I read through particular oil spill stories and 
compared constructions within stories and between stories across time to interpret what is taken-
for-granted in explicit descriptions of settings, characters, plots and prescriptions in order to 
make visible the underlying widely-held beliefs that provide for “narrative coherence” within 
policy narratives (Rideout 2013).    
In my view, using a comparative method is consistent with ideals established by Gubrium 
and Holstein (1997) who wrote about the need for developing a “new language” in qualitative 
methods.  By using an inductive reasoning approach to narrative analysis whereby I interpreted 
text of policy hearings using a map of elements (setting, characters, plot, morals), I was able to 
compare stories and theorize about the persistence and/or transience of values and beliefs 
regarding oil spills to comment on their link to the wider social order.   
In this chapter, I summarized the methodological approach and analytical techniques that 
I used to explore cultural influence in policymaking.  In the next few chapters, I report the 
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findings of my study and illustrate the narrative comparative approach in more detail with 
analyses of congressional testimony of the Santa Barbara oil spill (chapter 4), the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill (chapter 5) and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (chapter 6).   In my final chapter, I 
synthesize findings across oil spill events to offer conclusions regarding widely held beliefs in 
policy stories that can shed light on their influence on the wider social order more generally. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: STORIES ABOUT THE SANTA BARBARA OIL SPILL 
On Tuesday, January 28, 1969, a well operated by Union Oil blew out which ultimately 
caused between one and three million gallons of oil to spill into the Santa Barbara Channel 
(Gramling and Freudenburg 2012).  The Santa Barbara oil spill is known as the first major oil 
spill in America (Kurtz 2004).  The oil spill received a lot of media attention in an historical 
context in which oil drilling was new and contested.  Molotch (1970) suggested that a collective 
heightened awareness and concern for the environment had the effect of dramatizing the spill and 
bringing it into the foreground among the political elite.  Indeed, the oil spill became the topic of 
a previously scheduled hearing about water pollution legislation.  As Kingdon (1995) suggests, 
the Santa Barbara oil spill was a “focusing event” that shifted the original policy agenda from 
general water pollution issues and legislative proposals to a focus on understanding the extent of 
the oil spill problem, who or what caused it, and what should be done.   
In the paragraphs that follow, I provide a narrative analysis of testimony in the first 
Senate hearing to investigate the event.  First, I summarize the institutional context in which 
stories are told, and then I address research questions about who the story tellers are and the 
interests they represent as well as how storytellers construct problems, causes and solutions.  I 
organize my analysis using Stone’s (1997) “causal story” framework.  Finally, I conclude with a 
discussion of findings and highlight the ways diverse stories reveal widely held beliefs or morals 
about how the world should work.   
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Institutional Context 
 
According to Jones and McBeth (2010), the policy narratives are shaped to some extent 
by context-related constraints.  Indeed, the Santa Barbara oil spill is storied in a policy arena of 
air and water pollution, and in the institutional context of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Air 
and Water Pollution of the committee on Public Works.  As previously mentioned, the Santa 
Barbara oil spill was the first major offshore oil spill to occur in America – the only precedent 
(referred to in testimony) was the Torrey Canyon shipwreck which happened off the coast of the 
U.K. in March 1967.   
It was Wednesday, February 5, 1969.  The U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water 
Pollution of the Committee on Public Works met at 10 in the morning in room 4200 of the New 
Senate Office Building.  Several senators, along with invited witnesses, convened to discuss 
issues related to water pollution, specifically “bills to amend the federal water pollution control 
act” and “related matters pertaining to the prevention and control of water pollution.”  Yet about 
a week prior to the hearing, an event in Santa Barbara, California interrupted the scheduled 
policy agenda. The committee chairman, Senator Muskie, a Democrat from Maine, called for 
order.  “The hearings before the subcommittee this week – and today’s testimony in particular – 
have taken on an expanded significance with the disastrous oil spill which continues off the coast 
of Santa Barbara” (p. 267).  Present at the meeting were members of the Senate Subcommittee 
on Air and Water Pollution as well as invited witnesses.  (See Table 2). 
On the first day of the two day hearing, witnesses from Santa Barbara County, George 
Clyde from the County Board of Supervisors and Richard S. Whitehead, Director of Planning for 
Santa Barbara County were invited to speak at the hearing.  In addition, Fred Hartley, President 
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of Union Oil presented testimony about the event.  Thomas R. Glenn of the State and Interstate 
Water Pollution Control Administrators also testified briefly.   
Table 2 – Alphabetical List of Senate Members of the Subcommittee on Air and Water 
Pollution 
 
Name Political Party 
Howard H. Baker, Jr. R-Tennessee 
Birch Bayh D-Indiana 
J. Caleb Boggs R-Delaware 
John Sherman Cooper R-Kentucky 
Robert J. Dole R-Kansas 
Thomas F. Eagleton D-Missouri 
Joseph M. Montoya D-New Mexico 
Edmund Muskie (Chairman) D-Maine 
Jennings Randolph D-West Virginia 
William B. Spong Jr.  D-Virginia 
 
On the following day, Thursday, February 6, other witnesses testified before the senators 
including Louis Clapper from the National Wildlife Federation, Dr. Spencer M. Smith of the 
Citizens Committee on Natural Resources, C.R. Gutermuth of the Wildlife Management 
Institute, Ted Pankowski of the Izaak Walton League, William Towell of the American Forestry 
Association, Lloyd Tupling of the Sierra Club and M. Rupert Cutler of the Wilderness Society.  
(See Table 3).  
In brief, the first Senate hearing to make sense of the Santa Barbara oil spill was storied 
by particular individuals who represent particular interests.  The oil spill shifted the original 
agenda of water pollution legislation to an investigation of what caused the spill and what should 
be done about it.  Senators representing both Democratic and Republican interests were in 
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attendance as well as several individuals representing the interests of the environment, Santa 
Barbara County and Union Oil.  In prepared statements and in questions and answers between 
witnesses and senators, I observe contesting stories that construct the Santa Barbara oil spill 
problem, causes and solutions in predictable ways. 
Table 3 – Chronological List of Witnesses – Santa Barbara 
Name Organization Date 
George Clyde Member, Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors February 5, 
1969 
Richard S. 
Whitehead 
Director of Planning, County of Santa Barbara(accompanied George Clyde)  
Thomas R. Glenn Association of State and Interstate Water Pollution Control Administrators  
Fred Hartley President, Union Oil Co.  
Louis S. Clapper Chief, Division of Conservation Education, National Wildlife Federation February 6, 
1969 
Dr. Spencer M. 
Smith 
Secretary, Citizens Committee on Natural Resources  
C. R. Gutermuth Vice President, Wildlife Management Institute  
Ted Pankowski Conservation Associate, Izaak Walton League  
William Towell The American Forestry Association  
Lloyd Tupling Sierra Club  
Mr. Rupert Cutler The Wilderness Society  
 
Causal Stories 
Throughout the transcripts, witnesses provide testimony that constructs diverse stories 
about the Santa Barbara oil spill – the problem, causes and solutions.  Stone (1997) provides a 
framework for capturing causal narratives that attempt to explain how and why an event like the 
Santa Barbara oil spill occurred.  This framework organizes types of “causal stories” or plotlines 
that are often proffered in policymaking and are somewhat predictable.  Explanations of cause 
can be organized according to whether the actions of groups and individuals are deemed 
unguided or purposeful and whether the consequences of actions are deemed intended or 
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unintended.  According to this framework, the way cause is represented in causal stories is 
linked with prescriptions for the problem’s redress.  Arguably, simple causes beget simple 
solutions.  But in Santa Barbara oil spill testimony, representations of cause are contested and 
complex. 
Invited witnesses came to the hearing with prepared testimony and statements about the 
oil spill and related problems.  They told causal stories that reflect their constituent interests.  For 
example testimony from Santa Barbara representatives construct the oil spill problem as due to 
the recklessness of the oil industry and the Federal Government that had disastrous implications 
for residents and tourists in Santa Barbara county.   The president of Union Oil, on the other 
hand, constructs the problem as an accident of nature – that the oil company was the unlucky 
bidder on a geographically unstable parcel in the outer continental shelf.   Environmental 
advocates construct the problem as a symptom of a larger problem of environmental neglect.  
Senators point fingers at the oil industry and complex causes testifying that the problem 
underlies the need for more proactive policymaking.  In addition to offering testimony 
constructing the problem, witnesses and senators construct the victims (who are harmed) and 
villains (who caused the harm) along with prescriptions for redress.   
As Stone (1997) points out in her framework, problems are constructed with symbolic 
representations, including metaphors, numbers, and other literary devices (ambiguity, 
synecdoche) that are visible in testimony.  Not surprisingly, constructions of the problem are 
strategically aligned with the particular interests of the speakers that are visible in policy 
proposals to address the oil spill.  In what follows, I present causal stories offered by witnesses 
and senators and highlight the way testimony constructs the problem, victims, villains and 
solutions that are linked with particular interests. 
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Santa Barbara County Representatives: Avoidable Ignorance (Industry/Government 
Recklessness) 
The first witnesses to testify in the hearing were Mr. Clyde (Santa Barbara County 
Supervisor) and Mr. Whitehead (Santa Barbara County director of planning).  They were invited 
to provide testimony about the oil spill because Mr. Clyde wanted drilling in the channel to cease 
because of the Santa Barbara oil spill.  Their interests were to “protect the channel” on behalf of 
residents, tourists, and business owners.  The first part of Mr. Whitehead’s testimony emphasized 
the history of oil development in California.  His testimony worked to construct the idea that 
while there is a long history of oil development and an abundance of the resource in California, 
the aesthetics of the area were more important to local Santa Barbarans.  In addition to providing 
an historical background about oil development in the State, Mr. Clyde and Mr. Whitehead also 
testified about the geographic composition of the channel using maps to depict fault lines, 
sanctuaries and buffer zones as well as lease negotiation practices between Santa Barbarans and 
the Federal Government.   
However, Mr. Clyde and Mr. Whitehead suggested they knew very little about 
geographic faults in the area.  Mr. Clyde testified, “We are not technicians, I want to emphasize 
that” (p. 269).   And later added, “We can discuss that in a limited way as laymen” (p. 269).  
When discussing existing oil exploration and drilling in the Santa Barbara area, Mr. Clyde 
remarked “Our local knowledge of the area out there, both in the State and in the Federal areas 
[of the channel], is extremely limited, but there has been a lot of exploration” (p. 283).  However, 
these claims are challenged in testimony by other witnesses who suggest people did know or 
should have known about the vulnerabilities given their perceived experience and expertise.  This 
explanation shifts the application of blame and accountability from an accident of fate to human 
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action in that the spill may not have happened were it not for “avoidable ignorance” (Stone 
1997).   
Santa Barbara representatives construct an avoidable ignorance causal story that places 
blame and responsibility for the oil spill with the oil industry and the Federal Government.  
Simultaneously, testimony constructs Santa Barbarans as innocent victims who were taken 
advantage of by greedy market interests.  Finally, testimony constructs the solution to cease oil 
drilling in the channel and beyond. 
Problem Definition: Tragedy 
According to Mr. Clyde, the Santa Barbara oil spill is “terribly tragic” (p. 295) “stinking 
mess” (289).  Additionally, the spill is constructed as large with references to numeric estimates.  
Mr. Clyde’s testimony suggests that the scope of the problem is big.  “We have received 
estimates from some of the scientists at research companies and at the university ranging from 
5,000 to 20,000 barrels a day” (p. 288).   As Stone (1997) points out, numbers have normative 
meaning.  Mr. Clyde uses numbers to construct the meaning of the oil spill problem as large and 
therefore in need of immediate action.  “Measures imply a need for action, because we do not 
measure things except when we want to change them or change our behavior in response to 
them” (Stone 1997:167-8). 
Numbers also convey what is included and excluded in the problem.  Santa Barbara 
representatives also construct the oil spills as a problem because it is expensive.  While Mr. 
Whitehead testified that California is abundant in oil resources, he further testified that oil is not 
the most important resource in Santa Barbara County.  More important than oil to Santa 
Barbarans was the natural aesthetic beauty of the coast.  As Mr. Clyde stated, “We have a lot of 
fine beach area, but this is some of the finest” (p. 289).  Beauty is constructed as economically 
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valuable – a draw for vacationers.  And ugly oil spills conflict with aesthetic beauty.  Many 
aspects of Santa Barbara’s beauty are highlighted.  Specifically, Mr. Whitehead commented that 
Santa Barbara is “internationally known as the Riviera of the West” (p. 271), because of its 
“year-round Mediterranean climate, the scenic beauty, the mountain backdrop, with ocean views 
clear to the islands, the excellent beaches with year-round swimming.”  He also constructs Santa 
Barbara as unique for its “restrictive zoning controls [which] have attracted many retired persons 
and established a tourist, recreation, and convention industry” (p. 271).  These testimonies 
illustrate the use of container metaphors that suggest the problem is contained to a fixed space.  
According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), constructing boundaries around physical spaces like 
beaches and islands is an act of quantification that assumes substances and values that “fill” the 
space.  In this case, scenic beauty fills and is the substance of Santa Barbara. 
Continuing to construct quantitative estimates of the problem, Mr. Whitehead testified 
that “Sixty percent of our basic income in the south coastal area is derived from these sources 
[recreation, tourism, convention industries] including the University of California.  An additional 
20 percent comes from the high-type research and development industries attracted by our 
environmental assets, a total of 80 percent of our basic income that can be ruined by disasters 
such as oil spills.  In contrast, the oil industry contributes only 2 percent to the basic income of 
the south coastal area” (p. 271). Again, witnesses use numbers to convey the value and 
importance of the Santa Barbara coast.  The implication here is that Santa Barbara may have 
abundant oil resources, but the area is not dependent on oil revenues.  The value and substance of 
Santa Barbara’s beauty is constructed in economic terms and numeric estimates.  
Simultaneously, the Santa Barbara oil spill is constructed as causing great and costly harm to 
Santa Barbarans.   
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Victims: Santa Barbara Beaches, Santa Barbarans, Residents, Tourists and Businesses 
Not surprisingly, Santa Barbara representatives construct the Santa Barbara area itself as 
a victim of the spill.  The beauty of Santa Barbara is constructed as so important that Santa 
Barbarans protested against oil development processes in the area.  For example, Mr. Whitehead 
testified about the political conflicts surrounding the development of onshore processing 
apparatus required to distill and store oil products prior to exportation and distribution.  “In 1968, 
the planning commission and the board of supervisors adopted ordinance, over protest, 
permitting the first new processing plant required to service platforms in the Federal waters at 
Carpinteria.  A referendum petition was filed in about 3 weeks and at the national election on 
November 5, the voters in the county and its five cities forced the rescinding of this ordinance” 
(p. 272).   According to Mr. Whitehead, this protest “indicates the attitude of the majority of 
voters toward oil development” (p. 272).  This testimony works to construct the interests of 
Santa Barbara voters who did not want oil development in the area. 
And Mr. Clyde testified, “It was a difficult battle in the State legislature” (p. 284).  He 
suggested that Santa Barbarans are “constantly on the lookout to protect that sanctuary because it 
is extremely important to our tourist economy and residential economy” (p. 284).  He testified 
that Santa Barbarans feared the possibility a spill would happen.  In contrast, the Federal 
Government and the oil industry are described by Mr. Clyde as being “hell bent to lease the 
channel” (p. 281).  Mr. Clyde constructs his interests on behalf of Santa Barbara constituents in 
testimony that points the fingers at the Federal Government and the oil industry for causing the 
oil spill.  Further, he exonerates Santa Barbarans who tried to protest oil development.  The 
Santa Barbara oil spill is constructed as a big, expensive problem for Santa Barbara residents, 
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tourists and business owners that was caused by the greed and recklessness of the Federal 
Government and oil industry.   
Villains: Industry, Federal Government 
In response to testimony that suggested the oil spill was caused by unstable geographic 
faults (accident of fate), Santa Barbara representatives testified that people should have known 
about the geographic instability in the Channel.  For example, Mr. Clyde testified at length about 
the investment made by the oil industry to investigate and explore the Santa Barbara Channel.  
His comments suggest a frustration with the proprietary nature of the knowledge gathered by the 
industry and Federal Government.  Specifically, he said, “I don’t know whether the Federal 
Government knew about it…We didn’t know…The oil industry did know about the geological 
conditions out there…People with technical know-how should have known” (p. 281).  Here, Mr. 
Clyde’s testimony suggests that ignorance about geographic conditions was avoidable.  Mr. 
Clyde’s testimony works to construct villains as the oil industry, “people with technical know-
how” and the Federal Government which also works to construct the problem as one of intent 
rather than accident (Stone 1997). 
Moreover, Mr. Clyde’s testimony constructs the oil industry and Federal Government as 
villains who intended harm in testimony that suggests Santa Barbarans were taken advantage of.   
In a version of what Stone (1997) would call the “story of decline,” Mr. Clyde’s testimony paints 
an image that during the proposal stage in leasing negotiations, the industry’s presentations to 
local groups and organizations about oil drilling technologies created a false sense of security.  
He expressed an uncertainty about offshore drilling technology as a cause for concern prior to 
the drill but that a “laymen’s” lack of understanding about complex oil extraction processes were 
assuaged by “the experts.”  Speaking on behalf of his Santa Barbara constituents, Mr. Clyde’s 
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comments imply that an “urgency” to drill the channel for oil industry operators and the Federal 
Government was met with concern by Santa Barbarans.  “[Y]ou may well ask why we at the 
local level didn’t stress spillage controls…It was discussed several times, but always Interior 
Department and oil industry officials led us to believe that we had nothing to fear. They said they 
had perfected shutoff devices that were foolproof” (p. 281).    
Continuing, Mr. Clyde later testified that residents had no opportunity to protest the lease.  
Specifically, an exchange between Mr. Clyde and Senator Cooper (R-Kentucky), emphasizes 
that there are no public hearings or public notices that enable residents to protest or gain 
information about offshore oil drilling (p. 284-5).  In other words, members of the lay public are 
not “in the know.” 
Senator Cooper (R-Kentucky): It is correct, then, that there are hearings that would enable the community 
of Santa Barbara or other communities and their people to protest the drilling of a certain area or a certain 
well?   
 
Mr. Clyde (County Supervisor – Santa Barbara): It would only be on the moving in of platforms, only on 
permanent structures that there would be hearings, and the hearing is called only if the Corps of Engineers 
feels that it is necessary. 
 
Senator Cooper (R-Kentucky): Is there any kind of public notice of which you are aware given to the 
community or to the State or to the people at the time these applications for permits are filed with the 
Department of the Interior? 
 
Mr. Clyde (County Supervisor – Santa Barbara): Not as far as I know. 
 
The implication is that Santa Barbarans were innocent victims of the careless disregard 
among the villainous industry and Federal Government for drilling in the vulnerable Santa 
Barbara Channel.  Constructing a story of decline, Mr. Clyde implies that things were good in 
the beginning, but now they are horrible.  Santa Barbarans have been expelled from paradise.  As 
Stone (1997:206) points out, contesting causal stories are symbolic attempts to locate “moral 
responsibility and real economic costs” of the Santa Barbara oil spill.  According to Mr. Clyde’s 
testimony, moral responsibility lies with industry and the Federal Government. 
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Solutions: Stop Drilling for Oil, Protect Beauty 
Mr. Clyde concluded his testimony with a request that constructs his interest in protecting 
the Santa Barbara Channel from oil drilling. “Gentlemen, we need help and protection and this 
help and protection is not needed in just Santa Barbara or California, but in all areas which are 
now being opened to offshore drilling.  We have not gotten this help from the Interior 
Department” (p. 291).  By including “all areas” in his prescription, Mr. Clyde constructs 
potential victims of oil drilling as other places that might be affected by these operations and 
therefore the benefit of his prescription to be far reaching. This narrative strategy is what 
McBeth, Shanahan, Arnell and Hathaway (2007) refer to as “loser’s tale.”  If the proposal to stop 
drilling in Santa Barbara is not accepted, then everyone loses. 
Mr. Clyde also prescribed technological improvements in oil development in order to 
provide “at least some guarantee that this won’t happen again” (p. 305).  Arguing against the use 
of platforms in the production process, Mr. Clyde testified, “In the interest of protecting the 
esthetic environment of the community…we were attempting to keep platforms that were close 
in at a minimum…if we could get some type of other completion method that did not require this 
number of platforms…” (p. 299).  Consistent with causal stories that construct the Santa Barbara 
area as victim, Mr. Clyde proposes an inducement to protect the beauty of Santa Barbara. 
In summary, Santa Barbara representatives construct the oil spill problem, causes and 
solutions consistent with their constituent interests.  The testimony of Mr. Clyde and Mr. 
Whitehead construct the Santa Barbara oil spill as a tragic problem which led to significant 
economic consequence for Santa Barbarans, tourists and businesses.  Using rhetorical devices 
such as numbers, and metaphors, Santa Barbara representatives blame the oil industry and the 
Federal Government for recklessness that led to the spill.  In contrast, they hold blameless Santa 
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Barbarans who did not have any access to protest or participate in lease negotiations.  Finally, 
testimony constructs solutions to stop drilling, protect aesthetic coastal environments, and 
regulate the industry so that “this won’t happen again.”  The next witnesses to testify about the 
oil spill was the President of Union Oil, Mr. Hartley. 
Union Oil Representative: Accident of Fate (God’s Fault), Unavoidable Ignorance 
Predictably, Mr. Hartley constructs an accidental causal story consistent with his interests 
to protect his company’s reputation and to avoid fiscal responsibility.  His company was the 
principal operator of the well that blew out leading to millions of gallons to leak into the Santa 
Barbara Channel and as such was held responsible for the spill.  Not surprisingly, Mr. Hartley 
blamed the geological conditions in the area.  Mr. Hartley of Union Oil said, “[V]ery frankly, 
Mr. Chairman, we do rely on the uniformity of Mother Earth to take barrel one out of it” (p. 
386).   
In Stone’s (1997) causal theory framework, constructing the cause of the oil spill as an 
accident of fate deflects blame from individuals to conditions beyond human control as she 
writes, “no one is responsible in the realm of fate” (Stone 1997:191).  Indeed, if the cause of the 
problem is determined to be due to an “unavoidable accident” then accountability for its clean up 
and response is diffuse and hard to pin down. It is predictable that deflections of blame and 
responsibility are advanced by individuals such as Mr. Hartley who represent the interests of the 
oil industry.  
Deflections of blame are observed in other industry representations of cause.  Stone refers 
to this type of story as “inadvertent causes.”  In inadvertent causal stories, the consequences of 
drilling may be predictable, but not intended as can be seen in Mr. Hartley’s testimony when he 
testified, “Obviously if there were no well drilled in Santa Barbara I presume today this problem 
 78
would not exist…” In these types of representations the cause of the spill is not due to “willful 
negligence,” per se but because of a lack of sufficient knowledge about the geological 
vulnerability of the area being drilled.  In short, actors involved were ignorant of the geological 
vulnerability. 
In addition to deflecting blame away from the oil company, Mr. Hartley’s testimony 
constructs shared responsibility with the Federal Government.  Specifically, he opened his 
testimony with: “I would like to first stress that we do have here a Federal Government-industry 
partnership involved in the development of offshore oil on the Outer Continental Shelf….for the 
development of oil resources for the supply of the energy requirements of this country” (p. 320).  
Additionally, he testified that the Federal Government was a major beneficiary of offshore 
drilling in California in that they collected “about $602 million” in the offshore sale in the state” 
(p. 321).  The Union Oil Company was the principal operator of the drilling operation in Santa 
Barbara, but Mr. Hartley’s testimony works to deflect blame or at least to share blame with the 
Federal Government to avoid punitive outcomes.   
Problem Definition: Accident, Not a Disaster 
While Mr. Clyde of Santa Barbara described the oil spill as “tragic,” Mr. Hartley’s 
testimony downplays the extent of the problem by using less hyperbolic representations such as 
“incident” and “accident.”  For example, Mr. Hartley, testified:  “I think we have to look at these 
problems relatively.  I am always tremendously impressed at the publicity that death of birds 
receives versus the loss of people…in this day and age…I think relative to that the fact that we 
have had no loss of life from this incident is important…[A]lthough it has been referred to as a 
disaster, [it] is not a disaster to people.  There is no one being killed” (342-3).  So, for Mr. 
Hartley, the oil spill was a problem, but not a disaster, because there were no human casualties.  
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Such testimony works to downplay the severity of the spill and to further distance his company 
from responsibility.  It also constructs “disaster” as a particular type of problem that includes the 
loss of human life. 
Additionally, Mr. Hartley testified that the size of the spill was not as large as Mr. Clyde 
suggested.  Mr. Hartley of Union Oil company disagreed with the estimate of 20,000 or more 
barrels a day and countered with “I think the numbers that we have indicated of between not less 
than 100 barrels a day and not more than 500 barrels is a pretty fair range and perhaps pretty 
much in keeping with our general knowledge to date” (p. 351).  Again, numbers are given 
meaning (Stone 1997).  In Mr. Hartley’s testimony, using a smaller estimate constructs the spill 
as a problem that is not so big.  It is understandable that witnesses whose interests may be to 
protect and remediate the Santa Barbara Channel might represent the size of the spill with large 
estimates while the chief executive of the company who may be held responsible for the event 
might refute these estimates.     
Victims: Union Oil 
From the perspective of the oil industry, Union Oil is constructed as the victim.  Mr. 
Hartley deflected claims that he and his company knew about the risks for drilling in the 
Channel.  His testimony suggested that they were doing the best they could with what they knew 
at the time.  “We are satisfied that the Government and the industry were believed to be, at least 
up until Tuesday before last, well supplied with experience and knowledge that would say a 
prudent man, a  prudent company following the regulations, implementing them, would 
successfully drill oil wells” (p. 328).   
In response to charges that Union Oil was ill prepared to respond to the problem, Mr. 
Hartley claimed that both the industry and the Federal Government lacked response capability. 
 80
“[O]ur industry and our government, both of us do not really have the proper apparatus to take 
oil off the ocean. Normal cleanups that take place occur basically in still waters, in harbor areas, 
in terminal areas, and the problem of recovering oil from a terminal water surface and the 
problem of recovering oil from the surface of an ocean are two entirely different things” (p. 336).  
Mr. Hartley’s testimony constructs the Santa Barbara oil spill as an event with which he lacked 
experience and familiarity.  His testimony also suggests that his expertise was limited to “normal 
cleanups.”  Constructing the event as qualitatively different from “normal” can be interpreted as 
another strategy to deflect blame and responsibility.  As Del Rosso (2011) argued, actors use 
rhetorical techniques to “deny, justify, and qualify” events as “isolated incidents” to avoid 
responsibility.  Accordingly, the Santa Barbara oil spill is constructed as a freak accident, an 
anomaly in the day-to-day business of oil drilling.   
Indeed, Mr. Hartley later testified “[W]e did not anticipate a flow out of the earth’s 
crust…this kind of failure I think I am the first to admit has not really been appreciated by we 
mere human beings” (p. 356).  Using the symbolic representation “mere human beings” works to 
construct actions as unintended and consequences as unforeseen simultaneously constructing Mr. 
Hartley and company as sympathetic characters. 
Villains: Federal Government 
In addition to blaming Mother Earth, Mr. Hartley pointed the finger at the Federal 
Government.  Mr. Hartley testified that the Federal Government is the greedy villain which had 
much to gain while his company had much to lose.  He testified that while the Federal 
Government gets paid royalties and rents, Union Oil is left holding the bill for the spill.  Mr. 
Hartley’s comments imply regret for having won the bid to drill in the Channel because of high 
risks and related expenses.   “Block 402 containing about 5,000 acres was auctioned off and I 
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supposed I should say today, we unfortunately were the successful bidder at $61 million…Uncle 
Sam has had that money since last March…Yes, this is an expensive game” (p. 350).   
Mr. Hartley’s use of the symbol “Uncle Sam” is a widely recognized nickname for the 
U.S federal Government that personifies the government and elicits an underlying narrative that 
works to re-cast Union Oil as the victim and Uncle Sam as the villain (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980).  Lakoff and Johnson (1980:34) argue that personification metaphors “allow us to make 
sense of phenomena in the world in human terms – terms that we can understand on the basis of 
our own motivations, goals, actions, and characteristics.”  Mr. Hartley’s company is suffering the 
attribution of blame and responsibility for the oil spill, so uses the government as adversary 
metaphor to provide “a coherent account of why we’re suffering losses” (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980:34)  It is somewhat predictable as it is in Mr. Hartley’s interest to construct the oil spill as 
an accident of fate and moreover, to metaphorically cast the Federal Government as the lucky 
winner in the risky game of oil drilling and Union Oil as the unfortunate loser.  
Solutions: Improve Clean Up Technologies and Learn from the Experience 
Mr. Hartley’s testimony constructs solutions to the Santa Barbara oil spill that involve 
improvements to technologies, sharing of knowledge among industry players and to learn from 
experience that are consistent with his interests to avoid fines and fiscal responsibility.  
Constructions of solutions assume their feasibility (Stone 1997).  “Our engineers do not think it 
is to be a ridiculous thought that something in the nature of a floating drydock [to provide for the 
recovery of spilled oil]” (p. 331).  Additionally, constructing solutions as shared responsibilities 
also work to deflect blame against a particular company, such as Union Oil.  As Mr. Hartley 
testified, “industry should get busy and clean things up…it should cooperate…should 
interchange equipment” (p. 358).  By referring to the oil industry as an entity, or object, Mr. 
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Hartley invokes “ontological metaphors.”  The use of this metaphor serves the purpose of 
“setting goals and motivating actions” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).  Focused on the future, Mr. 
Hartley proposes what the industry should do. 
Finally, Mr. Hartley testified for proposals that suggest the hearing will not solve the oil 
spill problem, but that he hopes hearings will bring about positive outcomes: “I hope that the 
hearing does bring forth facts that can be intertwined into regulations that will be beneficial to 
our industry and the government (366).  Stone (1997) argues that proposing “facts” or 
information gathering as a policy instrument is an act of persuasion that makes punitive sanctions 
such as fines, or constricting rules and regulations unnecessary.  By emphasizing regulations, 
again Mr. Hartley’s testimony shifts the solution toward future events and deflects the potential 
application of punitive fines.  After Mr. Hartley’s testimony concluded, the hearing was 
adjourned for the day.  The following day, a panel of environmental advocates testified. 
Environmental Advocates: Avoidable Ignorance (Careless Industry and Federal 
Government) 
Environmental advocates testified on the second day of the hearing.  All witnesses 
provided their statements and then were asked questions by senators.  In the testimony of 
environmental witnesses, the Santa Barbara oil spill is constructed as a disaster for the 
environment as a whole, perpetrated by the reckless oil industry that necessitates solutions to 
protect environmental resources.  Predictably, constructions of the problem, causes and solutions 
are consistent with the speaker’s particular interests.   
Problem Definition: Catastrophe, Synecdoche 
Most environmental witnesses construct the oil spill as a disaster or “catastrophe” (Mr. 
Tupling of the Sierra Club (p. 402).  However, some testified that calling the oil spill a disaster 
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was unfortunate.  For example, Mr. Towell, Executive Vice President of the American Forestry 
Association argued that it is “unfortunate that the Santa Barbara incident has become the focal 
point of this hearing” (p. 421) because it blinds the committee to the “real purposes of S. 7 and 
the Water Pollution Control Act.”  And Mr. Gutermuth, Vice President of the Wildlife 
Management Institute complained that “we can get all hot and bothered about such a small 
stretch of ocean, when…the general public across this country have paid so little attention to the 
serious pollution matters that have been going on in all of our waters throughout the entire 
continent” (p. 387). Here, Mr. Gutermuth’s comments suggest a frustration with the necessary 
visibility of environmental problems – that if pollution is out of sight, then it is out of mind.  
Using symbolic constructions such as “synecdoche,” these witnesses constructed the oil spill as 
just an instance of a larger problem, environmental neglect.  “Synecdoche is a figure of speech in 
which a whole is represented by one of its parts” (Stone 1997:145).  In this case, the Santa 
Barbara oil spill represents a small part of a larger problem consistent with the witness’s concern 
for the environment and natural resources. 
Like other testimony in the hearing, environmental witnesses use numbers to describe the 
scope of the problem but predictably numbers differ according to speaker.  In Mr. Hartley’s 
testimony, the spill was estimated to be between 100 and 500 barrels a day.  Mr. Gutermuth of 
the Wildlife Management Institute on the other hand testified that the scope of the problem 
measured 21,000 barrels a day.  “That is a figure [21,000 barrels a day] that has been used by 
everyone.  Heaven knows it’s bad” (p. 416).  Conflicting estimates are not surprising in 
policymaking as Stone (1997) argues “Debating the size of a phenomenon is one of the most 
prominent forms of discourse in public policy.”  And estimates coincide with the interests of 
storytellers.   
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Victims: Wildlife, Beaches, Birds 
In testimony proffered by environmental advocates, constructions of the victims are 
predictably linked to interests to protect, preserve and conserve natural resources.  For example, 
a wildlife advocate constructed the natural environment as being victimized by the oil spill.  
Specifically, Mr. Cutter of the Wilderness Society suggested that just one oil spill has far 
reaching implications: “It is easy to belittle the death of a few thousand birds and sea mammals 
caught in a Torrey Canyon or Santa Barbara Channel – type disaster – until one considers that 
the entire continental population of a given waterfowl species…can be wiped out with one bad 
spill” (p. 408).  Here, Mr. Cutter uses synecdoche to expand the domain of victims from a few 
thousand birds to entire species. This strategy works to link the implications of the oil spill 
beyond the local to a larger issue related to the loss of biodiversity.  Expanding the domain of 
potential victims makes the oil spill a problem that everyone should care about (Loseke 2003). 
Other victims constructed in testimony by environmental advocates include: “recreational 
beaches and death or damage to wildlife and fishery resources” (Mr. Clapper of the National 
Wildlife Federation, p. 369), and potential victims including sea lions, brown pelicans and bird 
colonies (Mr.Tupling of the Sierra Club, p. 402.).  Mr. Tupling described photographs of victims 
covered in oil that he presented in his testimony, “This picture here shows the oil which is on the 
rocks on the Santa Barbara shore…Here is one of the gulls covered with oil…And here is 
another one…this one didn’t make it… He’s dead” (p. 404).  Using images of oil-soaked birds 
works to construct blame and responsibility for the oil spill.  Morse (2012) argues that oil soaked 
birds are part of a visual narrative that constructs the oil industry as evil and threatening to 
human life and the natural environment.  In Mr. Tupling’s testimony, the oil industry is 
constructed as responsible for the death of birds and the potential harm to sea lions. 
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Villains: Federal Government, Oil Industry 
In most testimony from environmental witnesses the finger of blame is pointed at the 
Federal Government and the oil industry for perceived carelessness.  For example, in discussions 
about the number of wells being drilled in Santa Barbara, Mr. Gutermuth testified that according 
to Mineral Leasing Act, the Secretary of the Interior Department “has the right to not only let 
areas for option and leasing, but he has the right to establish the rules and regulations that should 
be imposed upon the operators” (p. 411).  And he later qualified, “My criticism here in this 
statement is that the Government has not done that [established rules and regulations…]”  This 
testimony works to construct the Secretary of the Interior Department as responsible for not 
enforcing regulations that may have prevented the oil spill.   
Blame is also levied at people who should have known better.  Dr. Smith of the Citizen’s 
Committee on Natural Resources argued that the knowledge about vulnerable geographic 
conditions was available as of the late 1950s.  “This is precisely what [Zimmerman of the Bureau 
of Land Management and Indian Affiars Division] predicted…I remember the little schematic 
drawing he made exactly how the drills went down; where the fault was and how the oil seepage 
would take place…This was in the late 1950s when this was being discussed…So, some people 
had this knowledge” (p. 375-6).   While particular individuals are not singled out, blame and 
responsibility are levied at the oil industry as well as at the Federal Government for their 
responsibility for knowing about geological conditions and potential risks.  The implication in 
testimony is that government and industry officials had the knowledge about the faulty 
conditions and drilled anyway, and that they should have been more cautious, they should have 
known better.  Stone (1997:203) refers to this strategy as showing that the effects of action (oil 
spill due to oil drilling) were accepted as “a calculated risk by the actor.”  Constructing a story of 
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“willful neglect” works to frame the problem as one of avoidable ignorance; thereby pushing the 
cause of the event into the realm of intent (Stone 1997). 
Solutions: Study, Organizational Change, Operator Fines, and Cessation of Drilling 
Solutions proposed by environmental advocates are linked to what Stone refers to as the 
“rational ideal.”  “The rational ideal presupposes the existence of neutral facts” (Stone 
1997:307).  Mr. Gutermuth of the Wildlife Management Institute proposed “I favor increased 
research and mineral exploration by the new agency, assisted by the U.S. Geological Survey” (p. 
380).  And Mr. Cutler of the Wilderness Society supported the passage of legislation “which 
provides at least for a study of the feasibility of a national system of marine sanctuaries” (p. 
420).  While the rational ideal supposes that facts are not interest-based, Stone (1997:307) asserts 
that “facts do not exist independent of interpretive lenses” but are “political acts.”  Interests of 
the speaker are observed in the proposal for fact gathering.  Arguably, the Wilderness Society 
would benefit from a study affirming the protection of marine sanctuaries. 
Other proposals suggested include what Stone refers to as “constitutional engineering” 
which include proposals to reorganize organizational structures and decision making.  For 
example, Mr. Gutermuth’s (Wildlife Institute) commented, “I favor an alternative proposal…to 
transfer all administrative functions, exclusive of the military, to a single agency in the 
Department of the Interior, which would have the responsibility of drafting regulations…based 
largely on an analysis of the national supply-demand situations” (p. 389).   
Furthermore, Mr. Clapper of the Division of Conservation Education of the National 
Wildlife Federation suggested that “the Federal licensing agency be required to get 
recommendations of the Interior Department for compliance” before an oil-drilling project is 
certified (p. 373).  Other suggestions for restructuring decision making protocols include 
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requiring “an applicant for a federal license or permit to provide the licensing agency with 
certification from appropriate State or interstate water pollution control authorities that the 
facility shall comply with applicable water standards (p. 394),” as stated by Mr. Pankowski, 
Conservation Associate with the Izaak Walton League.   The implication of constructing the 
solution as a matter of reorganizing the chain of command is that the change in decision making 
processes will produce better decision making.  Changes to organizational structure will yield 
efficiency and predictability that was lacking before and partly responsible for the oil spill (Stone 
1997).   
And some witnesses testified that the oil industry be held financially accountable for oil 
spills.  That is witnesses suggest that oil industry operators be held liable for potential spills. For 
example, Mr. Towell of the American Forestry Association recommended a fund to be created 
and maintained by the oil industry in the event of an oil spill.  “This would be a pool on the part 
of the oil industry in which they would contribute according to the size or volume of their 
business which could be drawn upon whenever there was an accidental, intentional, or careless 
oil spill that required attention (p. 421).”  The implication in this testimony is that oil operators 
should be prepared to pay which simultaneously constructs the belief in the ability to compensate 
beaches, coastlines and wildlife for damages resulting from an oil spill.   
Finally, some comments raise questions about laws that permit oil production activities in 
the United States at all.  Mr. Clapper of the National Wildlife Federation argued that avoiding 
trouble is tantamount to stopping offshore oil drilling in beautiful areas like Santa Barbara.  
“[W]e believe the time has come to consider priorities.  It is our opinion the Federal, State, or 
local governments should establish policies of refusing to permit offshore oil operations which 
pose a threat to outstanding public recreational beaches and other facilities” (p. 371).   Mr. Cutler 
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of the Wilderness Society similarly testified, “I have often wondered why we permit oil drilling 
in such scenically and biologically valuable areas as the Santa Barbara Channel and Cool Inlet in 
Alaska, when we could import oil from abroad and save our own domestic reserves for later 
exploitation when needed (p. 408).”  Here the underlying assumption is that Santa Barbara is too 
pretty to drill.  With the use of ontological metaphors that contain domestic scenic and biological 
areas as valuable, environmentalists propose that Santa Barbara should be protected from 
exploitation, but that drilling abroad is not problematic.  As Cutler’s comments suggest, we can 
“exploit” our domestic reserves later, after we exploit foreign reserves.   
In summary, diverse environmental advocates construct stories consistent with interests 
to protect the environment, get resources to establish marine systems, sanctuaries and for future 
oil spill remediation.  Witnesses use strategies such as synecdoche by referring to the oil spill 
problem as a symptom of a larger problem of environmental neglect.  They implicate the Federal 
Government and the oil industry for careless disregard for natural resources and propose 
solutions that are linked with environmental protection in general. 
Senators: Recklessness (Avoidable Ignorance) and Compex Systems (Unavoidable 
Ignorance) 
With the exception of Senator Muskie (D-Maine) who provided an opening statement, 
Senators in attendance at the hearing told stories in comments and questions posed to witnesses.  
Senator Muskie opened with “The hearings before the subcommittee this week – and today’s 
testimony, in particular, have taken on an expended significance with the disastrous oil spill 
which continues off the coast of Santa Barbara, Calif” (p. 267).  Not surprisingly, Senators 
construct the oil spill as a disaster caused by the recklessness of the oil industry that requires 
expanded governmental oversight, improved legislations and regulations.   
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Problem Definition: Disaster, Accident 
Constructions of the Santa Barbara oil spill is consistent with legislators’ interest in 
legislation.  Some senators construct the oil spill as a disaster.  For example, Senator Muskie (D-
Maine) described the oil spill problem as a “disaster that underscores the need for careful site 
selection” (p. 267).  He also testified that the spill represented a “justification for broadened 
Federal responsibility” (p. 267).  Senator Cooper (R-Kentucky) described it as “a terrible 
disaster” (p. 279) and hoped that the damage is not “irreparable.”  While Senator Baker (R-
Tennessee) constructed the spill as an “accident” (p. 346) that needed further investigation before 
drilling was resumed in the Channel.  According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), constructing 
experiences, events such as oil spills as “disaster” renders them understandable as “objects” that 
can be picked apart and treated as discrete entities.  Like other witnesses, senators’ use of 
“ontological metaphors” works to identify aspects of the event and make it comprehensible.  
“Ontological metaphors…are necessary for even attempting to deal rationally with our 
experiences” (Lakoff and Johnson 26). 
Victims: Californians, Business Losses, Beautiful Coastlines 
Senator Cranston (D-California) constructed California residents as the primary victims 
of the event due to potential losses to tourism and recreation.  For example, he testified that 
Californians bear most of the burden with regard to the spill while the rest of the nation stands to 
benefit from profits related to Federal oil drilling in the area.  “[I]t seems to me that the people of 
California bear 100 percent of the burden that comes out of this unfortunate development.  The 
threat is posed to their beaches, their harbors, their boats, and their beautiful environment along 
the coast” (p. 364).  Similarly, Senator Muskie (D-Maine), argued “To the people who live in the 
affected area, the spill is a very real threat” (p. 267) suggesting that proximity to the event makes 
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it real.  “Victims” of the oil spill are “people who live in the affected area” who “bear 100 
percent of the burden” to “their beaches…harbors…and their beautiful environment.”  
Predictably, constructing victims as Californians is consistent with Senator Cranston’s interest 
for constituent support.  
Moreover, some testimony constructs the victims as the Santa Barbara coast.  Senator 
Muskie (D-Maine) agreed, “This is one of the most beautiful coasts west of the Maine coast” (p. 
279).  Similarly, Senator Cooper (R-Kentucky) testified that he regards it as “one of the most 
beautiful areas in this country” (p. 279).  Constructing the damage as isolated to a particular 
place illustrates the use of what Stone (1997) refers to as the “container” (see also Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980) metaphor, or the idea that the problem is contained in a fixed space.  Implied in 
both Cranston’s and Muskie’s testimony is that the environment is not communal property, but 
owned by Californians.  Furthermore, constructing victims as people and particular places 
renders the problem controllable and contained (Stone 1997). 
Villains: Careless Oil Industry, Complex Systems 
Stories observed in senators’ testimony construct the oil industry as responsible for the 
spill.  Senator Muskie’s (D-Maine) comments reveal frustration with the suggestion that industry 
executives were ignorant and lacked experience and counters with testimony that constructs 
ignorance as avoidable.  “I find it rather incredible that those in the business would say that it 
was an unpredictable risk” (p. 375).  And Senator Boggs (R-Delaware) asked Mr. Hartley at 
different times about what the company knew about the geographic vulnerability in the Channel.  
“What I want to get in the record if possible is your knowledge, your company’s knowledge of 
the seismographic knowledge of this particular area in preparation for your drilling” (p. 340).  
The implication in these testimonies is that Union Oil was aware of the risk and proceeded to 
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drill anyway.  Such representation is consistent with the committee’s interest in assigning 
culpability for the spill. 
  Related to the stories that situate cause as due to the avoidable ignorance of the oil 
company are those stories that suggest the cause is due to institutional barriers that prevent the 
sharing knowledge.  Some testimony suggests that knowledge is often produced for particular 
audiences and the sharing of such knowledge depends on permissions and protocols.  For 
example, in an exchange between Senator Eagleton (D-Missouri) and Mr. Gutermuth, testimony 
implies access to particular reports is privileged.  Specifically, Mr. Gutermuth testified about a 
report that focused on problems in the outer continental shelf which he described as 
“voluminous” and contains “a complete evaluation of our problems on the Outer Continental 
Shelflands” (p. 391).  But it was only produced for the Public Land Law Review Commission 
and as such is proprietary 
When Senator Eagleton asked whether a copy of the report can be made available for 
congressional staff, Mr. Gutermuth’s reply suggests that it would have to be obtained from the 
Commission.  Specifically, Mr. Gutermuth testified “There is a summary, but it is only available 
to the members of the Advisory Council and to the commission itself” (p. 391).  This testimony 
is undergirded by the belief that knowledge is prioritized, and privileged for some audiences and 
not others.   Implicitly, Senator Eagleton blamed the Wildlife Institute for not sharing what it 
knew about vulnerable geological conditions that led to the oil spill.  In summary, testimony 
constructs the notion that there are institutional barriers to knowledge production which works to 
construct cause as so complex so as to diffuse or deflect responsibility.  Stone (1997:194) refers 
to these types of stories as “far more complex than can be contained in the table.”  Importantly, 
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complex systems stories work like accidental causal stories in that no one person can be held 
accountable in complex systems involving transactions between multiple individuals and groups. 
Senator Muskie’s comments construct this complexity: “The whole impression that I get 
from the reactions to this incident are: 1) that it was not anticipated by anybody; 2) that there is 
strong indication that perhaps it should have been anticipated because of the geological nature of 
the area; 3) that when the crisis came, no one was really prepared to deal with it or had arranged 
for standby preparations to deal with it effectively; and 4) that legal responsibility for it is not yet 
very clearly fixed” (p. 326). 
Solutions: Study and Investigation, Legislation 
Constructions of solutions are linked with causal definitions of the problem.  In the main, 
Senate testimony constructed the oil spill problem as one of avoidable ignorance.  Not 
surprisingly, Senator Baker (R-Tennessee) stated “[W]e would have to take into account the 
geological history and the likelihood of seismic accidents or other geological factors which 
would bear on the desirability or the undesirability of leasing a particular area” (p. 296).  As 
observed in previous stories, rendering the oil spill problem as manageable through the collection 
of facts and information is rational or reasonable in the polis (Stone 1997).  Constructing the oil 
spill and future oil spills as affecting “particular area” is as Stone might argue appropriate to the 
metaphor of “containment.”  With more knowledge about areas in the Outer Continental Shelf, 
oil spills can be avoided.  Furthermore, particular areas can be evaluated as desirable or 
undesirable as the testimony of Senator Baker suggests.  In terms of how policy proposals work, 
the prescription for knowledge gathering works to make the problem and its solution knowable 
and is consistent with what Stone (1997) calls the “rational ideal.”  “The rational ideal, in sum, 
offers a vision of society where conflict is temporary and unnecessary, where force is replaced 
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by discussion, and where individual actions are brought into harmony through the persuasive 
power of logic and evidence” (Stone 1997:305). 
Senators’ causal stories also construct the problem as due to complex systems which 
make assignment of blame and responsibility difficult as Senator Muskie’s (D-Maine) comments 
suggest when he claims to be unaware of “any quantitative way…for dividing the money 
damages” unless the oil industry operator is held “absolutely responsible” (p. 382).  Arguably, in 
complex events like oil spills it is difficult to construct “absolute responsibility.”  Union Oil is 
not constructed as “willfully negligent” – that is, the consequences (oil spill) of actions (drilling) 
were not intended.  It is not surprising that the lack of a clear villain (one who intended to create 
harm) in Santa Barbara oil spill stories leads to constructions of solutions that are aimed at 
preventing oil spills from happening in the future.   As Senator Muskie’s comments suggest, 
“There is no question but what our policies in this country tend to be crisis oriented, but 
nevertheless we do have to take advantage of hindsight to avoid trouble in the future” (p. 326).  
According to Lakoff and Johnson, the use of “crisis-oriented” to describe policies serves the 
purpose of setting goals and motivating actions (1980:27).  The emphasis in Senator Muskie’s 
comment is on learning from mistakes.   
In summary, the causes of the oil spill are contested among diverse storytellers (see Table 
4).  Analysis of stories about the Santa Barbara oil spill as told in the first Senate Hearing show 
how actors use narrative strategies and tools such as synecdoche, numbers, and metaphors to 
protect their interests.  Stories attempt to assign blame and responsibility as well as to deflect.  In 
the next section, I explore diverse stories for taken-for-granted assumptions that hold them 
together and discuss underlying morals of stories told. 
 
 94
Table 4: Summary of Causal Stories by Diverse Storytellers in Santa Barbara Oil Spill 
 Santa Barbara 
County Reps 
Oil Industry Environmentalists Senators 
Causal 
Story(ies) 
Avoidable Ignorance  Accident of Fate/ 
Unavoidable 
Ignorance 
Avoidable Ignorance, 
Complex Systems 
Avoidable 
Ignorance/ Complex 
Systems 
Problem 
Definition 
Tragedy Accident of Fate, 
Not a Disaster 
Catastrophe, Synecdoche Disaster, Accident 
Victims Santa Barbarans, 
Residents, Tourists, 
Businesses, 
Aesthetic beauty 
Union Oil Wildlife, Beaches, Birds Californians, 
Business Owners, 
Coastlines 
Villains Careless Industry, 
Federal Government 
Federal Government Careless Federal 
Government, Industry 
Careless Industry, 
Complex Systems 
Solutions Stop drilling, protect 
beauty 
Improve cleanup 
technologies, Learn 
from experience 
Investigation, 
Organizational change, 
Operator fines, Stop 
domestic drilling and 
import oil from abroad 
Investigation, 
Legislation 
 
Discussion of Findings 
 So far I have explored testimony about the Santa Barbara 1969 oil spill for how witnesses 
and senators construct stories that attempt to explain the causes, consequences and prescriptions 
for resolution.  The main plot of the story was that there was an explosion on Union Oil’s 
platform A, which resulted in approximately three million gallons of oil spilled into the Santa 
Barbara Channel.  In this socio-cultural context, there was no previous experience with offshore 
oil spills and offshore drilling was considered a new and somewhat untested technology.  The 
Santa Barbara oil spill was the first offshore oil spill in America.  Testimony constructs the 
cultural climate as divided between support for oil development due to the abundance of the 
resource in California and preservation of the natural environment due to the aesthetic beauty 
and marine life.   Witness testimony constructed the victims of the spill to be local residents and 
business owners, wildlife, fish, birds, seals and other marine life, and the oil company as well (a 
victim of bad luck).  Furthermore, the “beautiful environment along the coast” was considered a 
victim of the spill.   
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Attempts to explain the cause of the event first centered on the notion that the area in 
which Union Oil was drilling was geologically vulnerable and unstable.  For some, the spill 
occurred due to an act of God and could not have been anticipated.  However, conflicting stories 
suggested that industry operators and the Federal Government knew about the geographic 
conditions and drilled anyway situating them as the greedy villains who were out to capitalize on 
the rich oil reserves despite the risks.  Other causal explanations implicated the collective lack of 
knowledge about drilling technology.  Representatives from Santa Barbara pointed the finger at 
the interior department and oil industry experts who promised California residents and officials 
that they had fool proof shut off devices in the event something goes wrong.  Yet, something did 
go wrong and apparently the technology was not fool proof.  Further complicating the picture 
was a companion lack of clean up or response technology.  The explanation offered in testimony 
was again – no one knew or could anticipate the event, so they could not prepare.  The blame is 
placed on the lack of knowledge and implicates institutional barriers that obfuscate the ability or 
efforts to know. 
In the end, witnesses propose solutions to the problem that are informed by various 
problem and causal definitions.  There is an emphasis placed on learning from the event with 
prescriptions for more study and investigation about geological conditions, about oil drilling 
capabilities and spill prevention technologies.  Further witnesses recommend restructuring the 
decision-making processes to facilitate knowledge sharing and transparency.  And it was 
suggested that a Government agency be created to draft regulations the purpose of which would 
be to prevent another oil spill from happening.  Finally, prescriptions focused on holding 
‘polluters’ financially accountable for compensating victims for losses and damages. 
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Underlying Morals 
Underlying morals of the story are that Santa Barbara is too pretty to drill.  One 
prescription was to import oil from other countries and save domestic resources until we 
absolutely need them.  What we need to do is develop more knowledge about geography and 
technology.  Further we need to fix institutional barriers that prevent transparency and 
knowledge sharing across disciplinary, institutional, organizational boundaries.   In short, 
contesting causal stories are linked with prescriptions for redress.  But as Stone (1997) argues, 
there are predictable underlying storylines among the contesting details.  There is the “story of 
decline” (and variants) which suggests that the policy problem represents that everything will go 
downhill unless certain policy proposals are considered.  The other broad story line is the “story 
of helplessness and control” which suggests that the oil spill problem is bad and we thought it 
was out of control, but there is hope.  In general causal stories illuminate the links between 
interests and ideas that tell us something about what is assumed or taken-for-granted about the 
world. In the following paragraphs I make conclusions with regard to underlying beliefs that 
undergird stories about the Santa Barbara oil spill.   
Disasters are Big, Visible, and Deadly 
 Implicit in constructions of the Santa Barbara oil spill problem are taken-for-granted 
notions about the types of problems we should worry about, the types of people and 
organizations that should be held accountable and the types of solutions that should be 
implemented to respond to the problem.  As Stone (1997) argues, these narrative constructions 
are packed with normative assumptions.  Some speakers referred to the spill using terms such as 
“disaster,” “catastrophe,” “tragedy” because of the perceived contamination of the beautiful 
Santa Barbara coast.   
 97
It is well documented in social constructionist literature that the use of hyperbolic 
representations of problems is necessary in order to draw attention to the matter, especially if the 
goal is to do something about it (Loseke 2003) whether that is to legislate or regulate in the area 
of oil drilling practices, or to eliminate it altogether.  For example, Senator Muskie, chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the committee on Public Works clearly formed 
his interest in water pollution legislation.  Other speakers, such as Mr. Clyde of Santa Barbara 
County board of Supervisors and Mr. Cutler of the Wilderness Society constructed the 
prescription that we cease drilling in “scenically and biologically valuable areas” and import oil 
from abroad instead.  Such representations reveal underlying moral assumptions about the 
importance of nature and aesthetic beauty.   
Broadly, causal stories that construct the oil spill as a disaster or tragedy follow what 
Stone (1997) refers to as the “story of decline” narrative.  As Stone (1997:138) argues, “This 
story usually ends with a prediction of a crisis.”  If actors continue to drill in valuable areas, 
more oil spills are likely to follow. Another broad type of narrative is the “story of helplessness 
and control” which constructs the oil spill as an accident of fate that can be changed or controlled 
through human agency (Stone 1997).  Mr. Hartley, testifying on behalf of his oil company, 
formed his interest in deflecting responsibility for the spill when he referred to the event as an 
“incident” or “accident” but not a “disaster” because nobody was killed.  Indeed, Mr. Hartley 
reframing the event as incident and not disaster represents a hopeful story that the spill can be 
controlled. 
Interestingly, from the perspective of some conservationists, calling the Santa Barbara oil 
spill a disaster obscures other environmental problems that are less visible and less dramatic.  
This exemplifies what Stone (1997) considers another version of the “decline story.”  
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Specifically, some conservationists construct the broad story line of “change-is-only-an-illusion” 
when they argue that treating the oil spill as a disaster is wrong.  As Mr. Gutermuth stated, we 
get all “hot and bothered about a small stretch of ocean and pay little attention to the serious 
pollution matters that have been going on in all of our waters throughout the continent.”  
Arguably, Mr. Hartley’s comments may serve to deflect blame and responsibility from his 
organization to avoid potential liabilities, and regulation that may curtail his organization’s 
practices.  And the comments of conservationists may serve to draw attention to less visible 
water-quality related problems.  
Taken together, stories of the Santa Barbara oil spill as an incident or accident reveal 
underlying assumptions about what qualifies as a disaster or catastrophe – that which causes 
death to humans, that which is visible, and that which occurs in aesthetically beautiful places.  
This supports what scholars of disasters have argued, that there is a tendency to regard events as 
disaster only when they are acute, located in a particular time and place and result in human 
death.   It is toward these types of events that actors are compelled to act with urgency (Clarke 
2006, Steinberg 2006, Tierney 2007).  The emphasis on Santa Barbara as a unique place that 
advocates feel should be off limits to oil drilling practices also illuminates taken for granted 
assumptions about nature more generally.  As testimony suggests, we lease some parcels of land 
for drilling, but not others.  We implement zoning controls in some communities, but not others.  
In short, there is an underlying belief that nature and its embedded resources is not a universally 
held public good, but a commodity that is compartmentalized, fenced off, and economically 
valued (Fourcade 2011).   
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Some People Should Know Better 
 Representations of the Santa Barbara oil spill also reveal assumptions about knowledge 
and knowledge production.  Causal stories about the Santa Barbara oil spill construct blame and 
responsibility from particular perspectives.  Witnesses testifying on behalf of the Santa Barbara 
community blamed the oil spill on the greed and carelessness of the Federal Government and the 
oil industry for being “hell bent” to lease parcels and drill for oil in “scenically” important 
places.  Witnesses testifying on behalf of the principal operator – Union Oil deflected assertions 
that the company or the government was careless in its oil drilling activities.  The implication in 
testimony was that oil operators and government officials did the best they could with the 
knowledge they had at the time.  Union Oil’s causal story suggests that the event was an accident 
of fate and that the oil spill could not have been anticipated.  Mother Earth is unpredictable.   
 Despite different causal versions of the story offered in testimony, what stands out is an 
underlying assumption that some people are expected to have knowledge given their social 
position.  Laypeople are not expected to know about the risks related to oil drilling and 
production.  But experts are.  Representations of Santa Barbara residents as victims who were 
not responsible for the harm they experienced are predicated on assumptions that equate 
ignorance with absolution. On the other hand, representations of the oil industry and the Federal 
Government as villains illuminate moral assumptions about people who are expected to know 
better.  Testimony suggests that the oil industry and the Federal government knew or should have 
known about the potential risks involved in drilling off the Santa Barbara coast, but ignored 
those risks in order to capitalize on the abundant oil supply.   
 This exemplifies another version of the control story or the “conspiracy story.”  
According to Stone (1997:143), the conspiracy story is visible in plot shifts that show control of 
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a situation or problem “has been in the hands of a few who have used it to their benefit and 
concealed it from the rest of us.”  Conspiracy stories also reveal underlying morals with regard to 
people and knowledge.  With all the study and exploration of geological areas prior to signing 
leases to drill, the expectation is that “people with technical know-how” should have known 
about the risks.  Several observers have pointed out that in social problems claims-making there 
is a “hierarchy of credibility” (Loseke 2003) that suggests some people are more credible and 
believable than others.  In my view, representations also reveal what may be a hierarchy of 
liability as well.  This hierarchy of liability is linked with respective social positions within 
institutional organizational arrangements.  People who are expected to know, who are credited as 
having knowledge and expertise given their social position as expert or chief executive are also 
expected to predict and avoid problems related to oil extraction and production.  The rest of us 
are exonerated from responsibility due to our ignorance of technical lease negotiation practices 
and beliefs in sophisticated technological oil drilling processes.    
We Have the Technology 
 Related to assumptions about knowledge and credibility are assumptions about 
technological advancement in general.  There is ample testimony calling for more study and 
investigation to improve technological processes.  Again, illustrating the broad policy narrative 
of control and conspiracy, witnesses representing California residents argued that they trusted the 
oil company operators were to be prepared.  Testimony suggests that members of the lay public 
were assured by industry operators and the Federal Government that there were “fool proof 
shutoff devices.”  Yet, as the spill demonstrated, the shutoff devices were not fool proof.  
Furthermore, testimony suggests that there was a gross lack of technological capability to 
respond to the event.   
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 Accordingly, prescriptions for redress focus on the development of better understandings 
of geological spaces and technological capacities so that another spill event never happens again.  
The underlying belief is that the development of innovations is possible and is tantamount to 
progress.   Stories emphasizing technological capabilities to prevent oil spills are hopeful in that 
they promise that a situation is controllable (Stone 1997).  “Stories that purport to tell us of less 
control are always threatening, and ones that promise more are always heartening” (Stone 
1997:142).  Assumed is the idea that we can and will develop more sophisticated knowledge 
about oil extraction and production followed by the assumption that this knowledge will prevent 
future disastrous spills.  Stone (1997:168) suggests that the call for measurement or scientific 
investigation is persuasive and implies “the first step in promoting change.”  Implied in 
prescriptions to study geology more carefully, to investigate more stringent drilling practices is 
the suggestion that we can study and with more study, things will change for the better.   
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, stories about the Santa Barbara oil spill offer constructions of the oil spill 
problem, its causes and consequences as well as prescribed solutions to remediate and prevent oil 
spills from happening in the future.  Predictably, symbolic representations are linked with 
material interests of the witnesses who are not independent actors, but representatives of places, 
organizations, ideals (Stone 1997).  A narrative analysis of congressional testimony illuminates 
the ways interests and ideas are held together by normative assumptions about how the world 
should work.  By unpacking contesting explanations of the Santa Barbara oil spill, I interpret 
how testimony constructs the type of problem that should garner the attention of policymakers, 
the types of causal agents that should be held responsible as well as the types of solutions that are 
feasible.  Further, I show how storytelling in the polis is predictable in terms of types of stories 
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told.  In the end, I argued that visible in causal stories and broad policy narratives are underlying 
morals or taken-for-granted assumptions about how the world should work.  In short, we believe 
oil spills are problems when they are big, visible and occur in sacred places.  We believe that 
there is a hierarchy of liability that exonerates some people from responsibility but implicates 
others due to their location in the wider social hierarchy.  And finally, we believe we can fix it.  
We have, or can develop, the technology. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: STORIES ABOUT THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL 
 In the previous chapter, I explored stories about the Santa Barbara oil spill as constructed 
and told in U.S. Senate congressional testimony that attempted to make sense of the event.  
Through congressional testimony, contesting definitions about the type of problem represented 
by the oil spill as well as who or what caused it and what should be done illuminated links 
between interests and ideas.  In short, testimony constructs taken-for-granted assumptions about 
the types of problems that garner attention, types of causal agents as well as types of solutions 
that are linked with respective interests of witnesses invited to testify before the Senate 
committee.  This chapter unpacks stories about the Exxon Valdez oil spill that occurred in Prince 
William Sound, Alaska in 1989 as told in Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation which held the first hearing to investigate this oil spill.   
On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez tanker ran into Bligh reef, 25 miles from the port 
of Valdez in Prince William Sound causing what was then the biggest oil spill in U.S. history 
(Picou, Gill, Dyer and Curry 1992).  Scholars have argued that the Exxon Valdez oil spill was 
devastating not only for the natural environment, but was also socially disruptive (Dyer, Gill and 
Picou 1992).  The tanker crash caused approximately 11 million U.S. gallons of crude oil to spill 
into the Prince William Sound (Paine, Ruesink, Sun, Soulanille, Wonham, Harley, Brumbaugh 
and Secord 1996).  Members of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation and 
invited witnesses met about two weeks later on April 6, 1989 to explore the causes and 
consequences of the spill as well as to determine what should be done so that another event like 
this does not happen again in the future.      
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Institutional Context 
As previously discussed, policy narratives are shaped by contexts (Jones and McBeth 
2010).  While Santa Barbara testimony occurred in the institutional context of the U.S. Senate 
Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Committee on Public Works, the Exxon Valdez 
event is storied in the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. (See 
Table 5).  The chairman of the Senate committee invited several witnesses who testified at the 
hearing.   The composition of speakers in the Exxon Valdez hearing differs from speakers invited 
to testify before the Santa Barbara hearing.  In the Santa Barbara hearing there were several 
witnesses speaking on behalf of environmental organizations as the original agenda of the 
hearing was to evaluate water pollution-related bills.  But, as discussed, the agenda was shifted 
with the “triggering event” of the Santa Barbara oil spill.  In contrast with Santa Barbara, the 
Exxon Valdez hearing was comprised of several witnesses speaking on behalf of governmental 
agencies.  This is important from a narrative perspective as Stone (1997) suggests, in that sides in 
policy debates attempt to influence the definition of events, and consequences. 
It is important to remind the reader that these were two different types of spills at two 
different times and in different places.  Santa Barbara’s spill was offshore in the outer continental 
shelf and allegedly brought about by a combination of factors including unstable geological 
conditions, untested drilling technologies, and lack of experience with oil spills.  Exxon Valdez 
on the other hand seemed on the surface to be more straightforward.  There was a tanker, a 
captain who had consumed alcohol and passed out on his post when the tanker crashed into Bligh 
Reef resulting in the release of approximately 11 million gallons of oil into Prince William 
Sound.  Fundamentally, these differences influence the types of stories told about the events.  
Santa Barbara was constructed by some as an accident of fate, while the Exxon Valdez spill was 
 105
constructed as inadvertently caused by the recklessness of the oil industry, and the U.S. Coast 
Guard.   
Table 5 – Alphabetical List of Senate Members of the Committee on Commerce, Science 
and Transportation 
Name Political Party 
Lloyd Bentsen D-Texas 
John B. Breaux D-Louisiana 
Richard H. Bryan D-Nevada 
Conrad Burns R-Montana 
John C. Danforth R-Missouri 
J. James Exon D-Nebraska 
Wendell H. Ford D-Kentucky 
John F. Kerry D-Massachusetts 
Albert Gore, Jr.  D-Tennessee 
Slade Gorton R-Washington 
Ernest F. Hollings (Chairman) D-South Carolina 
Daniel K. Inouye. D-Hawaii 
Robert W. Kasten, Jr. R-Wisconsin 
Trent Lott R-Mississippi 
John McCain R-Arizona 
Bob Packwood R-Oregon 
Larry Pressler R-South Dakota 
Charles S. Robb D-Virginia 
John D. Rockefeller IV D-West Virginia 
Ted Stevens R-Alaska 
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I do not propose that my comparison of storied events are “apples to apples” so to speak, 
but are still comparable given that each hearing is the first published, Senate account of “oil 
spill” events.  Arguably, stories are shaped and constrained by the types of witnesses who tell 
stories as well as the different institutional contexts in which stories are told.  
Along with democratic and republican senators, invited witnesses included government 
experts and agency representatives as well as the industry representative from the Exxon 
Corporation. (See Table 6.) 
Table 6 – Chronological List of Witnesses – Exxon Valdez 
Name Organization Date 
Honorable Samuel 
Skinner 
Secretary, Department of Transportation April 6, 1989 
Captain  Larabee  U.S. Coast Guard (accompanied Hon. Skinner)  
Honrable William 
K. Reilly 
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency  
L. G. Rawl Chairman of the board and Chief Executive Officer, Exxon Corp.  
Admiral Paul A. 
Yost 
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard  
Captain Ken 
Thompson 
U.S. Coast Guard (accompanied Adm. Yost)  
Captain Dave 
Spade 
U.S. Coast Guard (accompanied Adm. Yost)  
Dr. William E. 
Evans 
Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere NOAA  
Dr. Charles N. 
Ehler 
Director, Office of Oceanography and Marine Assessment (accompanied 
William Evans) 
 
Thomas A. 
Campbell 
Deputy General Counsel (accompanied William Evans)  
Steve Robinson Deputy Director, Fish and wildlife Service, Department of the Interior  
 
Causal Stories 
As with my previous case about the Santa Barbara oil spill, I analyze testimony according 
to Stone’s (1997) framework for documenting causal stories that construct blame and 
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responsibility as well as prescriptions for redress to highlight how storytellers construct the event 
in accordance with their interests.  Specifically, I note how unique and diverse storytellers 
construct the Exxon Valdez oil spill problem as due to human error or purposeful actions of 
individuals and groups that resulted in unintended consequences.  I also observe how those 
charged with responsibility construct innocence or deflect blame and responsibility by 
suggesting they were just following orders, and that the orders were flawed.  I note how 
competing stories push and pull the definition of the event from the realm of accident to the 
realm of intent (Stone 1997) in accordance with particular interests of storytellers. 
I explore testimony to observe how witnesses construct stories about the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill.  As with the Santa Barbara oil spill story, I use narrative analysis to interpret testimonies 
for how they construct the setting, plot, characters and morals of the story that reflect diverse 
interests of the storytellers.  Then, in my discussion of findings, I interpret diverse stories told for 
how they illuminate the taken-for-granted assumptions or widely held beliefs that shape 
policymaking.  I argue that by delineating the ways actors tell stories about events such as oil 
spills I can observe the way culture works in policymaking. 
Like the previous chapter, I organize causal stories according to the interests of speakers 
for how they construct the problem, victims, villains and solutions.  Specifically, I analyze 
stories from senators, government bureaucrats and the Exxon Corporation. 
Senators: Avoidable Ignorance, Reckless Operator, Complacent Industry and Federal 
Government 
Unlike the Santa Barbara oil spill hearing in which only the chairman of the 
subcommittee presented an opening statement, several senators provide opening statements in 
the Exxon Valdez oil spill hearing.  In opening statements and in exchanges between senators 
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and witnesses, senators construct causal stories that are linked with their respective interests.  
Besides the chairman of the committee (Senator Hollings, D-South Carolina), three other 
senators (Senator Stevens, R-Alaska; Senator Packwood, R-Oregon; and Senator Gorton R-
Washington) provided oral statements before witnesses were called to testify.  Chairman 
Hollings was the first to speak and set the grounds for the hearing: “We have convened this 
hearing to assess the impact and implications of the recent oil spill by an Exxon tanker in Prince 
Williams Sound near Valdez, Alaska” (p. 1). 
Senator Hollings’s opening statement constructs his interests in determining “what 
government action is required to prevent or minimize similar disaster in the future, whether in 
Alaska or Elsewhere” (p. 1).  He went on to say that the extent of losses are not known and also 
suggested that blame and responsibility lie with the operator, Captain Hazelwood of the Exxon 
Valdez, Exxon officials, who were “so slow to respond,” the Alyeska Pipeline service which was 
“so poorly prepared,” and the. U.S. Coast Guard for failing “to perform an immediate drug test” 
on Captain Hazelwood.  Here, Senator Hollings constructs the problem as due to human 
culpability rather than accident or fate making the problem amenable to solutions such as fines or 
penalties (Stone 1997). 
Senator Stevens (R-Alaska) constructs his interests in support of the oil pipeline in 
testimony that suggests opposition to the pipeline is partly responsible for the spill. “[T]hose of 
us that voted for the oil pipeline in 1973 were assured that the latest technology would be utilized 
to prevent oil spills…We feel almost abandoned by the Federal government and disturbed by the 
lack of supervision given to the preparation of plans for disaster recovery” (p. 4).  Senator 
Stevens, too, constructs the problem as due to human culpability, and implicates the Federal 
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Government for their lack of supervision. Using the word “abandoned” constructs supporters of 
the oil pipeline as victims of the oil spill. 
Senator Packwood (R-Oregon) constructs his interests in protecting the Portland coast by 
stating his opposition to moving the crashed vessel to a Portland port.  “We cannot allow the 
Valdez to make the trip out of Prince William Sound and to Portland, or to any other port 
without ensuring that the vessel is seaworthy…The Valdez disaster raises further questions about 
how best to balance the need for resource development with that of protecting our unique coastal 
environments” (p. 6).  Like Senator Gorton, Senator Packwood constructs the importance of the 
Portland coast using the container metaphor.  Constructing a boundary around Portland implies 
values and substances that are contained within Portland in particular, Oregon in general.  The 
coastline is constructed as uniquely valuable and in need of protection. 
And Senator Gorton (R-Washington) constructs his interests on behalf of Washington 
state constituents and the banning of supertankers in Washington-owned waters.  “After 
Washington State’s own oil spill affecting the Olympic National Park, I would hope that the 
Department of the Interior is not wasting a moment of time in preparing for potential impacts of 
the Valdez spill on some of our nation’s most ecologically valued public lands.  I am now more 
satisfied than ever that I worked to make permanent the supertanker ban in Puget Sound” (p. 8).  
Here, Senator Gorton uses the oil spill as a cautionary tale or what Stone (1997) might regard as 
“synecdoche” in support of his position on supertankers, simultaneously constructing natural 
spaces as compartmentalized.  Identifying the Puget Sound as a special place can again be 
understood as an illustration of the “container” metaphor (Stone 1997, Lakoff and Johnson 
1980).  Indeed, Lakoff and Johnson (1980:29) regard the human act of defining a territory as “an 
act of quantification.”  
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While the Santa Barbara oil spill was considered the first in U.S. history, the Exxon 
Valdez oil spill had precedents.   As the chairman of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, Senator Hollings (D-South Carolina) stated, “Bear in mind that this is far from 
the first spill to impact our coastlines” (p. 2-3).  He went on to enumerate several other spills had 
occurred both within the United States and in foreign waters.  Specifically, Senator Hollings (D-
South Carolina) mentioned the Argo Merchant barge that spilled “about 221,000 gallons” on 
December 22, 1988 as well as the Campeche oil spill of 1979 which occurred in the Gulf of 
Mexico north of Yucatan Peninsula which “resulted in the spill of 155 million gallons – the 
largest in history.”  Later testimony refers to Amoco Cadiz oil spill that occurred off the coast in 
Brittany in France (p. 84).  Senator Hollings concluded his summary of previous spills with 
comparative estimates of cleanup costs and liabilities to construct his interest in protecting the 
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge from oil exploration.  As such, Hollings like Senator Gorton 
uses the oil spill as a synecdoche for other issues related to oil development (Stone 1997).    
Problem Definition – Disaster, Tragedy 
Explicitly, most senators construct the Exxon Oil spill as a “disaster.”  Senator McCain 
(R-Arizona) constructed the Exxon Valdez oil spill as “greatest ecological disaster that we have 
experienced” (p. 29).  Senator Hollings (D-South Carolina) further constructs the event as an 
“historic tragedy” (p. 3), Senator. Stevens (R-Alaska) used a metaphor to capture the magnitude 
of the problem and goes so far as to equate the event as tantamount to an atomic bomb: the spill 
is a “disaster which ranks with Hiroshima” (p. 4).  Finally, Senator Gordon (R-Washington) 
referred to the Exxon Valdez oil spill as “[P]erhaps the most severe man-made disaster, 
environmental disaster in our history” (p. 58). 
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The event is given more meaning with the use of numbers in testimony that constructs the 
size of the spill and its environmental impacts.  As has been well documented by social 
constructionist scholars who study social problems, problem definition not only encompasses 
constructions of the type of problem, but also the scope or size (Loseke 2003).  The point is that 
numbers have symbolic meaning.  Several witnesses provided estimates that provide such 
specificity to the overall magnitude or size.  For example, Senator Hollings (D-South Carolina) 
argued that the spill was estimated to be “nearly 11 million gallons” endangering a “$100 million 
local fishing industry” (p. 1).  This testimony links the oil spill problem (11 million gallons) with 
consequences ($100 million in fish).  Similarly, Senator Stevens (R-Alaska) estimated that the 
tanker was carrying “53 million gallons of oil…and as we all know…12 million gallons, 
approximately, leaked out in less than five hours” (p. 4).  And Senator Packwood (R-Oregon) 
testified “the spill of more than 10 million gallons of oil in Alaska’s Prince William Sound raises 
a multitude of questions about the transport of oil from the Alaska pipeline and our ability to 
respond to accidents of this magnitude” (p. 6).  Referring to the oil spill as an entity that “raises” 
questions illustrates the use ontological metaphors that serve the purpose of “setting goals and 
motivating actions” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).  Here, the goal is call attention to a related 
policy issue regarding the Alaska pipeline. 
Furthermore, senators construct the oil spill as a disaster because of where it happened.  
As Senator Hollings testified “[T]he Sound has a particularly diverse population of birds, fish 
and other animals – the result of a subarctic habitat which includes fresh water from melting 
glaciers and saltwater from the sea, a mountainous coastline overlooking sandy beaches, and 
pine forests sheltering productive marshlands” (p.1-2).  He went on to say, “Although larger 
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spills have occurred, this disaster is unique because it is in a body of water ringed by islands and 
relatively isolated from the open sea” (p. 2).   
The oil spill is constructed as a disaster that is large in scope therefore something that 
must be redressed in policy proposals.  Constructing the oil spill as a disaster is linked with 
politicians’ interests to define government responsibility, protect coastlines, to justify the 
development of oil pipelines, to transport and deliver oil and to justify bans on supertankers.  By 
using quantities and estimates, senators construct the oil spill as a particular type of problem as 
well as damages in terms that can be addressed with policy instruments.  According to Stone 
(1997) counting also implies that the situation can be controlled.  There is an underlying 
assumption in numbers that the oil spill is “an identifiable entity with clear boundaries” (Stone 
1997:173).  Senators’ testimony not only constructs the size and extent of the oil spill but also 
who or what is harmed.   
Victims: Prince William Sound, Marine Life, Tourists, Residents 
In testimony by senators, victims are constructed as the particular place in which the oil 
spill occurred (Prince William Sound), fish and wildlife as well as people (tourists, residents).  
For example, the Chairman’s opening statement, describes the Prince William Sound as 
victimized by the spill, “The tanker ran aground in what is described as one of the richest 
concentrations of wildlife in North America” (p. 2).  He further constructs the environment as 
special because of its “mountainous coastline overlooking sandy beaches and pine forests 
sheltering productive marshlands” (p. 2).  This is not surprising.  As Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980:30) theorize, “We use ontological metaphors to comprehend events.”  Chairman Hollings 
(D-South Carolina) constructs the Prince William Sound as a unique and discrete area which 
serves to quantify it in terms of substances it contains such as mountainous coastlines, sandy 
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beaches and pine forests as well as productive marshlands.  These substances are constructed as 
productive and valuable. 
Other testimony illustrates the use of category expansion in the construction of victims as 
potentially anyone and everyone.  Constructing what Stone (1997) regards a “story of decline” as 
a result of the oil spill, Senate testimony draws attention to the birds, fish and marine life as well 
as coasts and rivers that have been harmed, killed or contaminated because of the spill.  
Examples include, “Many birds, fish, and marine mammals are killed by the toxic aftermath of 
an oil spill” (Senator Hollings, D-South Carolina, p. 3).  Expanding the category of victims 
beyond the immediate losses to wildlife, Senator Stevens (R-Alaska) lamented “All of us have a 
feeling of grief, as we have seen our marine life die, our fisheries contaminated, our recreation 
areas flooded with oil and our people and fishing, tourism, transportation and recreation forced 
out of work” (p. 5).  Similarly Senate Packwood testified “We have already seen a tragic loss of 
animal life.  Worse yet, the full impact of the spill on animal life, the food chain and the 
environment in this sensitive ecosystem will not be realized for many years to come” (p. 6).  And  
Senator Gorton (R-Washington) testified, “We have an immediate impact on the herring 
industry, whose season has now been cancelled, and a serious threat to the salmon industry.  It is 
not only the fishermen who will be impacted, but the processors will also suffer” (p. 7).  
Linking current and future losses related to marine life, birds, and fisheries with 
recreation, fishing, tourism and the nation’s food supply can be understood as expanding the 
category of victims to include potentially everyone (Loseke 2003). Casting a wide net of victims 
and potential victims is a predictable strategy to engender support for action and in this case, 
financial remediation.  Not only is the ecological environment threatened, according to 
testimony, but people’s jobs and livelihoods are at risk.  Quantifying the extent of the oil spill in 
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economic terms is linked with attributions of blame and responsibility (Stone 1997).  In Senate 
testimony, it is clear that the interests are to reimburse victims for losses.  As Senator Hollings 
(D-South Carolina) testified, “It is my understanding that the toll on marine life from the recent 
disaster is expected to be so immense that the Alaska Department of Environmental 
Conservation has transported refrigerated tractor-trailers to Valdez to store dead birds and 
animals; they will be collected by scientists as evidence in anticipated lawsuits” (p. 3).  Implied 
in this testimony is the assignment of guilt.  And in the main, senators blame the “reckless oil 
industry.” 
Villains: Exxon Oil Corporation, U.S. Coast Guard, Captain Hazelwood, Federal 
Government/Industry 
Like senators in the Santa Barbara oil spill hearing, senate testimony in Exxon Valdez 
points the finger at the oil industry and others for recklessness.  In short, competing causal stories 
among senators implicate “multiple human decision—makers, and interactions between different 
parts of a system” (Stone 1997:195) and as such construct inadvertent, yet “complex cause.”  As 
Senator Packwood testified, “A whole host of errors led to the grounding of the Valdez on Bligh 
Reef” (p. 6).   First, senators point fingers at the oil industry.  Second, they blame the U.S. Coast 
Guard.  Third, they blame the captain of the ship and finally, they blame “general complacency” 
about a risky process.  This is not surprising, as Stone (1997:205) points out, “Any bad situation 
offers multiple candidates for the role of ‘cause.’”   
Senator Gorton suggested that the acts of the oil industry are so devastating that they 
border on “criminal negligence” (p. 7).  He testified “I am appalled that an industry such as the 
oil industry, after having received immense monetary benefits from oil resources, would be so 
reckless in its preparation for imminent disaster” (Senator Gorton, R-Washington, p. 7).  
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According to Stone (1997) suggesting that the oil industry would be so careless so as to be 
criminal is a common strategy to “push” the causal explanation into the realm of intent.   
Similarly, Senator Exon’s (D-Nebraska) remarks construct the oil company as traitorous 
and deceitful.  In an exchange with the chairman, Senator Exon testifies:  “Mr. Chairman, you 
have made that pronunciation of my name incorrect for ten years now…It is E-x-o-n with one x.  
I have often said that the other people are the double cross boys” (p. 44).  Constructing the 
Exxon Corporation as the “double cross boys” illustrates the use of “personification metaphors” 
to construct the oil company as a person and moreover an adversary that can “attack us, hurt us, 
steal from us” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:34).  Constructing the oil company in these terms 
“justifies political and economic actions on the part of our government” (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980:34).  Senator Exon’s testimony encourages audience members to feel hatred and 
condemnation for the “traitorous” company.  This is not surprising, according to cultural rules 
regarding assignment of blame and responsibility, villains those characters who “intended” harm 
(Loseke 2003). 
Stone (1997) points out constructing “intentional harm” stories is “the most powerful 
offensive position to take, because it lays the blame directly at someone’s feet, and because it 
casts someone as willfully or knowingly causing harm.”  Exxon oil company is constructed as 
the villain that acted “with full knowledge of what the consequences would be” (Stone 
1997:191). That the company is constructed as ill prepared, reckless, and careless implies that 
they inadvertently intended harm.  The oil company is cast as the oppressor who intentionally 
caused harm to innocent victims. Such testimony can be read for how it assigns fiscal 
responsibility.  Exxon Corporation is expected to pay. 
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However, senate testimony also implicates The U.S. Coast Guard.  For example, some 
senators point the finger of blame and responsibility at the members of the Coast Guard who 
were held accountable for allowing a “convicted drunk” to “get on the bridge and be a captain of 
a super tanker” (Senator Breaux, D-Louisiana, p. 37).  In an exchange between Senator Breaux 
and Captain Larabee of the U.S. Coast Guard, the Senator blames Captain Larabee for giving a 
Coast Guard license to an individual who was not qualified due to a record of drunken driving 
arrests and convictions.  “What kind of a system does the Coast Guard have that would allow…a 
convicted drunk who is undergoing treatment – and I respect that, but how can he get on the 
bridge and be a captain of a super tanker…?” (p. 37).   
Such testimony further constructs the inadvertent causal story of “carelessness.”  
Inadequate requirements of the Coast Guard are implicated in other testimony as well.  For 
example, Senator Hollings’s (D-South Carolina) testimony morally condemns members of the 
U.S. Coast Guard for not doing “the right thing.”  “Now, that is a pretty bad dereliction on the 
part of our Coast Guard requirements, that one fellow and one fellow alone is sufficient on a 
supertanker. (p. 39).”   
And some testimony pointed the finger directly at the captain of the ship, “Apparently, 
Captain Hazelwood lied on his license renewal application regarding criminal conviction 
(Senator Kerry, D-Massachusetts, p. 36).”  Similarly, the captain’s culpability is implied in 
Senator Stevens’s (R-Alaska) claims that “As a result of alcohol abuse on board this tanker – the 
Exxon Valdez – hit the Bligh Reef (p. 4).”  However, constructing intentional harm is wrought 
with difficulty as scholars of social problems have noted (Loseke 2003, Best 2008).  There are 
often alternative explanations or other parties that are blamed for the problem.  Captain 
Hazelwood is constructed not a “bad guy” but a “flawed human” who suffered from alcohol 
 117
addiction.    And Senator Packwood (R-Oregon) stated, “We can mine coal and move oil and 
split atoms.  We have not yet perfected man.  God has not yet perfected man, and I doubt if 
Congress is going to improve on God’s efforts over the years” (p. 28).  That is, individual action 
is a moral responsibility, not a legislative imperative.  People are expected to do the “right 
thing.” 
Despite, later testimony from Mr. Rawl (CEO Exxon Corporation) that the captain was 
terminated from his job for violating company policies, senators largely absolve him of 
responsibility for the oil spill.  Indeed, by suggesting that God has not perfected man, the 
implication is that everyone is flawed, we all make mistakes and Congress cannot do anything 
about that.  Captain Hazelwood is constructed not as a villain who was responsible for causing 
the oil spill, instead he was constructed as a victim of addiction and the underlying assumption is 
that while we can perfect systems and processes (like splitting atoms), we cannot “perfect man.”  
Known as the “medicalization of deviance,” this strategy effectively deflects attention away from 
villain construction and expands the category of victims of the oil spill (Loseke 2003). 
As earlier stated, Stone (1997:206) argues that contesting causal narratives are not 
necessarily about finding the true “cause” but about assigning moral responsibility and assessing 
economic consequences.  Senate testimony that suggests the oil spill was the result of 
carelessness on part of the Exxon Corporation, U.S. Coast Guard and Captain Hazelwood 
illustrate what Stone (1997:205) refers to as a “struggle over causal definitions” that can be 
understood as serving the purpose of locating responsibility for the spill with parties who have 
the ability to pay the consequences.  Captain Hazelwood, arguably, does not have the financial 
wherewithal to pay victims, but Exxon Corporation does.   
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Indeed, Senator Kerry (D-Massachusetts) constructs the Federal Government and 
industry operators as careless due to their “complacency.”  “[I]t seems like there was a 
complacency in a very risky process where major guarantees had been given to citizens, not just 
in Alaska…but all over this country about this process” (p. 63).  Senator Kerry’s remarks 
construct elected officials and citizens as irresponsible for failing to consider that a “spill of this 
magnitude” was possible.  He and others blame the Federally backed Alyeska plan for setting the 
industry up to fail.  Kerry opined that the Alyeska plan was predicated on the belief that oil spills 
would not exceed 3.1 million gallons, but the Exxon Valdez oil spill was more than three times 
that amount, as he expressed, “[Y]ou are beginning with a plan that was faulty and you have got 
frustrated governors, frustrated environmentalists, frustrated fishermen, who feel like they are 
without input” (p. 35).  Senator Gorton (R-Washington) similarly stated, “The contingency plan 
drawn by Alyeska Pipeline Company was obviously flawed” (p. 7).  Constructing the cause of 
the oil spill by suggesting that the government and industry failed to observe risks again pushes 
the problem into the realm of purposeful action.  The government and industry are constructed as 
careless, and their ignorance was avoidable.   
In summary, senators’ testimony constructs competing causal stories that push and pull 
against each other in the assignment of blame and responsibility.  While there is agreement that 
the oil company acted carelessly, assignment of blame is complicated by alternative explanations 
with the role of the Coast Guard, the captain, and interactions between the oil industry and the 
Federal Government.  Not surprisingly, senators construct stories consistent with the interests on 
behalf of constituents.  As Stone (1997) writes, “People choose causal stories not only to shift the 
blame but to enable them to appear to be able to remedy the problem.”   
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Solutions: Protect Coastal Environment, Fine Exxon Corp., Federalize Response, Ban 
Supertankers 
Senators construct solutions consistent with their respective interests.  There are interests 
to protect coastal environments, protect areas from oil development, assign fiscal responsibility 
and ban the use of supertankers.  Importantly, constructions of causal stories are linked with 
constructions of proposed resolutions.  For example, Senator Packwood (R-Oregon) stated, “The 
Valdez disaster raises further questions about how best to balance the need for resource 
development with that of protecting our unique coastal environments” (p. 6).   Senator Packwood 
constructs his interests in protecting the Oregon coast from oil development risks.  Alternatively, 
Senator Hollings (D-South Carolina) constructs his interests in protecting the Arctic. “[W]e must 
closely examine whether the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge should be explored for future oil 
supplies” (Senator Hollings, D-South Carolina p. 3).  This is not surprising as Stone (1997:207) 
argues that political actors will use causal stories to support particular agendas.  “Causal stories 
then become mechanisms for linking a desired program to a problem that happens to be high on 
the policy agenda.”  Consistent with Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) theories about container 
metaphors, that the spill happened in a place that is proximate to the Arctic National Wildlife 
provides for the expansion of the consequences of the event/object to include surrounding land 
areas. 
Senator Exon constructed his interests in holding oil companies fiscally responsible for 
the spill.  He suggested that companies pull together to build a fund for future spills.  Senator 
Exon (D-Nebraska) argued, “There are other oil companies that do not have the resources of 
Exxon…that we may have difficulty suing or getting money out of.  Would it not be wise for us 
to establish some kind of a cleanup fund” (p. 45)?  At issue are fears about an oil company’s 
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ability to pay in the event of another catastrophe.  Again, testimony illustrates the purpose to 
account for economic costs of the event and in this testimony future, similar events. 
Related to proposals for legislation to hold the spiller financially responsible for oil spills 
are those proposals to coordinate response to the spill under the authority of the Federal 
Government.  Known as “constitutional engineering,” Senator Stevens’ testimony constructs the 
solution to the problem in a change in bureaucratic structures.  Senator Stevens (R- Alaska) 
stated, “Now we ought to have an emergency group.  We have asked the President to declare an 
emergency under the SBA Act; we have asked now for the Coast Guard to coordinate this effort 
as it leaves Prince William Sound.  Without question it should be a Federal responsibility now” 
(p. 16).  Senator Bryan (D-Nevada) agreed that the Federal Government should assume control, 
but that “federalizing the effort” should not restrict or limit the financial liability for Exxon (p. 
33).  Consistent with Stone’s (1997) theory that assigning fiscal responsibility is among the goals 
in policy stories, testimony consistently constructs a concern about who will pay the bill.  That 
is, Senator Bryan suggests that Exxon Corporation should be financially responsible even if the 
Federal Government (American taxpayers) assumes authority in coordinating the response to the 
spill. 
Furthermore, witnesses called for regulatory bans on supertankers to limit the potential 
for catastrophic oil spills.  Again, causal stories reveal what might be high on a particular 
politician’s agenda.  Senator Stevens (R-Alaska) wondered if a change in policy allowing large 
tankers to transport oil was a bad decision.  “Were we wrong to eliminate the smaller ones 
[tankers] and to have the large ones, so that when we have a spill it is a monster as compared to 
having a series of smaller ones, potentially?” (p. 20). And finally, Senator Hollings (D-South 
Carolina) summarized “[T]he question is, whether we go back to smaller tankers rather than the 
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240,000 barrels, go back to the 74,000 barrel type tankers that we used to have, because we just 
cannot afford this kind of catastrophe hereafter” (p. 74).  The underlying implication is that small 
spills are better than big spills.  And “this kind” of catastrophe can and should be avoided.  
Government Bureaucrats (Avoidable Ignorance, Reckless Operator, Complex Systems) 
In the Exxon Valdez hearing, several government bureaucrats provided testimony about 
the oil spill.  Like previous testimony among senators, agency representatives construct the 
problem, causes and solutions consistent with their interests.  Included among bureaucrats are: 
Honorable Samuel Skinner, Secretary , Department of Transportation, accompanied by Captain 
Larabee, U.S. Coast Guard; Honorable William K Reilly, Administrator, Environmental 
Protection Agency;  Dr. Evans, the Undersecretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, 
who was accompanied by Dr. Ehler, Director, Office of Oceanography and Marine Assessment; 
Admiral Paul Yost commandant, U.S. Coast Guard accompanied by Captains Ken Thompson 
and Dave Spade; and Thomas A. Campbell, Deputy General Counsel; and Steve Robinson, 
Deputy Director, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior.   
These witnesses construct diverse causal stories that are consistent with their interests.  
For example, agents speaking on behalf of environmental interests (EPA, Fish and Wildlife 
Services, etc.) construct causal stories that implicate the industry and others for carelessness that 
led to the devastation of natural resources.  Whereas, agents speaking on behalf of the U.S Coast 
Guard and the Department of Transportation construct complex causal stories that deflect blame 
and responsibility.  Recall that members of the U.S. Coast Guard were charged with 
responsibility in senate testimony for not checking the credentials of the captain and for allowing 
the supertanker to traverse in ecologically vulnerable seas.   
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Similar to testimony offered by senators, some agency representatives construct the 
setting in which the spill occurred as especially problematic, not only for ecological but 
economic reasons.  Predictably, witnesses use “container metaphors” to create boundaries around 
areas as discrete and special as a way to quantify the extent of the problem (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980).  For example, some witnesses construct the setting of the spill to be ecologically unique 
and therefore economically valuable.  Dr. Evans, the under-secretary of Commerce for Oceans 
and Atmosphere of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in the Department of 
Commerce testified “The ecology of Prince William Sound is especially vulnerable to an oil spill 
of the magnitude of Exxon Valdez” (p. 84), because of its “gravel beaches,” “limited wave 
action,” and “subarctic temperatures.”   Further, the administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), Mr. Reilly argued “It has occurred in one of the most productive and 
valuable ecological environments, and one of the most fertile fishing grounds of any in the 
world” (p. 17).  It is not surprising that testimony from agency representatives employed in the 
assessment and protection of natural environment and resources construct the economic 
importance of Prince William Sound.   
Problem Definition: Catastrophe, Tragedy, Disaster 
Like testimony offered by senators, agency representatives construct the oil spill event as 
a large and expensive problem.  Again, using container metaphors, Secretary Skinner of the 
Department of Transportation estimated the spill volume to be “10 million gallons of crude” (p. 
9).  He went on to testify, “There is no question that this is a disaster of major import” (p. 9).  
The comments of Mr. Reilly of the EPA construct the oil spill in hyperbolic terms.  Expressly, he 
argued “This is obviously an environmental catastrophe of the first magnitude.  It is a national 
tragedy for environmental resources of very unusual quality and significance” (p. 17).  Mr. 
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Reilly used the metaphor of earthquake to qualify the extent of the disaster, “[T]he San Francisco 
Earthquake of ecological catastrophes” (p. 17).  This strategy constructs the way the oil spill as 
symbolic of more diffuse cultural fears (Loseke 2003).  In other words, the Exxon Valdez oil 
spill was “the big one.”  Further, it illustrates the use of the “horror story” genre as a synecdoche 
for larger problems (Stone 1997).  “Often these stories are not only atypical , but also highly 
distorted” (Stone 1997:146).  The horror story works to “reduce the scope of the problem and 
thereby makes it more manageable” (p. 147). 
The horror story also works to reduce the problem by offering terrific consequences in 
terms of economic impacts.  Dr. Evans of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
quantified the problem in terms of economic impacts.  “These commercial fisheries are 
renewable resources that each year are worth over $100 million to that community…There are 
also a number of cruise ships that come into the area, and we do not even have the idea of what 
the economic impact is going to be on that” (p. 81-2)   And Mr. Robinson, the Deputy Director 
of the Fish and Wildlife Service in the Department of the Interior stated, “The scale of the spill 
impact is just now starting to become clear to us.  Our preliminary beach surveys have found 80 
oiled birds, per 100 meters of beach…It is highly unlikely that most of the oil birds can be 
recovered and cleaned, although we are making every effort to do so” (p. 86).  Constructing the 
oil spill event as an object provides for the ability to scale its composition.  The oil spill is 
viewed as an object, a distinct entity with itemized costs.  The use of numbers to contain the 
event is metaphorical (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).  It implies that costs can be repaid. 
As has been previously argued, numbers convey meaning (Stone 1997).  Constructing the 
problem in terms of statistics identifies the “agents and factors of control” (Stone 1997:172).  For 
example, quantifying the number of oiled birds constructs the evidence of catastrophe.  
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Quantifying the part of the beach affected creates boundaries around the area to be controlled.  
Numbers indicate what is included in the problem and what is not.  Oiled birds are included in 
the problem as are commercial fisheries, jobs tied to tourism and recreation.  Testimony not only 
constructs the type of problem, the size, but who is harmed.  Not surprisingly, government agents 
working on behalf of the natural environment, construct the environment as primary victims of 
the spill.  Whereas government agents working on behalf of the Department of Transportation 
and the U.S. Coast Guard construct their agencies as victims in stories that deflect blame and 
responsibility for the spill.  
Victims: Fish and Wildlife, Coasts and Rivers, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Citizens 
Many witnesses testifying on behalf of government agencies construct the natural 
environment, fish and wildlife as victims.  “The oil spill has had adverse and often fatal impacts 
on many species of wildlife in Prince William Sound…Bald eagles have been observed 
scavenging oil-killed birds” (Mr. Robinson of the Fish and Wildlife Service, p. 86-87).  
Additionally, Dr. Evans of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration testified, “At 
least five species of threatened or endangered marine mammals frequent the area during some 
time of the year” (p. 82). Related to testimony that constructs victims as wildlife, are comments 
that construct the environment in general as vulnerable, innocent and harmed by the spill.  As 
Secretary Skinner of the Department of Transportation suggested, “It is important to recognize 
that the Valdez spill illustrates dramatically the vulnerability of our coasts and rivers to the 
continuing threat of oil pollution” (p. 10).  Here Secretary Skinner uses synecdoche to construct 
the oil spill as a justification for legislative attention to natural resources (Stone 1997).  The 
Valdez spill becomes a metaphor or typification (Loseke 2003) for generalized environmental 
pollution concerns. 
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Other comments link the loss of wildlife and fish as well as the overall quality of the 
environment to lost jobs and income for U.S. citizens.  “Perhaps most devastating with this event 
was the timing of the spill…For example, migrating herring are finally in the sound and would 
be available for harvest…This means that not only lost jobs and income, but also lost export 
value to the United States” (Dr. Evans - National Oceanographic Association of America, p. 82).  
This is not surprising again, as social constructionist scholars have argued that constructing 
victims of policy problems as potentially anyone is effective for engendering support for urgent 
response to fix or mitigate the problem (Loseke 2003).  By constructing the Exxon Oil spill as 
consequential for the U.S. economy as a whole, everyone suffers.  This is a strategy referred to 
as the “loser’s tale” (McBeth, Shanahan, Hathaway, Tigert and Sampson 2010) or the “story of 
decline” (Stone 1997).  According to McBeth et al (2010:399), groups that construct stories in 
which the costs of a problem are diffuse and spread out do so to “expand the issue.”  This is a 
strategy referred to by constructionist scholars as “domain expansion” (Loseke 2003).  Domain 
expansion links policy problems together.  For Dr. Evans, the oil spill is not just a problem for 
the environment, fish and wildlife, but also for lost jobs the national economy.   
Villains: Exxon Corporation, Federal Government, Captain Hazelwood 
In the main, government agents hold the Exxon Corporation, the Federal Government and 
Captain Hazelwood as villains in causal stories about the Exxon Valdez oil spill.  For example, 
Secretary Skinner of the Department of Transportation testified, “I think it is fair to say that 
Exxon has the primary responsibility for this accident” (p. 9).  He goes on to implicate the 
Federal Government as well.  “[M]y impression is that a somewhat over-optimistic attitude crept 
into our readiness and ability to deal with a spill of this magnitude, or even than accident of this 
size would occur.  The industry-government contingency planning was based on an assumed 
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spill level that was quickly exceeded.  The industry did not have enough equipment on hand.  
This was compounded by the remote location of the spill” (p. 9). He later testified: “They 
[Exxon] had not planned for a catastrophe of this magnitude” (p. 28).  The underlying 
assumption is that the Exxon Corporation was negligent of risks and they should have planned 
better and had been more prepared.  This is predictable in policy stories that seek to assign fiscal 
responsibility.  Exxon Corporation is cast as a villainous character that intended harm with its 
negligence or avoidable ignorance. 
However, other governmental witnesses did not construct particular villains as 
responsible for the harm.  For example, Honorable Reilly of the EPA testified about evidence 
from previous spills, priorities for responding to the present spill, overseeing analysis of 
ecological effects and impacts and the coordination of multiple Federal agencies in responding to 
the spill.  Summarizing the interest of the EPA, Reilly testified, “We are concerned with 
response oversight and with some assistance on environmental impacts and shoreline protection” 
(p. 19).  Like some environmentalist witnesses in the Santa Barbara case, he uses the rhetorical 
device of synecdoche to construct the oil spill problem as a more general problem of 
environmental neglect.  “It strikes me that, from an environmental point of view, over the last 
several years we have become very absorbed, very focused on toxic spills, hazardous waste, 
some of the more exotic problems of medical waste on beaches…all very serious, difficult 
problems urgently in need of attention.  But at the same time, we have perhaps become less 
attentive to the need for maintaining our readiness to address the more conventional and more 
familiar problems…” (p. 19). 
Similarly, Dr. Evans of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 
Department of Commerce avoided the construction of villains and mainly testified about impacts 
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and consequences of the spill, thereby expanding the category of victims (“recreationists,” 
fishing and hunting, lost jobs and income) as a justification for the “damage assessment work” 
that was being undertaken by the NOAA.  “As the nation’s principal marine pollution research 
and monitoring agency, NOAA examines the long-term ecological consequences” (p. 83).  And 
later, he constructed his interest in economic remediation.  “Once we have made the assessment 
for all practical purposes what we will do is we will present a bill to Exxon for what the costs of 
the damages are” (p. 85).  Finally, Mr. Robinson of the Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of 
the Interior, testified about the impact that the spill had on wildlife resources.  Avoiding the 
construction of villains as “intending to harm” is not surprising given theoretical notions that 
such constructions are wrought with difficulty.  “Perhaps because as practical actors we know 
that causes of social problem conditions are complex, audience members in the United States 
tend to be drawn far more to claims about victims than we are to claims about villains” (Loseke 
2003:85). 
Along these lines regarding complexities surrounding the construction of blame and 
responsibility, are counter narratives by those who others hold accountable for the spill.  In 
response to testimony that charged the U.S. Coast Guard with responsibility for allowing an 
impaired captain to pilot a tanker through the Sound, Captain Larabee of the Coast Guard 
deflected blame and responsibility for inadequate background check procedures when he 
testified: “The current procedure is to do a criminal background check” but that “In this 
particular case, I do not think that the problem was picked up…” (p. 38-9).   
Furthermore, it is not surprising that those accused of causing the harm, will attempt to 
persuade audience members that it was someone else’s fault in order to protect their interests 
(Stone 1997).  Admiral Yost also of the U.S. Coast Guard testified that the reason protocols and 
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procedures were not followed was because the agency is understaffed and underfunded.  “[L]et 
me talk…in terms of the support the Coast Guard gets from Congress.  We have always had 
trouble getting a reasonable budget within this government, and that includes the Unites States 
Congress…I think that every time we close a Coast Guard Station, we close a lifeboat station, we 
close a vessel traffic service, we, as the American people, assume more risk, for accidents in 
these places” (p. 77.)   
The testimony points the finger at the Federal Government for not allocating enough 
resources to ensure the Coast Guard can function appropriately.  This is not surprising given 
Stone’s (1997:200) observation that “risk” has become a “key strategic weapon for pushing a 
problem out of the realm of accident into the realm of purpose.”  In this instance, Yost’s 
testimony constructs a competing causal story that implicates the Federal Government for not 
providing an adequate budget for Coast Guard activities, simultaneously constructing the Coast 
Guard and American citizens as victims.  The implication is that by not funding the Coast Guard, 
the elected officials brought the problem on themselves.  As an accused party, the Coast Guard 
witnesses predictably construct the cause of the problem as inadvertence, deflecting charges of 
careless neglect.   
Complexities in villain construction are further illustrated in testimonies among 
government agents who assign responsibility to the operator of the ship, Captain Hazelwood.  
Secretary Skinner of the department of transportation stated, “As you know, the master of the 
Exxon Valdez had a record of DWI convictions and he did not acknowledge them in seeking 
renewal of his license with the Coast Guard (p. 10).”   In short, testimony constructs Captain 
Hazelwood as a liar and a drunk whose actions led to the Exxon Valdez oil spill.  The captain is 
further implicated in testimony that constructs the innocence of the Coast Guard.  For example, 
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When Senator Robb (D-Virginia) asked, “Does the Coast Guard…maintain positive control until 
the ship is completely clear of the area where any potential hazard could exist?” (p. 40).  Captain 
Larabee (USGS) responded, “No sir.  The system does not provide that.  It is an advisory system, 
and the pilot is required to provide that.”  Yet, as previously argued, the construction of the 
captain as responsible for the spill is complicated by narratives that construct him as a victim of 
disease.   
In short, causal stories are constructed from particular vantage points with particular 
purposes.  Stories from government agents who are implicated in senate testimony predictably 
try to cast other parties as responsible.  According to Stone (1997:198), parties in a political 
battle to construct causal stories will struggle for definition in accordance with their interests.  
Failing the ability to construct cause as accidental, members of the coast guard construct a causal 
story of willful intent on the part of the Captain.  Conversely, other government agents avoid the 
construction of particular villains and concentrate instead on the construction of victims (coasts 
and rivers, fish and wildlife, etc).  This is a useful strategy given the difficulties associated with 
villain construction (Loseke 2003). 
Solutions: Improve Captain Certification Processes, Create Oil Spill Liability Protocols, Assess 
Environmental Consequences, Improve Contingency Planning 
Consistently, solutions constructed in testimonies by government agents are linked with 
respective causal stories.  For example, causal stories that implicate the captain of the tanker are 
linked with solutions to prevent people like the captain from getting certified.  Causal stories that 
implicate the oil company are linked with solutions to regulate shipping interests.  And causal 
stories that implicate failures in planning and preparedness are linked with suggestions to 
improve contingency plans and to be better prepared.   
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Stone (1997) argues that a popular strategy in constructing solutions to policy problems is 
to propose changes to rules and laws.  Secretary Skinner from the Department of Transportation 
testified “there are several things that can be done in the area of legislation.”  He went on to 
stress that legislation should focus on preventing people from lying on applications, should 
provide access to registries.  “This Committee originated legislation that authorized access to the 
National Driver Registry by the FAA for airmen and to railroads…We are considering whether it 
can be usefully extended to the Coast Guard certification process for licensed seamen.”  
Similarly, Admiral Yost of the U.S. Coast Guard suggested, “[W]e have got to tighten up the 
application requirements and the background checks of people coming in for licenses” (p. 78).  
Suggestions for changes to application requirements, and ways to prevent people from lying 
construct “classifications of people and situations that determine permissions and entitlements” 
(Stone 1997:260).  The implication in Secretary Skinner’s testimony is that the solution is to 
punish or hold accountable people like Captain Hazelwood who lied on his application which is 
linked to the causal story that blames the captain for the spill. 
Secretary Skinner also constructs “oil spill liability” as a solution to the problem.  Of 
concern was “foreign carriers” that lacked the financial wherewithal of Exxon.  As he testified 
the department should “work with the House and the Senate on legislation that will protect the 
environment in the future if – heaven forbid – we have a spill of this magnitude anywhere close 
to this, and if the spiller does not have the wherewithal of Exxon, so that the environment and the 
victims of this type of catastrophe are protected” (p. 11).  Predictably, Secretary Skinner of the 
Department of Transportation is concerned with shipping interests and jurisdictions.  In his 
testimony, it is clear that foreign carriers are not only outside U.S. jurisdiction in terms of 
compliance and protocols, they are also outside of laws and liabilities. Predictably, he argued, 
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“[I]t is a significant issue, it is a preemption issue – and I do not mean to minimize it, but the 
foreign protocols are something we have to look at” (p. 34).  And he later emphasized that “an 
internationally enforceable piece of legislation…to deal with the problem if it were ever to occur 
in international waters and the ship was an international ship” (p. 45).  Linking the oil spill to 
fears related to foreign carriers can be understood as constructing popular worry (Loseke 2003) 
or the broader policy narrative of decline (Stone 1997).  Not acting to prevent foreign carriers is 
constructed as a potential problem for national security.  The implication is that if Congress does 
not act to prevent foreign carriers from transporting oil in U.S. waters, then it will no doubt lead 
to greater more expensive problems. 
Determining financial responsibility depends in part on coming up with economic 
estimates for damages caused by the spill.  Dr. Ehler (Director of the Office of Oceanography 
and Marine Assessment) testified about the need to measure the extent of losses due to the spill 
in order to get reimbursed by Exxon for damages, “[T]he immediate purpose of doing the 
measurements of environmental effects is to be used in the damage assessment which means 
putting economic values on those effects so that we can, in fact, file claims to recover some of 
those damages” (p. 85).  Emphasizing fines and liability are what Stone (1997:263) refers to as 
“inducements.”  “The idea behind inducements is that knowledge of a threatened penalty or a 
promised reward motivates people to act differently than they might otherwise choose.”  
Assigning fiscal responsibility to Exxon may serve as a ‘stick’ to prevent future oil spills, but is 
also used as a justification for internationally enforceable legislation that implies that penalties 
should extend to foreign carriers as well. 
Other prescriptions are linked to complex causal stories that blame poor contingency 
planning and the lack of preparedness demonstrated by the Exxon Corporation in causing the 
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Exxon Valdez oil spill.  Honorable Reilly of the Environmental Protection Agency argued, “I 
think that we have to acknowledge that the adequacy of contingency planning for this and other 
spills deserves review and attention” (p. 19-20).  He further argued that we should also consider 
the technological capabilities for dealing with oil spill problems.  “There are, no doubt, a great 
many lessons to be learned here, and there is no shortage of groups that are now 
investigating…the adequacy of the response, the civil and criminal liabilities, and the changes 
that may need to be made in contingency planning” (p. 25).  All in all, government agents 
construct solutions that are oriented to preventing and/or mitigating oil spills in the future with 
an emphasis that the polluter must pay and the polluter must have the financial wherewithal to 
pay.   In short, they construct the story of control that frames the oil spill as something that can 
be dealt with and managed with laws and fines (Stone 1997). 
Exxon Oil Representative: Accident (Alcoholic Captain) and Unavoidable Ignorance, 
Inadvertent Cause (Reckless Captain) and Complex Systems 
While most senators and governmental representatives construct diverse inadvertent 
causal narratives of avoidable ignorance, reckless operator/industry, and complacent Federal 
Government, the CEO of Exxon Corporation constructs a counter narrative of accident due to 
unavoidable ignorance and complex systems.  Stone (1997) writes that accidental causal stories 
include those that construct problems as unintended consequences of unguided actions.  In Mr. 
Rawl’s testimony, the oil spill is constructed as a disaster that was caused by the actions of an 
impaired captain and exacerbated by the particular location in which it occurred.  Mr. Rawl of 
Exxon Oil summarized his prepared statement.  “I am here to provide a frank response to 
questions regarding the Exxon Valdez oil spill and to describe our continuing efforts to deal with 
its consequences” (p. 47).  He then expressed condolences and regrets and said “As has been said 
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many times this morning and by us earlier we take full responsibility.”  But then, he deflects 
blame in testimony that suggested that part of the problem is the environment in which the spill 
occurred.  “It has already been mentioned by Secretary Skinner that the environment in this area, 
its remoteness, the high tides and the associated physical problems make it a particularly difficult 
problem” (p. 47).   
Mr. Rawl continued his statement by testifying about the “factual information” that they 
had at the time that constructs the spill as contained and response underway:  In short, Mr Rawl 
testified (p. 47-8) that the captain left his post, the oil spill contingency plan was activated, 
several organizations were helping to respond to the spill (“We have a large number of experts, 
academics and so forth under contract,”) the claims office was well staffed and prepared to 
provide “immediate advance payment,” the oil that could be removed was removed and the ship 
was “successfully refloated.”  He also testified that it was “too early to assess the long-term 
environmental damage,” and that there were “many unanswered questions” with regard to the 
actions of the captain and crew on board.  Constructing uncertainty with regard to the actions of 
the captain and crew is consistent with Mr. Rawl’s interest to protect the company’s potential 
liability.  In summary, Mr. Rawl’s testimony constructs the definition of the oil spill, victims, 
villains and solutions in predictable ways consistent with his and his company’s interests to 
minimize charges of liability.  Deflecting the responsibility for the spill to the setting and the 
workers constructs alternative explanations that complicate the assignment of willful intent to 
Exxon Corporation. 
Problem Definition: Disaster/Accident 
Mr. Rawl constructs the definition of the problem in testimony about the “facts.”  “A few 
comments about the spill, just to put it into perspective. As mentioned before the spill is 
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estimated at 240,000 barrels which occurred early on March 24.  We have other factual 
information.  The weather was clear.  The ship had no known mechanical difficulties.  A course 
change was requested and authorized because of ice in the outgoing channel.  The captain 
subsequently left the bridge and tests made some time after the grounding showed the captain’s 
alcohol level was above the limits established by the Coast Guard.”   
Unlike previous testimony that estimated the oil spill in terms of gallons, Mr. Rawl uses 
barrels as the metric for size.  This is not surprising as comparatively, 11 million gallons appears 
much larger than 240,000 barrels.  Best (1994) argues that large numbers convey large problems, 
whereas smaller numbers convey  small problems and often statistical claims are not critically 
questioned.  Mr. Rawl constructs the size in terms of barrels rather than gallons conveying a 
comparatively smaller problem.  Again, numbers have normative meaning for constructing 
problems in need of redress, and arguably, constructing the problem using barrels rather than 
gallons serves the interest of Exxon Corporation to minimize the extent and hence costs related 
to the disaster. 
The Chairman and CEO of Exxon Corporation referred to the event as both disaster and 
accident, “I really cannot tell you how sorry we are this disaster occurred” (p. 47).  Later, he 
referred to the event as an accident “[T]he accident has been receiving our full attention and will 
continue to until the job is done.”  Here, Mr. Rawl constructs the event as a disaster/accident, 
offers a “mea culpa” and some clues as to the cause – impaired captain.  Naming a problem as a 
particular type (disaster or accident) is symbolic in policymaking, as Stone 1997 notes.  
Arguably, constructing the spill as an accident rather than a disaster has normative implications.  
“[B]y conveying images of good and bad, right and wrong…these [symbolic] devices are 
instruments in the struggle…”(Stone 1997:156).  Mr. Rawl constructs the spill as bad “disaster,” 
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and causal actions as unintended “accident” pushing the causal narrative out of the realm of 
intent and into the realm of bad luck and misfortune. 
Victims: Alaskans, Exxon Corporation 
Mr. Rawl primarily constructs victims of the spill as those people most proximate.  “[W]e 
are particularly sympathetic to the impacts on the residents of Alaska and particularly those in 
the Prince William Sound area.  That is where the spill is creating a great deal of problems.”  He 
later stated that his company is prepared to respond to claims by injured parties.  “The claims 
office is staffed by 30 people…Our intention is provide fair, reasonable and prompt settlements” 
(p. 48).  Constructing victims as those proximate to the spill limits potential liabilities.  Using the 
container metaphor (Stone 1997, Lakoff and Johnson 1980), Mr. Rawl constructs victims as 
residing in a particular place that are consistent with his interests to minimize potential costs 
related to compensating victims.  Testimony effectively constructs a controllable, containable 
upper limit on potential claims for victim compensation. 
Indeed, in an exchange with Senator Gorton (R-Washington), Mr. Rawl constructs limits 
to liabilities.  Senator Gorton asked, “Was your response to him [Senator Stevens] another 
attempt to limit your liability only to people who are voting residents of Alaska, or does it extend 
to everyone whose livelihood is impacted by this spill?”  To which Mr. Rawl responded “If, in 
fact, there is a fisherman in your home State who has been going up to Alaska during the 
summer and fishing and has records to show that, presumably he would be damaged…[But] I 
cannot accept…liability ad infinitum, and wherever it goes in the world.  You know the rules of 
proof and so forth…” (p. 56).  Here, the implication is that victims will be expected to “prove” 
victimization and in testimony that contains the pool of potential litigants to Alaskans can be 
read as protecting the interests of Exxon Corporation. 
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Further minimizing the extent of the spill and containing potential victims, Mr. Rawl 
testified that at least no one died as a result of the spill and response.  “But, one of the only good 
things I can say about this thing is that so far no one was killed in this operation” (p. 55).  Other 
testimony by Mr. Rawl is interpreted for how it downplays the construction of victims.  For 
example, Mr. Rawl does not testify about environmental damages.  Instead, Mr. Rawl testified 
“For now, it is too early to assess the long-term environmental damage.  Natural resource 
damage assessment studies are underway…We also are having a number done ourselves” (p. 
48).  In short, using the container metaphor, Mr. Rawl limits construction of victims to Alaskan 
residents and others who can prove their negative impact by containing them to communities 
proximate to Prince William Sound (Stone 1997). 
Like other witnesses who were charged with responsibility, Mr. Rawl constructs the 
Exxon Corporation as a victim of the impaired captain.  Again, Stone (1997) notes that it is 
predictable that those who are blamed for the problem will attempt to hold others accountable.  
In Mr. Rawl’s story, it was the captain’s fault.  Specifically, Mr. Rawl, Chairman and CEO of 
Exxon Corporation testified, “Obviously, we had no knowledge that he was impaired” (p. 49).  
His testimony suggests that ignorance of the Captain’s impairment was unavoidable.  Later he 
stated “We did not know about the DWI’s and, of course, I had never heard of this man until two 
weeks ago.  So, obviously, I am not looking for any sympathy, but we did not know he came in, 
as I understand it, and said he had an alcohol problem a number of years ago. He was 
rehabilitated” (p. 50).   
In short, it is not surprising that Mr. Rawl constructs a causal story of accident due to the 
health impairment of the captain.  According to Loseke (2003) one way to deflect blame 
attribution is to re-cast the villain as a victim of disease, in this case alcoholism.  As previously 
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mentioned the “medicalization of deviance,” is a strategy that pushes the construction of cause 
into the realm of accident.  It is consistent with the claims making strategy to avoid the 
construction of villains, and rather to expand the category of victims. 
Mr. Rawl further constructs a narrative of unavoidable ignorance due to the complexities 
of within the organization.  Protecting his own interests as the CEO of Exxon Corporation, Mr. 
Rawl testified that he was ignorant of operational judgments at the “lower levels.”  Specifically, 
Mr. Rawl testified “Well, when it gets to the lower levels, I lose the track…There are…other 
people who tell this captain what to do in terms of scheduling” (p. 57).  In other words, it was not 
Mr. Rawl’s fault.  His testimony constructs the company and himself personally as victims of 
unavoidable ignorance. 
Villains: Reckless Captain, Alyeska Oil Spill Contingency Plan/Federal Government 
In much of the testimony by senators and government bureaucrats, the villain in causal 
stories is the Exxon Corporation for reckless decision-making regarding the Valdez tanker that 
ran aground.  However, stories that attempt to blame individuals for the Exxon Valdez oil spill 
are challenged by stories that deflect blame and responsibility.  For example, stories that 
construct the Exxon executives as traitors who acted recklessly for their own gain are countered 
in Mr. Rawl’s testimony with a story that suggests that Exxon executives were ignorant of the 
captain’s qualifications and hence victims themselves.   
Predictably, Mr. Rawl blames the captain of the ship for poor decision making which led 
to the oil spill and deflects responsibility for putting only one captain in charge of a supertanker 
filled with oil.  In short, the captain could have prevented the situation.  “[T]he same 
impairment…that created the spill to begin with, created a situation where the master could have 
brought another officer to the bridge…If the captain had sent for another mate before he went 
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below…I would expect it would have had a much better chance of getting through there” (p. 49).  
Later he testified “When we found out, however, there was alcohol involved and the other 
circumstances – we found out he violated a number of company policies – he was terminated” 
(p. 50).  By assigning blame and responsibility to the impaired captain, Mr. Rawl protects the 
interests of Exxon Corporation.  Here, Mr. Rawl constructs what Stone calls an inadvertent 
causal narrative of recklessness on the part of the captain.  Stone (1997) notes that this is a 
typical strategy for problems in occupational safety and health.  Managers of companies blame 
the workers.  The inadvertent carelessness is understood to be the risks that the captain took in 
piloting a ship while impaired by alcohol, deflecting blame from the company as a whole.  The 
oil spill was the unintended consequence of willed human action (alcohol consumption). 
In addition to constructing the captain as responsible for the spill, Mr. Rawl constructs 
the government backed Alyeska oil spill contingency plan for failing to better prepare Exxon 
Corporation for the ability to respond to an oil spill.  “It has always been recognized that a large 
tanker spill was possible in Prince William Sound, however nobody ever thought it was probable 
that a spill would be this large.  There has been a rather modest write-up in the contingency plan 
for that, which recognized the possibility of a 200,000 barrel spill” (p. 51).  Blaming the Alyeska 
plan is a strategy to push the cause of the spill to the realm of complex systems, which is akin to 
saying that the cause was accidental (Stone 1997).   
The complexity of contracting to transport oil requires interactions between the 
government and the industry contractor.  Implied with the invocation of the Alyeska plan is that 
the industry contractor acted in accordance with the criteria established by the Federal 
Government and was hence, just following rules.  That is, Exxon Corporation acted in 
accordance with contingency protocols as stipulated in the government backed Alyeska plan.  
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However, the contingency plan is implicated in Mr. Rawl’s testimony that charged the faulty 
plan for under-estimating the potential for a worst case scenario.  This narrative strategy 
constructs the government as partly responsible for the conditions that led to problems with 
responding to the oil spill.  
In summary, Mr. Rawl constructs a causal story of accident and inadvertence and deflects 
blame and responsibility for the oil spill by assigning responsibility to the reckless captain and 
the Federal Government.  As Stone (1997) points out, it is somewhat predictable that parties 
charged with responsibility for an event like the Exxon Valdez oil spill to push the causal 
explanation into the realm of accident or to blame others for their carelessness and avoidable 
ignorance in order to avoid responsibility and/or punishment. 
Solutions: Learn from Event, Improve Company Policies, Continue Domestic Exploration of Oil 
Causal narratives that deflect blame from Exxon Corporation, (implicating the captain, 
unavoidable ignorance, and the Federal Government instead) are linked with proposed solutions.  
“The first thing we have to find out is what is the size of this environmental disaster” (p. 59).  
Quantifying the extent of the disaster in terms of size and scope is inevitably related to potential 
liabilities.  Predictably, it is in Mr. Rawl’s interest to mitigate liabilities and claims.   
Furthermore, as Stone (1997) points out, defining a problem in terms of numeric estimates 
creates moral boundaries around what is and is not the problem.  “Numbers can be ambiguous, 
and so leave room for political struggles to control their interpretation” (Stone 1997:176).  In Mr. 
Rawl’s story, the size of the disaster is not known.  And in exchanges with senators who queried 
whether Exxon will compensate all potential victims, Mr. Rawl testified that he would not take 
“liability ad infinitum.”  Indeed, Stone (1997:176) theorizes, “Measuring any phenomenon 
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implicitly creates norms about how much is too little, too much, or just right.” The point is it 
counting implies control. 
Another solution proposed by Mr. Rawl regards company policies for drug and alcohol 
testing.  Consistent with the causal story that an alcoholic captain piloted the barge into Bligh 
Reef, is the solution to require drug and alcohol testing of employees.  While Exxon Corporation 
did not test the captain in this event, changes can be made for the future.  “We can impose testing 
in certain instances, and we have imposed it.  Not before the spill, but we have got it in the 
revised policy, and we are going to do it.  If we get lawsuits on it, we are going to take lawsuits” 
(p. 50).  This is another illustration of a policy instrument referred to as “constitutional 
engineering” (Stone 1997) and is future oriented.  Constructing change in practices, and decision 
making protocols to prevent future tanker crashes is predicated on metaphors of mechanisms and 
machines.  Again, the implication is that oil spills can be prevented and controlled if the broken 
bureaucratic structures (like drug and alcohol testing) are fixed. 
Mr. Rawl also testified about what he is not willing to do in light of the oil spill.  
Consistent with causal stories that portray the CEO as a victim of unavoidable ignorance, Mr. 
Rawl testified that was not willing to take the fall personally.  In an exchange with Senator 
Gorton (R-Washington), the Senator wanted Mr. Rawl to comment on what his company was 
willing to do in response to the disaster, the implication being that Mr. Rawl should agree to 
resign.  “As I understand their [Japanese] corporate structure, you now, when something like this 
happens, everyone takes responsibility, from the individual…up to the CEO.  And everyone 
offers his resignation…”  To which Mr. Rawl responded “I appreciate that expresses your 
opinion.  I doubt if I have to comment on it except that a lot of the Japanese kill themselves also, 
and I refuse to do that” (p. 58).  Here, Mr. Rawl constructs boundaries around what he is willing 
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to do consistent with his individual interest to remain employed as CEO.  Constructing 
expectations for his resignation as tantamount to suicide is a symbolic device that is wrought 
with normative meaning.  In short, his resignation is constructed as an immoral act. 
Finally, Mr. Rawl proposes that in light of the oil spill, one of the main “lessons learned” 
is that the country should maintain domestic exploration of oil.  “In terms of oil exploration, I 
think we need to continue to do it in this country.  I think it is very vital.  As you know…we are 
importing 40-plus percent of the oil we consume and we have a balance of payment problems.  If 
we do not explore for domestic oil we will have tankers coming to U.S. coasts with foreign 
rather than Alaskan oil” (p. 62).  Consistent with other stories that construct the United States as 
exceptional and more virtuous than foreign countries, constructing the expansion of U.S. 
domestic oil exploration as a solution is consistent with the interests of the U.S. based Exxon 
Corporation which stands to gain from such expansion.  Furthermore, it works symbolically to 
normalize domestic oil production as a “good thing.” 
In summary, like causal stories in the Santa Barbara case, stories constructed to explain 
the Exxon Valdez oil spill are diverse and contested.  This is predictable according to Stone’s 
(1997) framework that organizes policy stories according to actions and consequences.  Causal 
stories represent struggles to bring the oil spill under human control, to assign fiscal 
responsibilities and legislative reform and to avoid punitive costs of doing business.  In short, 
stories work to advance and/or protect the interests of the storyteller. Testimony from Mr. Rawl 
of Exxon Corporation constructs the oil spill as caused by willed human action that resulted in 
unintended consequences.  In other words, it was an accident.  The causal stories offered by 
senators cast the captain, the company and the Federal government as accountable for 
miscalculation, poor judgment, lies, dereliction and complacency that created underlying causes 
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of the spill.  However, causal explanations that attempt to levy individual blame are undermined 
by alternative explanations that deflect blame and exonerate people or construct the problem as 
everybody’s fault.  Not surprisingly, other testimony levies blame and responsibility on the 
complex systems in which individuals are embedded. (See Table 7).   
Table 7: Summary of Causal Stories by Diverse Storytellers in Exxon Valdez Oil Spill 
 Senators Government Agents Oil Industry 
Causal 
Story(ies) 
Avoidable Ignorance, 
Reckless Operator, 
Complacent 
Industry/Government 
Avoidable Ignorance, Reckless 
Operators, Complex Systems 
Accident (Alcoholic Captain), 
Unavoidable Ignorance, 
Inadvertent (Reckless Captain) 
and Complex Systems 
Problem 
Definition 
Disaster, Tragedy Catastrophe, Tragedy, Disaster Disaster, Accident 
Victims Prince William Sound, 
Marine Life, Tourists, 
Residents 
Fish and Wildlife, Coasts and 
Rivers, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. 
Citizens 
Alaskans, Exxon Corporation 
Villains Exxon Oil Corp., U.S. 
Coast Guard, Captain 
Hazelwood, 
Government, Industry 
Exxon Corporation, Federal 
Government, Captain 
Hazelwood 
Reckless Captain, Alyeska Oil 
Spill Contingency 
Plan/Federal Government 
Solutions Protect Coastal 
Environment, Fine 
Exxon Corporation, 
Federalize Response, 
Ban Supertankers 
Improve Captain Certification 
Processes, Create Oil Spill 
Liability, Assess Environmental 
Consequences, Improve 
Contingency Planning. 
Learn from Event, Improve 
Company (alcohol and drug 
testing) Policies, Continue 
Domestic Exploration of Oil 
 
Like in the Santa Barbara case, storytellers use rhetorical devices to accomplish diverse 
goals (assign responsibility, deflect responsibility).  Despite the complexity and diversity of 
stories told, there are underlying assumptions that provide for their overall coherence.  Taken 
together, I consider the ways witnesses at the initial senate hearing pertaining to the Exxon 
Valdez oil spill represent the problem, cause and resolutions for how they make sense of the oil 
spill event.  All in all, the spill was represented as an economic and ecological disaster that was 
caused by individual dereliction as well as organizational complexity and that it could have and 
should have been prevented.  Prescriptions focused on assessing the overall economic impact to 
natural and biological resources as well as to industrial, recreation and tourism economies in 
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order to determine the aggregate financial toll caused by the spill.  Other solutions emphasized 
the need for better planning and preparedness as well as more monitoring and oversight of 
individual contributors.  Like the previous chapter, I argue with Stone’s (1997) assertion that 
notwithstanding the contesting stories and details, causal stories reflect two broad storylines:  
stories of decline and stories of control that are held together by taken-for-granted assumptions.  
In the final section, I consider the ways diverse stories are held together by similar taken-for-
granted assumptions or underlying morals about how the world should work.   
Discussion of Findings 
So Far, I have examined testimony about the Exxon Valdez oil spill.  Like the previous 
chapter that explored testimonies about the Santa Barbara oil spill, multiple stories construct the 
problem, causes and prescribed solutions that are linked with the interests of storytellers.  In this 
section, I consider stories together for how they reveal underlying morals.  Within diverse and 
contesting narratives I interpret underlying moral assumptions about what is valued and what is 
devalued.  The context of the Exxon Valdez oil spill was different from the Santa Barbara oil 
spill in that it had precedents. That is, it is not the first oil spill to have occurred in the United 
States.  The main plot of the story is that a tanker carrying millions of gallons of crude oil ran 
into Bligh Reef spilling nearly 11 million gallons of oil into “pristine” waters of Prince William 
Sound.  At the first Senate hearing that addressed the spill witnesses decried the event as one of 
the worst environmental catastrophes ever to occur in America.  In oral testimony, Alaska was 
extolled for its unique ecology that not only provided for recreation and tourism, but also for the 
nation’s economic well being.  Several witnesses describe and define the Exxon Valdez spill 
using comparison to other previous spills that were either more or less severe. Most witnesses 
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agreed that the event was a disaster.  Some used disastrous metaphors suggesting that the spill 
was akin to an atomic bomb or a devastating earthquake.    
 Victims of the spill were constructed as the natural environment, birds, marine life and 
especially the valuable fisheries.  Others mentioned coasts and rivers, as well as residents and 
tourists whose livelihoods were altered by the spill.  From some vantage points, villains were 
constructed as the “convicted drunk” as well as the traitorous oil industry that acted recklessly 
and irresponsibly leading to what was considered then the largest oil spill on record to have 
occurred in U.S. waters. Members of the U.S. Coast Guard were also impugned for not 
conducting proper background checks, and/or for allowing an impaired captain to steer a large 
barge full of oil through the ecologically vulnerable and narrow Sound.   
But, other stories deflected blame and responsibility for the oil spill.  That is, testimony 
from the Mr. Rawl of Exxon Corporation and members of the U.S. Coast Guard blamed complex 
systems and Congress for not funding the Coast Guard well enough to provide for the checks and 
balances.  Government officials and industry operators are blamed for complacency and 
misplaced trust in processes and procedures.  Mr. Rawl pointed fingers at the contingency plans 
(Alyeska protocol, for example) that were used to establish clean up and response protocols, 
suggesting that oil spill scenarios defined in contingency plans were grossly underestimated.  In 
the main, blame was placed on complex causes and institutional processes that created the 
conditions for the accident to happen.   
 In the end, solutions to the problem were consistent with description of the problem.  
Principally, the focus was on establishing clear liability which was difficult given the multiple 
stories constructing inadvertent causes (ignorance, lack of staff and funds, lack of foresight, 
addiction, and poor judgment) and complex institutional causes (lack of monitoring/oversight, 
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failed protocols and inadequate contingency plans).  Despite the lack of a clear villain, the Exxon 
Corporation was named as principally liable to compensate victims and to assume responsibility 
for clean up.  Further, prescriptions pointed to fixing contingency plans and protocols, providing 
more budget allocations to the U.S. Coast Guard to enable the agency to do its job correctly.  
And finally, witnesses argued for a need to legislate stringent practices to protect against “fly by 
night” foreign carriers who do not have the deep pockets that Exxon Corporation does.  The 
implied emphasis in this prescription is that oil companies should be able to pay for any and all 
damages that result from oil extraction and development practices – and foreign carriers are not 
as good as U.S. carriers.   
Underlying Morals 
 The underlying morals in Exxon Valdez stories are not unlike the Santa Barbara event. 
Unique natural landscapes should be protected such as the Prince William Sound or the Alaskan 
Wilderness in general.  Furthermore, areas constructed as important for the national economy 
should also be protected.  Constructed as “the most fertile, most productive and uniquely 
vulnerable,” senators advocated environmental stewardship.  The underlying assumption is 
supported by ontological metaphors that create boundaries around land areas and events.  As 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980:29) argue “[W]e experience the rest of the world as outside us.  Each 
of us is a container, with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation.  We project our own in-
out orientation onto other physical objects that are bounded by surfaces.” 
Individuals and organizations should “do the right thing” and uphold moral 
responsibility.  As has been demonstrated, the struggle in diverse causal stories about the oil spill 
is focused on assigning moral responsibility and “real economic costs” (Stone 1997:206).  That 
is, industry operators and government agencies such as the U.S. Coast Guard should know better 
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than to employ a person with an alcohol addiction.  They should be more responsible in their 
vetting processes to ensure the person at the helm of a large tanker carrying millions of gallons 
of oil is up for the task.  Government and industry should plan better and be more prepared.  
Specifically, in contingency planning (as stipulated in Alyeska oil spill contingency plan) they 
should redefine what constitutes a “worst case scenario.”   
Finally, testimony emphasizes a need for a comprehensive accounting of environmental 
loss in economic terms to enable the Federal Government to provide an accurate bill to the 
Exxon Corporation for damages and losses to the natural environment as well as local, regional 
and national economies. The underlying assumption is predicated on constructing aggregate 
costs to Prince William Sound and other victims that can be remunerated and remediated with 
cash. 
Some Places are More Valuable than Others 
 While representations of the Santa Barbara oil spill were contested by stortellers, 
participants in the Exxon Valdez oil spill hearing nearly unanimously refer to the event as a 
catastrophic event.  The “good reasons” (Fisher 1985) provided to support the representation of 
the spill as a catastrophe are illustrated in testimony that highlights the economic costs to 
“pristine waters” of the Prince William Sound.  This place is described as uniquely valuable due 
to the fact that it is considered among the “most productive” and one of the “most fertile fishing 
grounds of any in the world.”  But it is also described as uniquely vulnerable because of its 
“gravel beaches, limited wave action and sub-arctic temperatures,” and because it is “one of the 
richest concentrations of wildlife in North America.”   
Following the storyline of helplessness and control (Stone 1997), the oil spill is 
constructed as a situation that was out of control, but can be managed if we [insert policy 
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proposal].  The underlying assumptions illuminated in representations of the oil spill as a 
controllable problem are that the Prince William Sound is uniquely wild, vulnerable, and 
valuable and should be protected.  The story suggests that we should be more cautious with 
regard to places that we select to exploit for oil extraction, production, and distribution.  The 
implication is that a Wildlife Refuge should not be explored for oil supplies because of both its 
ecological and economic importance for the nation’s food supply (of salmon, herring, etc.).  In 
other words, we should not drill where we eat. 
 Indeed, Fourcade (2011) recently argued that the moral importance of place in American 
culture lies between “wilderness” and “commodity.”  Fourcade’s work points to underlying 
beliefs about the importance of untamed, untouched and wild landscapes of Alaskan wilderness 
that are juxtaposed with beliefs about structured, tamed landscapes of the urban environment.  
The representation of place as wild and characterized by natural beauty arguably leads to 
practices to protect or pay up.  Fourcade (2011) argues that representing the moral value of 
nature in economic terms is embedded in complex histories and political arrangements.  As she 
writes, “[Economic valuation] incorporates in its very making evaluative frames and judgments 
that can all be traced back to specific politico-institutional configurations and conflicts” 
(Fourcade 2011:1769).   
 In short, stories that construct the uniqueness of the Alaskan wilderness are similar to the 
stories that construct the uniqueness of the Santa Barbara coast. Both are supported by 
ontological metaphors that contain land spaces as entities (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) that are 
morally valued as naturally beautiful, precious areas that should be protected.  In contrast, places 
not represented as unique, wild, undeveloped, beautiful, and vulnerable are not accorded as much 
value.  The places we regard with high moral evaluation, we regard with high economic 
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valuation. Arguably the reverse also applies: the places we regard with high economic valuation 
we regard with high moral evaluation.  As Lakoff and Johnson (1980:22) argue, “The most 
fundamental values in a culture will be coherent with the metaphorical structure of the most 
fundamental concepts in the culture.” And as testimonies in the Exxon hearing suggest, beauty is 
among the most fundamental values in our culture. 
Nobody’s Perfect and Accidents Happen 
 
 Exxon Valdez oil spill stories also reveal moral assumptions about people and 
knowledge.  Specifically, testimony highlights the necessity of learning from mistakes. There is 
much moral condemnation of the acts of individuals deemed responsible for the spill. Following 
the conspiracy storyline which Stone (1997:143) regards as a “twist on the control story,” some 
causal stories constructs victims and harms as “deliberately caused or knowingly tolerated, and 
so evoke horror and moral condemnation.”  The captain of the tanker is regarded as a “convicted 
drunk,” who “lied on his license renewal application” and whose actions led to the “defiling” the 
wildlife and fisheries of the Prince William Sound.  Senator Hollings’s (D-South Carolina) 
comments further condemns the guilty, “Why should the citizens of this country continue to be 
subject to the tyranny of small minds who abuse alcohol and drugs” (p. 3)?   
Similarly, the Exxon Corporation is referred to as the “double cross boys” whose 
carelessness led to catastrophe.  Representations of those who were held responsible for the oil 
spill as criminally negligent traitors suggest that the oil company intentionally defiled Alaska’s 
beautiful wilderness for economic gain. Furthermore, consistent with conspiracy plotlines, 
witness representations imply that the U.S. Coast Guard and Exxon Corporation were in cahoots.  
Indeed members of the Coast Guard are labeled derelicts for not having more stringent protocols 
for the transport of oil through the Prince William Sound.   
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But, predictably representations of villains in nefarious terms are juxtaposed with 
alternative explanations that deflect blame and responsibility away from particular individuals.  
Loseke (2003) notes the difficulties and complexities regarding the construction of villains.  
Villains must be constructed as intending to do harm for no good reason (my emphasis).  
Further, Stone (1997:191) argues that constructing intent is the “most powerful offensive 
position to take, because it lays the blame directly at someone’s feet.”  However, as has been 
argued, there are often counter narratives that deflect blame and responsibility away from parties 
charged with guilt.  That is to say underlying representations that vilify the captain, the 
corporation and the coast guard are widely held beliefs that nobody is perfect and accidents are 
bound to happen.   
Yet, broadly, diverse constructions again imply a story of control (Stone 1997).  
Alternative explanations are considered for the acts of those deemed responsible.  The captain 
had an addiction problem for which he was seeking treatment.  The chairman and CEO of Exxon 
Corporation did not know that the captain lied or was impaired which was addressed in proposals 
to fix broken bureaucratic structures of certification and alcohol testing.  Testimony suggests that 
the decision to hire him was an operational one that was made without the knowledge of the 
chief executive.  And the Coast Guard said they were understaffed and under-funded.  Blame is 
levied at a stingy Congress.  In other words there were alternative explanations for derelictions of 
duty that are were offered to absolve the accused of guilt, or to provide for their forgiveness. 
Taken together, the underlying belief is that nobody is perfect.  The cause of the Exxon 
Valdez oil spill was constructed as due to imperfect processes, and systemic inefficiencies.  
People are victims of complex systems.  Senator Packwood’s comments illustrate the moral 
tension with holding individuals accountable for disastrous events, “God has not yet perfected 
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man, and I doubt if Congress is going to improve on God’s efforts over the years” (p. 37). 
Additionally, Secretary Skinner of the DOT said, “It clearly is, from what the preliminary reports 
show, an act of…significant negligence. We cannot mandate acts of negligence.  They are going 
to happen on occasion” (p. 44). And as the analysis reveals in more detail, people are further 
absolved of guilt if they are just following orders.  It was not the fault of any one individual; it 
was due to faulty scenario planning.  Based on previous experience and knowledge, industry 
actors did not, nor could not anticipate an oil spill could be so big.   
Importantly, political actors use narratives of control to buttress goals for policy design.  
Expressly, storytellers avoid the construction of villains and concentrate on the construction of 
victims which works to quantify the extent of damages and liabilities as finite and countable.  
Additionally, testimony constructs the need for more stringent legislation and regulation to 
protect the environment from another oil spill.  Moreover, stories construct the problem as 
controllable with more stringent background checks on captains of large tankers, and more 
clearly defined responsibilities for government agencies tasked with oil industry oversight.  
Finally, proposals to update contingency plans and protocols in order to be prepared for future 
spills that may exceed our imagination in scope and size illustrate the belief that what was 
construed as a disaster similar to an atomic bomb is “amenable to change through human 
agency” (Stone 1997:143).  Underlying prescriptions to fix broken systems is the normative 
assumption that we can.  And with systemic re-engineering, we can prevent future oil spills. 
Polluters Can (and Must) Pay 
 
Despite the complexities in assignment of blame and responsibility, prescriptions for 
redress construct the “right thing to do” which is for Exxon Corporation to pay penance for 
spilling oil into the Prince William Sound.  Stone (1997) argues that “inducements” or 
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punishments are predicated on the belief that sanctioning wrong doers with financial penalties 
will work to shape human behavior.  “Our most commonsense notion of how to bring about 
change rests on the proverbial carrot and stick” (Stone 1997:263).  Here again is the underlying 
narrative of control that implies the oil spill problem is definable, calculable, and fixable.  All in 
all, the Exxon Corporation is expected to compensate human and environmental victims for the 
damages and losses caused by the oil spill.  In addition to beliefs about the applications of 
punishments to control or shape behavior are underlying beliefs that suggest nature can be 
compensated for losses and damages caused by the oil spill.  Nature is conceptualized as an 
entity or object that can be remunerated. 
Consistent with theories regarding metaphorical coherence testimonies attempt to make 
sense of the oil spill using the “container” metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).  Diverse stories 
construct the oil spill problem as an object, the setting in which it occurred as a unique natural 
space, and the activities surrounding the spill as “substances” that are contained which works to 
construct the scope of the problem and proposals for redress.  Causal stories that are constructed 
to hold individuals and organizations accountable for the oil spill: (the captain, the U.S. Coast 
Guard, and the Exxon Corporation) are linked with calls to create punitive laws that assign 
financial responsibility for the consequences of the oil spill.  Creating boundaries around events, 
actions and states (places) is an act of quantification, an attempt to bring the oil spill problem 
under human control (Stone 1997).  While not writing about oil spills per se, Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980:34) argue: “When we are suffering substantial economic losses due to complex economic 
and political factors that no one really understands, the [oil company] as adversary metaphor at 
least gives us a coherent account of why we’re suffering these losses.”  Underlying prescriptions 
that emphasize financial remuneration for the oil spill are taken-for-granted assumptions that 
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ecological resources can be bought and replenished with cash – that money can redress the 
impacts to “fish stocks, birds, marine mammals, and the extensive critical habitats that comprise 
Prince William Sound” (Dr. Evans of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, p. 
84).   
Prescriptions for fines and inducements are consistent with the polluter pays principle in 
environmental law (Stenis and Hogland 2003).  Underlying beliefs in polluter pays prescriptions 
are assumptions that the ability to pay damages absolves the sin of natural defilement.  For a 
company like Exxon Corporation that is perceived to have deep enough pockets to pay up when 
oil spills happen there is an underlying positive evaluation of their ability to clean up their 
messes.  In contrast, prescriptions for financial inducements construct “fly by night foreign 
carriers” as potentially lacking the ability to pay as a justification for oil spill legislation to apply 
internationally.  Constructing foreign carriers as lacking in necessary financial might and 
stability that is required to compensate for future oil spill disasters (simultaneously constructs the 
moral superiority of United States companies as exceptional in the activities of oil transport).  
This illustrates an underlying belief that future oil spills are controllable but only if/when led by 
the United States.   Polluter pays principle is predicated on the assumption that a carrier must 
have the ability to pay for the inevitable oil spill and presumably no carriers have the resources 
that American carriers do.  Furthermore, prescribing that polluters pay for damages assumes 
finite, countable damages can be redressed with money.  Money is the answer. 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, stories about the Exxon Valdez oil spill illuminate contesting constructions 
of the problem, victims, villains and solutions that are patterned according to the interests of the 
storytellers.  All in all, analyses of stories show that political actors use rhetorical devices and 
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narrative strategies to construct the Exxon Valdez oil spill as a problem that is amenable to 
human control.  Moreover, when examined together, stories reveal underlying assumptions about 
how the world should work.  We should not transport oil in ecologically valuable places, 
convicted drunks should not be able to captain tankers carrying oil via waterways, and related 
groups and agencies should be more knowledgeable; have more proactive plans and protocols.  
Finally, oil companies should have deep pockets to compensate for the economic losses to 
ecology and to economy.  While the ideal is that oil spills should not happen, there is an 
underlying tacit agreement that they will, but metaphorical quantifications construct oil spills as 
controllable problems.  This assumption speaks to a larger shared cultural tolerance for risk that 
has the potential to threaten our natural environment beyond our ability to pay (Lash 2000).  
Perhaps shared risk is supported by beliefs in the ability to control and contain the consequences 
of oil spills.  Nowhere in the testimony about the Exxon Valdez oil spill is there a suggestion that 
we consider other means for energy production or to consider constricting energy consumption.  
While some propose the idea that we should go to smaller tankers or not drill in ecologically 
vulnerable areas no one suggests that we curtail our demand for oil.  The narratives focus on 
being better prepared for the next “big one,” which is just around the corner – in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX: STORIES ABOUT THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL 
 
 Analyses in this comparative project have, thus far, illuminated the multiple and 
contesting stories about significant oil spills.  All in all, stories that are constructed to explain oil 
spill events are patterned in predictable ways.  For example, senators construct stories of 
inadvertent causes which assign blame and responsibility to reckless oil operators and other 
implicated parties for actions that inadvertently led to the oil spill.  Whereas the accused 
(industry representatives and other parties) construct counter stories of accidental cause, worker 
incompetence, and complex systems to deflect blame and minimize responsibility.   
Taken together diverse stories reveal underlying morals or widely held beliefs that 
provide for their coherence.  In general, I observe underlying narratives of control in diverse 
stories told among diverse storytellers (Stone 1997).  Summarily, diverse causal narratives depict 
oil spills as controllable problems.  Widely held beliefs revealed in the Santa Barbara case are 
visible in testimonies that suggest we should not drill in beautiful places like the Santa Barbara 
coast.  Further, we should be and can be more knowledgeable about the geological conditions 
and technological capacities before we drill.  Finally, we have or can develop the technology to 
avoid future oil spills.  In the Exxon Valdez hearing, I find evidence of control in testimonies 
that suggests nature is economically valued and that some places are more valuable than others.  
Further, I note taken-for-granted beliefs such as people are not perfect and accidents can and will 
happen.  Finally, I observe the belief that industrial “polluters” can and should be able to pay for 
defiling nature and natural resources.   
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The underlying assumption is that oil companies should repent and pay – they should 
have deep pockets and stronger contingencies in the event, “God forbid,” another oil spill event 
occurs.  The widely-held belief that nature can be recompensed for losses due to oil spill events 
with cash.  Oil spills are quantifiable and controllable phenomena.  But, despite what might be 
regarded as growing awareness of the consequences of oil drilling to natural and social 
environments, another oil spill event does happen and it is even bigger than the last one.  In this 
chapter, I examine testimony about the Deepwater Horizon or BP oil spill – otherwise known as 
the largest oil spill in American history.  
According to Hoffman and Jennings (2011:100):  
On April 20, 2010, the mobile drilling rig Deepwater Horizon exploded about 41 miles 
off the coast of Louisiana when methane gas ran up the drilling column and ignited.  At 
the time of the incident, production casing was being installed and cemented by 
Halliburton Energy Services.  The explosion killed 11 platform workers and injured 17 
others.  Within 2 days, the rig sank, setting off an unrestricted flow of oil from the 
damaged wellhead 5,000 feet below the surface of the Gulf of Mexico.  An estimated 
53,000 to 62,000 barrels of oil were released per day, covering 3,850 square miles in just 
over a week.  After 88 days of unsuccessful attempts to stem the flowing oil, the wellhead 
cap was finally replaced on July 15.  On September 19, nearly 5 months after the initial 
blowout, the federal government declared the well officially “dead.”  At this point, the 
BP Oil Spill became, in terms of volume, the largest accidental spill in history. 
 
 Over the course of five months, the well spilled nearly 205 million gallons of oil into the 
Gulf of Mexico (Hoffman and Jennings 2011).  To put this amount into perspective, the Exxon 
Valdez Oil Spill that occurred approximately 20 years prior was then considered the largest oil 
spill in United States history with an estimated volume of 11 million gallons.  In addition, the 
Santa Barbara oil spill that occurred nearly 20 years prior to Exxon released approximately three 
million gallons of crude (Kurtz 2004) (See Figure 2).  In what follows, I interpret oral testimony 
in the first Senate hearing to address the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.   
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Figure 2: Oil Spills Compared by Volume of Oil 
Institutional Context 
On May 22, 2010, nearly three weeks after the spill, Jeff Bingaman (committee chairman 
and Democratic Senator from New Mexico) along with other members of the Senate Committee 
on Energy and Natural Resources held a hearing to “create a thorough factual record and an 
informed discussion of the very important questions presented by the disaster” and to “advance 
any necessary and appropriate legislation through the Senate” (p.3a).  (See Table 8).  This is the 
initial or first Senate hearing that takes place following the spill.  As has been discussed in 
previous chapters, the chairman of the committee has the power to decide the structure of senate 
hearings.  And Chairman Bingaman (D-New Mexico) divided this hearing into two “panels” of 
“excellent witnesses” (Bingaman p.4a).   
The first panel included witnesses deemed “experts” in the oil industry and in regulation 
and oversight.  These witnesses included Dr. F.E. Beck, an associate professor of petroleum 
engineering at Texas A&M University and Mr. Elmer Danenberger, retired chief of offshore 
regulator programs for the Minerals Management Service, Department of the Interior. 
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Table 8 – Alphabetical List of Senate Members of the Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources 
Name Political Party 
John Barrasso R-Wyoming 
Evan Bayh D-Indiana 
Robert F. Bennett R-Utah 
Jeff Bingamen (Chairman) D-New Mexico 
Jim Bunning R-Kentucky 
Richard M. Burr R-North Carolina 
Sam Brownback R-Kansas 
Maria Cantwell D-Washington 
Bob Corker R-Tennessee 
Byron L. Dorgan D-North Dakota 
Tim Johnson D-South Dakota 
Mary Landrieu D-Louisiana 
Blanche Lincoln D-Arkansas 
John McCain R-Arizona 
Robert Menendez D-New Jersey 
Lisa Murkowski (ranking member) F-Alaska 
Jim Risch R-Idaho 
Debbie Sabenow D-Michigan 
Jeff Sessions R-Alabama 
Jeanne Shaheen D-New Hampshire 
Mark Udall D-Colorado 
Ron Wyden D-Oregon 
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The second panel comprised witnesses from the three oil companies implicated in the event: 
Lamar McKay, President and Chairman, B.P. America, Inc.; Steven Newman, President and 
Chief Executive Officer, Transocean Limited; and Tim Probert, President, Global Business 
Lines, Chief Health, Safety and Environmental Officer, Halliburton. (See Table 9). 
The structure of this hearing differs from previous hearings analyzed and as such bears 
mentioning.  As has been previously discussed, the institutional context of the hearing influences 
the stories told within the hearing (McBeth et al. 2011).  In panel 1, the stories focus on 
explaining “best practices” from the perspectives of an academic expert (Dr. F.E. Beck, 
Associate Professor of Texas A&M University), and a retired government official, (Elmer 
Danenberger, Former Chief of Offshore Regulatory Program, Minerals Management Service).  
In panel 2, the stories are focused on perspectives of industry leaders whose companies are 
implicated in the oil spill event.  Unlike the previous two oil spill hearings analyzed in this 
comparative report, there are no conservationists or environmental activists present.  Predictably, 
there is scant mention of environmental consequences in this hearing. 
Table 9 – Chronological List of Witnesses – Deepwater Horizon 
Name Organization Date 
Dr. F.E. Beck Associate Professor Petroleum Engineering at Texas A&M University May 11, 2010 
(Panel 1) 
Mr. Elmer 
Danenberger 
Retired Chief of Offshore Regulatory Programs for the Minerals 
Management Service 
 
Lamar McKay President and Chairman, B.P. America, Inc. May 11, 2010 
(Panel 2) 
Steven Newman President and Chief Executive Officer, Transocean Limited  
Tim Probert, President, Global Business Lines, Chief Health, Safety and Environmental 
Officer, Halliburton 
 
 
The fact that people died and/or were injured in the oil well explosion also shaped the 
protocols governing the way this hearing was conducted.  Unlike previous cases (Santa Barbara 
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and Exxon Valdez), witnesses in the Deepwater Horizon hearing were required to be sworn in as 
directed by Chairman Bingaman (D-New Mexico),  “Because of the gravity of this hearing, we 
have that all witnesses testify under oath…” (p.6a).    The implication is that what is said in this 
hearing can be used as evidence in a court of law.  Senator Bingaman stated, “Do you solemnly 
swear that the testimony you’re about to give to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth” (p. 6a)?  Arguably, this 
rule influenced the types of stories told.  Indeed, Stone (1997:203) argues, “The political success 
of causal theories is…constrained by two powerful social institutions for determining cause and 
legitimating claims about harms:  law and science.”   
Like the two previous cases, I regard congressional testimony as narratives that construct 
the meaning of the oil spill.  I examine stories about the Deepwater Horizon oil spill as 
constructed from the oral testimony of senators and invited witnesses.  Witnesses’ verbal 
statements answer questions about the context/setting of the event as well as the characters, 
plotlines and underlying morals.  I organize stories told according to Stone’s (1997) “causal 
stories” framework to illuminate how storytellers define the oil spill problem and its redress that 
illuminate links between interests and ideas. 
Causal Stories 
 
Consistent with previous case studies about oil spills, I examine transcripts from the first 
Senate hearing to investigate the Deepwater Horizon oil spill with an aim to document who the 
storytellers are as well as how they construct narratives that attempt to make sense of the oil 
spill.  In the main, there are three different groups of storytellers in this particular hearing:  
senators, government “experts,” and oil industry representatives.  As such, I organize stories 
beginning with senators, then,  the first panel (experts), and ending with stories told by witnesses 
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in the second panel, (industry representatives).  Notwithstanding opening statements, senators 
tell stories in comments and questions posed to witnesses.  Invited witnesses, on the other hand, 
tell stories through prepared statements and responses to questions posed by senators.   
Diverse testimonies are analyzed for how they construct the oil spill event as a problem 
that requires intervention.  For example, similar to previous cases, senators construct inadvertent 
causal narratives that construct the oil companies as reckless and ill-prepared villains whose 
actions led the oil spill.  Another story is that oil companies were in cahoots with the Minerals 
Management Service (government agency) tasked with oversight and regulation and did not do 
due diligence to ensure safety protocols were followed.  Consistent with what Stone (1997) 
refers to as “the conspiracy” story; this version constructs the problem as intentionally caused.  
Experts, on the other hand constructed a complex systems, accidental narrative, along 
with an avoidable ignorance/worker negligence narrative to explain the event.  Dr. Beck offered 
testimony to explain the mechanical processes involved in oil drilling and suggested that 
something went wrong with the highly technical processes.  In other words, he constructed the 
event as accidental due to complexities involving multiple failings of “multiple redundancies.”  
In contrast, Mr. Danenberger suggested the problem may have been the workers on the rig.  They 
did not follow proper procedures.  Mr. Danenberger also constructed a counter narrative to 
deflect blame levied at the Minerals Management Service, the government agency which he led, 
that was also charged with wrongdoing.   
Finally, industry representatives construct stories that attempt to deflect blame and 
responsibility.  As Stone (1997) has pointed out, usually parties who are held responsible for the 
problem will attempt to downplay the event, or shift responsibility and blame onto other parties.  
All in all, hearing participants construct stories consistent with their particular interests. 
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Senators: Reckless Industry/Federal Government, Complex Systems 
 Two senators offered opening statements: Senator Bingaman (D-New Mexico) and 
Senator Murkowski (R-Alaska).  Like previous cases, the first to speak was the chairman of the 
committee, Senator Bingaman (D-New Mexico).  Predictably, senators construct causal stories 
that are consistent with interests in legislation and other policy agendas (such as oil 
development).  “Our goal in this hearing is to create a thorough factual record and an informed 
discussion of the very important questions presented by the disaster…I intend to work with 
Senator Murkowski, the ranking member, and any other members of the committee, to develop 
and introduce and advance any necessary and appropriate legislation through the Senate” (p. 3a).  
Senator Murkowski emphasized that “industry must never grow complacent and always strive to 
minimize those risks.”  She constructed her interest in maintaining attention to oil development 
when she testified, “…[U]nder anyone’s most optimistic scenario, our nation will need a lot of 
oil for a long time to come” (p. 4a).  Taken together, senators construct causal stories that blame 
the oil industry, the Minerals Management Service as well as complex systems or as Senator 
Bingaman testified the oil spill was caused by “a cascade of failures and technical and human 
and regulatory errors” (p. 3a).  Like previous cases, senators construct causal stories that make 
visible the rhetorical or “ideational” strategies used to advance and/or protect the interests of 
storytellers (Padamsee 2009).  In opening statements, senators’ testimony forms their interests in 
designing legislation, and maintaining domestic oil production. 
Problem Definition: Horrible Disaster, Catastrophe, Tragedy 
Senators construct the event as a disaster, catastrophe or tragedy.  Senator Stabenow (D-
Michigan), for example, called the event a “horrible disaster” for the loss of human life and also 
because it was a “catastrophe economically and environmentally” (p. 27a).  And Senator 
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Barrasso (R-Wyoming) described it as a “tragedy unfolding in the Gulf of Mexico” that is 
“heart-wrenching” (p. 14a).  According to these constructions, the oil spill is a disaster because 
people died and also because of serious threats to our economy and environment.  Testimonies 
encourage audience members to feel sympathy for the losses that are “heart wrenching.”  Like 
previous cases, senator’s problem constructions are consistent with what Stone (1997) refers to 
as “horror stories.”  According to Stone (1997) suggesting that the spill is a catastrophe for the 
economy and environment is a form of synecdoche that is links the spill with other issues in 
dramatic and poetic terms.  It is a political strategy to draw attention to other policy issues of 
importance to storytellers. 
Some senate testimony constructs the oil spill as an event that is becoming more 
common.  Referred to as “the story of helplessness and control” (Stone 1997), Senator Menedez 
(D-New Jersey) argued, “I think it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out that there is no 
such thing as too safe to spill” (p. 20a).    And Senator Murkowski (R-Alaska) stated, “This 
accident has reminded us of a cold reality that the production of energy will never be without 
risk or environmental consequence” (p. 4a).  Here, the implication is that no matter what is done, 
there will be oil spills; we are helpless to prevent future spills, but we can endeavor to make 
changes to minimize, reduce and control future occurrences.  Underlying these implications is 
what Stone (1997) regards as the story of helplessness and control.  While we are helpless 
victims of fate, with human agency we can control and fix oil spills. 
In contrast, Senator Landrieu (D-Louisiana) constructs the oil spill as a rare occurrence, 
“The record will show, from 1947 to 2009, 175,813 barrels have been spilled out of 16 billion 
produced.  That is 0.001 percent of the total production…I think it’s important to keep that in 
perspective” (p. 16a).  This is not surprising as Senator Landrieu later testified about the 
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importance of the oil industry to her state constituents in terms of jobs and economic well being.  
This testimony constructs the Deepwater Horizon oil spill as a rare event which works to 
downplay the event.  While oil spills may be catastrophic, they are rare.  According to Del Rosso 
(2011) constructing an event as rare or “isolated” works to “downplay and rationalize” the event 
in accordance with the storyteller’s interest.  In this instance, Senator Landrieu forms her interest 
to protect the oil and gas industry in her state with the use of numeric estimates that work as a 
device to suggest there have been a lot more successes than failures in offshore drilling. 
Indeed several senators use the oil spill as a justification for continued domestic oil 
production as the comments of Senator Barrasso (R-Wyoming) illustrate, “It’s important to 
remember that this tragedy does not change America’s energy needs and our continued 
dependence on foreign oil” (p. 15a).  The necessity for domestic oil production is further 
highlighted in testimony that constructs dependence on foreign oil as “perilous” for both national 
energy needs and environmental safety.  For example, testimony suggests the United States can 
extract and develop oil resources more safely than any other nation as Senator Murkowski (R-
Alaska) claims, “[F]or the sake of our nation’s economy, for the sake of our national 
security…for the sake of the world’s environment, we need to safely produce the maximum 
amount of that energy here at home” (p. 4-5a).   
Additionally, offering a variant of the decline narrative (Stone 1997), Senator Landrieu 
(D-Louisiana) cautions against reductions in domestic production of oil for energy.  “Any 
constriction of domestic oil and gas production either onshore or offshore will only further put us 
in a perilous situation and an over-reliance of foreign oil.  And…we’ll export some of these 
problems to countries less equipped and less inclined to prevent this kind of catastrophic 
disaster” (p. 17a).  These testimonies rely on the rhetorical device of synecdoche to symbolically 
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represent the oil spill as a part of a larger problem of oil dependence on foreign producers.  The 
moral implication is that the United States extracts and produces oil more safely and efficiently 
than any other place on Earth.    
These stories are similar to stories documented in the Exxon Valdez oil spill chapter in 
which some witnesses constructed foreign carriers as derelict, “fly by night.”  Indeed, 
representations such as “less equipped and less inclined” construct foreign nations as careless 
and amoral in their oil extraction, production and distribution processes.  Simultaneously, the 
United States is elevated in storytellers’ moral hierarchy.  The U.S. is more equipped and more 
inclined to control oil spill problems.  Predictably, senators story the Deepwater oil spill problem 
in ways that are linked with interests in protecting American jobs in the oil and gas industry even 
if it means risks to human life and the environment. 
Victims: Workers Killed/Injured, Commercial Fishermen, Nation’s Food Supply, Commercial 
Boat Captains, Tourism, State/Local Revenue, Shipping Impacts, Oil Industry Impacts, Pristine 
Beaches 
Vividly, senators construct the primary victims of the oil spill as the workers who were 
killed and injured.  For example, Chairman Bingaman (D-New Mexico) stated, “We should 
begin by remembering the 11 people who lost their lives in the explosion…and express deep 
sympathy for their families” (p.3a).  And Senator Murkowski (R-Alaska) “[O]ur prayers 
continue to be with those who have lost loved ones in the explosion and with those who were 
injured.”  Recall that unlike previous oil spill events analyzed in this work, the Deepwater 
Horizon event had human casualties.  The gravity of human loss reflected in senators’ 
expressions of grief and condolences for the families affected can be viewed as a form of 
synecdoche to represent the oil spill problem as a horror story.   
 165
Indeed, most statements of senators construct people as victims of the spill.  For example,  
Senator Landrieu (D-Louisiana) testified about economic and industry losses to the people in her 
state as well as the nation as a whole.  “There are over 300,000 men and women that work in the 
oil and gas industry in Louisiana alone, and almost every state in the nation contributes in some 
way, shape or form to this industry, both onshore and offshore” (p16a).  She later testified, “The 
commercial fishermen in the Gulf of Mexico harvested 1.27 million pounds of fish and shellfish, 
generated $659 million in revenue.  Forty percent of the nation’s commercial seafood harvest is 
from the Gulf of Mexico.  We also…have commercial boat captains…unable to operate…And 
so, the amount of economic damage continues to mount” (p. 31b)  Her testimony constructs the 
extent of the problem as huge in terms of economic impacts.  Additionally, by constructing 
victims in economic terms, Senator Landrieu defines the boundaries around what the problem 
includes and implies fiscal responsibility (Stone 1997).   
Given her interests in victim (constituent) compensation, it is not surprising that she 
quantifies them in economic terms and expands the victim category to include just about 
everyone.  Importantly, Landrieu’s testimony constructs a “community” of victims with and 
through her counting:  men and women employed in oil and gas both onshore and offshore, 
commercial fishermen, boat captains (Stone 1997:174).  “Any number is implicitly an assertion 
that the things counted in it share a common feature and should be treated as a group” (Stone 
1997:174).  In short, Senator Landrieu constructs a community of victims that share the feature 
“economic damage.” 
Other senators offered similar testimony constructing victims of the spill to be local and 
national economies, workers in the oil and gas industry as well as environmental impacts.  For 
example, in testimony between Mr. McKay of B.P. and Senator Cantwell (D-Washington), in 
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which Mr. McKay is being asked whether or not his company will compensate those who are 
deemed harmed, Senator Cantwell constructs a wide net of potential victims.  Specifically, she 
asked Mr. McKay to specify what he meant by his statement that he would be willing to honor 
all “legitimate claims” and wondered if “legitimate” included [F]ishing industry both short-term 
and long term?” “[B]usiness loss from tourism?” “[S]tate and local governments for lost tax 
revenue?” “[L]ong term damages to the Louisiana fishing industry and its brand? “[T]roubles 
from depleted fisheries and their recovery?” “Shipping impacts?” “Impacts on further drilling 
operations?” “And impacts to the – to the pristine beaches that we have in this area, those are 
legitimate claims?”  (p 35-36b).  Like Senator Landrieu, Senator Cantwell expands the domain of 
the problem (Loseke 2003) or issue (McBeth, et al. 2011) constructing what it includes in terms 
of potential liability implications for the accused. 
Villains: Reckless Oil Companies, Minerals Management Services (MMS), Complex Systems 
Principally, senators point fingers at the oil companies involved in the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill.  B.P, in particular is singled out as having acted recklessly with regard to oil 
development processes.  For example, comments construct an overall lack of safety culture 
within the oil industry as a whole, B.P. in particular.  Senator Wyden’s (D-Oregon) testimony 
implicates B.P. for its role in previous oil-spill disasters and suggests that he is tired of the same 
hackneyed replies.  “And the company always says the same thing…We’re going to toughen up 
our standards.  We’re going to improve our management.  We’re going to deal with risk.  And 
then another such accident takes place.  And we have yet more finger pointing” (p. 20b).  In 
response, Mr. McKay’s (chief executive B.P.) testimony predictably attempts to deflect blame 
and position the company in a better light. “We are changing this company.  We’ve put in 
management systems that are covering the world in a consistent and rigorous way” (p. 20b).  By 
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emphasizing what the oil company is doing, Mr. McKay constructs responsibility thereby 
deflecting charges of irresponsibility. 
Transocean was also constructed as irresponsible in charges that executives sought to 
hide information.  Senator Udall (D-Colorado) testified, “I’ve heard reports that your workers 
were instructed to sign energy and liability waivers as soon as they returned to shore…before 
they were even able to see their families” (p. 24b).  To which Mr. Newman of Transocean 
defended, “We asked our workers if they had any information related to the cause of the 
event…I don’t think it’s appropriate to characterize those statements as waivers” (p. 24b). 
Constructing what Stone (1997:142) refers to as an intentional causal narrative, senators 
paint the oil companies as villainous liars who are only out for their own economic gain.  This 
causal story attempts to frame the cause of the oil spill as one of human intent.  As expected, oil 
company representatives struggle to deflect blame and responsibility with counter narratives that 
deny charges of impropriety. 
Reckless industry operators are further implicated in senate testimony for their lack of 
preparedness to deal with the spill once it happened.  Senator Shaheen (D-Hew Hampshire), for 
example, asked: “Why did it take the actual spill before the company came up with the idea of 
the containment dome?” (p. 14b).  To which Mr. McKay of BP predictably deflected 
responsibility by claiming ignorance and a lack of experience with this type of spill, “We’ve not 
dealt with a situation like this before” (p. 14b).  Senator Shaheen then turned her attention to the 
other industry witnesses (Mr. Newman of Transocean and Mr. Probert of Halliburton) in order to 
determine the extent of research and development into oil spill response.  Mr. Newman testified, 
“Transocean is not currently engaged in any research and development with respect to deepwater 
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oil spills” (p. 14b).  And Mr. Probert testified “Halliburton’s focus, really, has revolved to this 
point around the intervention of wells which require some kind of remedial activity” (p. 15b).   
Senators’ testimonies work to construct what Stone (1997: 193) refers to as a “radical 
labor version” of inadvertent recklessness on the part of oil companies.  These stories hold oil 
companies responsible for the spill due to failures in oversight and monitoring works to push the 
explanation of the oil spill into the realm of intent.  As Stone explains, stories constructing 
management conspiracy are those that suggest “management knowingly stints on safety in the 
interest of profits, a conscious trade-off that pushes the problem into the sphere of intent” 
(1997:193).  That is causal stories construct the spill as intentionally caused by industry 
operators.  As previously stated, constructing intentional cause is a powerful strategy in that it 
holds particular parties (oil companies) accountable for causing harm by acting with knowledge 
of potential consequences. 
Senators further construct the spill as intentionally caused in stories that can be 
understood as “conspiracy stories.”  According to Stone (1997) conspiracy stories construct the 
oil spill problem “as the result of deliberate but concealed human action.”  That is, the spill was 
due to the inappropriate relationship between the oil companies and the government agency 
tasked with monitoring and oversight.  Several comments construct the oil spill as caused by 
greed and self-interest of government agency representatives who stood to gain from oil 
revenues resulting from government/industry lease negotiations.  Senator Udall (D-Colorado), 
for example, implied a conflict of interest in an exchange with Mr. Danenberger, “I think you’re 
aware of ---where MMS has demonstrated its close and sometimes inappropriate relationship 
with industry” (p. 27a).   
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Similarly, Senator Wyden (D-Oregon) claimed, “[I]t seems to me there’s some pretty 
significant safety gaps at this agency that need to be corrected as well” (p.24a).  And Senator 
Lincoln (D-Arkansas) testified, “Some reports claim that MMS based these decisions [to not 
require certain devices, data, etc.] on complaints from some of the drilling companies in terms of 
cost, too expensive, not always reliable” (p. 26a).  Here the blame for the spill is placed on the 
“inappropriate relationship” between the oil industry and the Federal Government constructing 
both industry and monitoring agency as greedy villains who put self interest above the common 
good.  The spill is constructed as a result of the lack of oversight and enforcement by 
government regulators that created the conditions for a well explosion.  That is, they willingly 
turned a blind eye, knowing full well that shortcuts could lead to a disastrous oil spill. 
Finally, some senators construct a causal narrative of complex systems as observed in the 
testimony of Senator Risch’s (R-Idaho) “[W]hen you have human activity like this where 
you…have a highly technical and highly sophisticated process of…developing a deep water 
well, accidents are going to happen….and I think everyone would concur that this is an awful 
situation” (p. 22a).  Constructing the oil spill as caused by complex “technological systems” 
works in the same way as accidental causal narratives.  As Stone (1997:196) writes “They 
postulate a kind of innocence, because no identifiable actor can exert control over the whole 
system or web of interactions.  Without overarching control, there can be no purpose – and no 
responsibility.” 
In summary, contrasting narratives construct blame and responsibility for the oil spill 
consistent with interests to assign moral and fiscal responsibility.  Many senators construct 
stories that hold the three oil companies involved in the event as responsible for redress.  In these 
testimonies the implication that that willful intent led to the oil spill and therefore the accused 
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should compensate victims for losses and damages.  Others charge “complex systems” pushing 
the causal story away from the intentional realm into the accidental realm.  All in all, diverse 
causal narratives by senators are linked with prescribed solutions. 
Solutions: Continue Offshore Oil Development, Diversify Energy Portfolio, Learn from 
Mistakes, More Stringent Regulation, Legislation, Change Regulatory Agency, Fine Operators 
What stands out the most in prescriptive statements among senators in the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill story is that we should not respond to this event with constraints on oil 
extraction and energy production.  Consistent with problem definitions that construct the oil spill 
problem as just a part of the larger issue of dependence on foreign producers, some senate 
testimony emphasizes domestic production of oil as a solution to avoid importing oil from 
abroad.  For example, Senator Barrasso (R-Wyoming) argued against moratoriums on offshore 
drilling, “Blocking future offshore exploration only means we will import more from foreign 
countries.  And I’m confident that America can do a better job of developing offshore energy 
than Azerbaijan, Nigeria and Venezuela” (p.15a). And Senator Sessions (R-Alabama) stated, “If 
we don’t produce oil off our shores, we’ll be importing oil that was produced offshore 
somewhere else in the world” (p.15b).   
These testimonies construct a “story of decline” which suggests that even though the oil 
spill is bad, if we do not continue to produce oil domestically, things are going to get a whole lot 
worse (Stone 1997:138).  It is a strategy that political actors use to build support for particular 
policy proposals.  Here, the policy proposal is to continue domestic offshore production in order 
to avoid dependence on foreign producers, despite the disastrous oil spill.  Implicit in this 
proposal are assumptions of American exceptionalism and moral superiority as it regards energy 
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and natural resource development.  Elected officials construct domestic oil production as a 
national imperative despite consequences. 
However, other senators suggest we should eliminate our dependence on fossil fuels.  
Senator Cantwell (D-Washington) argued “Well…what I’ve learned from this situation is I think 
it’s time for us to diversify off of oil” (p. 27b).  Using the oil spill as a synecdoche of larger 
problems related to energy policy, Senator Cantwell refers to it as a justification to expand the 
national energy portfolio.  Additionally, Senator Risch (R-Idaho) suggested that we should re-
consider nuclear power as an energy resource.  “Forty years ago on the first Earth Day, the – big 
issue was stopping nuclear power.  And they were incredibly successful in stopping nuclear 
power.  And as a result of that…we are much more reliant today on fossil fuels” (p. 22a).  Again, 
testimonies construct “stories of decline” to justify policy action.  In short, the oil spill is a 
synecdoche for diversifying energy resources beyond oil and for reconsidering nuclear power. 
While some testimony constructs stories of decline in support of policy proposals to 
diversify, other comments emphasize the need to “learn from mistakes” and investigate ways to 
improve technologies and capabilities in oil and gas production processes.  The emphasis is on 
the future.  For example, Senator Bingaman (D-New Mexico) testified, “So, our examination of 
what happened here will have the goal of putting in place improved systems to ensure that this 
type of catastrophe never happens again” (p. 3a).  Senator Shaheen (D-Hew Hampshire) testified 
that we should be more proactive about deep water drilling that “despite all of the precautions, 
that there is the potential for this kind of disaster, and therefore, having research underway that 
would show us how to respond in case of a disaster” (p. 15b).  And, Senator Udall (D-Colorado) 
implied a need to investigate technological means for responding to oil spills: “It seems 
unfathomable to me that we didn’t have any focus on technological improvements in spill clean-
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up technology, since the Exxon Valdez more than 20 years ago.  We’ve expanded our 
technology to get to these resources, but we seem to be using 20th century technologies to 
respond to what’s happened” (p. 25b). 
According to Stone (1997:260) the prescription to gather more “facts” about a problem in 
order address or solve it is an act of persuasion that attempts to “change people’s behavior by 
operating on their minds and their perceptions of the world, rather than through rewards and 
punishments.”  Predicated on the assumption that “the pen is mightier than the sword,” 
prescribing rational information gathering, and investigations “obviates the need for force 
because [information, technological capabilities] can resolve conflict” (Stone 1997:304). 
Other senators propose the development of rules and regulations.  In the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill event, witnesses emphasize a need for more stringent safety rules and 
regulations because of the inherent risks involved in oil drilling practices.  For example, Senator 
Menedez (D-New Jersey) implies a need for “more stringent regulations for deep water 
development,” in contrast to onshore oil development practices” (p. 21a).  Proposing rules and 
regulations are “commands to act or not act in certain ways” which inevitably results in 
“classifications of people and situations that determine permissions and entitlements” (Stone 
1997:260).  Consistent with causal narratives that hold oil companies accountable for the spill 
due to their lack of safety protocols, lack of preparedness are policy proposals to make 
requirements for these more stringent.  But the “essential political nature of rules” creates types 
of people or organizations who share common interests.  As Stone (1997:285) argues, “Those 
treated favorably by a rule have a common interest in preserving it, while those treated 
unfavorably share an interest in overturning it.” 
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Related to suggestions to improve laws and regulations are suggestions to strengthen the 
enforcement of them.  Here, decision making structures that govern industry/government 
interactions are constructed as fixable machines or mechanisms.  For example, Senator Barrasso 
(R-Wyoming) suggested an independent organization. “I was wondering about the suggestion by 
Secretary Salazar recently that he’s considering proposing splitting MMS into two…One agency 
would be in charge of inspecting rigs, investigating oil companies, enforcing safety regulations, 
the other to oversee leasing and royalties” (p. 15a).  
And similarly, Senator Risch (R-Idaho) said, “[I]t would seem to me some type of an 
agency – and I’m thinking of a private agency – that brings together all of the companies 
that…are doing this kind of exploration and production would be very beneficial to them because 
this is a problem” (p. 22a).  Senator Murkowski (R-Alaska) testified about the need for tough 
enforcement constructing it as a moral imperative, “We often cite our nation’s strict safety and 
environmental laws for oil and gas development as a means to reassure Americans that we can 
responsibly develop our resources, but this argument will ring hollow if those stringent laws are 
not enforced equally stringently and objectively” (p. 5a).  The implication is that laws should be 
developed, and they should have teeth.  Prescriptions that highlight a restructuring of decision-
making assume that a change in the structure will produce desired outcomes.  According to Stone 
(1997), “Advocates of process reforms usually argue that a new process will produce better 
policies – ones that are more just, more efficient, more consistent with liberty…or more safe.”  
Constructing changes to decision making structures is predicated on the metaphor of machines 
and mechanisms (Stone 1997).  Agencies are constructed as composed of interworking parts.  If 
the regulatory agency is broken, it can be fixed.  
 174
Finally, there is extensive testimony at the end of the second panel that reiterates the 
expectation that B.P. will be expected to pay “all legitimate claims” because of the implied fear 
that the company will try to get out of it.  The underlying belief is that oil industry executives are 
uncaring, profit-mongers who will attempt to deflect responsibility.  Stone argues that proposing 
financial sanctions is a form of inducement that seeks to change behavior of actors.  In short, 
Senators propose control of future oil spills with the stick of financial penalty.   
Not surprising, Senator Landrieu (D-Louisiana) of the state most proximately affected by 
the event, argued for a revision to “revenue sharing agreements.”  “I want to call on this 
committee again to re-look at the revenue-sharing proposals that have been put before this 
committee.  Obviously, these are resources belonging to the federal government, but right now, 
Louisiana and the Gulf Coast states are assuming almost 100 percent of the risk to our wetlands 
and coastline” (p.17-18a).  Here Senator Landrieu shapes her interest in a larger percentage of oil 
revenues at the state level by using this oil spill and implied future oil spills as a justification.  In 
short, Louisiana doesn’t want to be on the short end of the next spill.  Another form of 
inducement, this proposal promises rewards to Gulf Coast states who assume the risk of oil 
development for the benefit of all states.  In other words, Senator Landrieu proposes a carrot to 
incentivize states which stand to lose the most when oil drilling goes wrong.  
In summary, senators construct causal narratives that are linked with particular interests 
and policy agendas.  In the main, what stands out is an underlying “story of decline” narrative 
that constructs the oil spill as a justification for the continuation of domestic offshore drilling.  
Additionally, causal narratives in senate testimony work as Stone (1997) argues to assess 
economic costs and assign moral accountability.  Following the storyline of control, senators use 
rhetorical devices such as stories, synecdoche, numbers and metaphors to symbolically represent 
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the oil spill as a problem in need of redress.  Solutions constructed in testimony define the oil 
spill problem as controllable and include: financial compensation for a large community of 
victims, continuance of domestic oil production and improvements in drilling technologies and 
decision making structures. 
Experts: Avoidable Ignorance/Worker Negligence, Complex Systems 
 The first panel of invited witnesses included experts: Dr. F.E. Beck, associate professor 
of petroleum engineering at Texas A&M University and Mr. Elmer Danenberger, retired chief of 
offshore regulatory programs for the Minerals Management Service, Department of the Interior.  
First to speak was Dr. Beck who constructed his expertise as objective and neutral, not interest-
based. “Prior to joining A&M…I worked in the industry for over 20 years…And during my 
industry career, I have safely drilled numerous high-pressure natural gas wells.  I do not claim to 
be an expert in deepwater drilling, but I do not see this as a hindrance.  Perhaps…it is even an 
advantage, as I have no preference for any process, practice, or equipment package exclusive to 
deepwater drilling” (p. 7a).  In other words, Dr. Beck was not taking any sides.  Stone 
(1997:303-4) argues that expert testimony is persuasive in policy struggles because it is 
associated with the “rational ideal.”  “Rational persuasion is associated with voluntarism.  If 
people can be educated, they will not need to be coerced or even induced to behave in harmony 
with their own and the common good” (1997:304).  In short, “neutral facts” make force 
unnecessary (Stone 1997).  With rational persuasion, we can work something out. 
The bulk of his testimony was to provide information about drilling high-pressure wells 
and strategies for controlling pressure which, as he testified, “will be critical for you to dissect 
the events that led to the deep water Horizon disaster” (p. 7a).  That is, Dr. Beck was there to 
provide the “facts” about oil drilling strategies that are “critical.”  This testimony can be read for 
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how it constructs events that led to the oil spill as an organism that can be dissected.  As Stone 
(1997:149) writes, “The assertion that something is like an organism is implicitly a claim that it 
must be viewed as a whole whose importance is more than the sum of its parts.”  In short, Dr. 
Beck constructed an inadvertent causal narrative of complex systems that assigns responsibility 
for the oil spill event to failures in “the multiple barrier strategy.”   
The other expert, retired chief of the MMS testified on behalf of the regulatory agency 
charged with responsibility for the oil spill.  He opened his testimony with expressions of 
condolences for families and friends of the “11 workers who lost their lives.”  He went on to 
summarize the history of offshore deepwater drilling, history of regulatory compliance and the 
history of blowouts.  He concluded his testimony with suggestions for the future, “I want to 
spend the rest of my time talking about the path forward” (p. 9a).  Like Dr. Beck, Mr. 
Danenberger constructed a complex systems causal narrative in testimonies about the 
interactions between multiple technologies and an inadvertent causal story of worker negligence 
that suggests the oil spill was a result of human error in managing one or more multiple barriers 
for preventing well blowouts.   
Problem Definition: Accident, Rare Event 
According to Dr. Beck, the oil spill is constructed as “the unthinkable” and “accident” (p. 
8a).  Constructing the oil spill as the unthinkable symbolically represents the problem as 
indicative of a story of decline to suggest that now, something must be done (emphasis, mine) 
(Stone 1997).  The suggestion being that now we have experienced the worst case scenario.  
Further Dr. Beck’s testimony works to construct the event as so rare as to be un-imaginable. The 
suggestion being, no one saw this coming.   
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In contrast, Mr. Danenberger of the MMS constructs the event in ambiguous terms.  “I 
talked to a lot of people associated with offshore oil and gas operations, and every one of them 
has taken this personally is committed to doing everything that they can to make sure this doesn’t 
happen again” (p. 8a, emphasis added).  According to Stone (1997:161), ambiguity is understood 
as a symbolic device that “allows people to agree on laws and policies because they can read 
different meanings into the words.”  In later testimony about suggestions to prevent other events, 
Mr. Danenberger constructed the event as a “major offshore accident.”  Constructing the event as 
an accident suggests that it was beyond human control, which according to Stone (1997) is a 
predictable strategy for parties charged with culpability. 
Finally, Mr. Danenberger, testimony also constructed the spill as a “low probability 
event” (Stone 1997).  In testimony summarizing the history of offshore deep water drilling, Mr. 
Danenberger suggested that there is extensive history, with few failures. “[D]eep water drilling 
really goes back to 1965, offshore California with wells in comparable depths to the Deepwater 
Horizon…So there’s extensive history of deepwater drilling, over 3,000 wells drilled in more 
than 1,000 feet of water”  (p. 8a).  Constructing his interests in protecting the regulatory agency 
overseeing deepwater drilling, he further testified: “Blowout history is better for deep water 
operations than it is for shallow.”  In short, Mr. Danenberger implies that there is a long history 
of compliance with effective regulations which makes his interests visible.  This is not 
surprising, given he was testifying on behalf of the regulatory agency (MMS) that was being 
accused of contributing to the oil spill due to conflicts of interest. 
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Victims: Workers Killed/Injured, Minerals Management Service of the Department of the 
Interior 
Dr. Beck’s testimony does not specify harm or victims of harm.  His testimony was 
focused on information about best industry practices in oil drilling.  Specifically, he testified 
about the strategies that are used to prevent well blowouts.  Mr. Danenberger, on the other hand, 
constructed the workers who died in the blast as victims in expressions of sympathy.  “Firstly, I 
want to extend my sincere condolences to the family and friends of the 11 workers who lost their 
lives” (p. 8a).  He then constructed MMS workers as victims of unfounded accusations.  “I also 
want to express my disappointment with some of the comments that have been directed at my 
former colleagues with the Minerals Management Service...[T]hey expose themselves to 
considerable risk everyday…And ethics – these people won’t take a donut from the industry” (p. 
8a).  Stone (1997) argues that it is predictable that those charged (directly or indirectly) with 
responsibility for harm, will attempt to shift blame away or onto someone, something else.  Mr. 
Danenberger constructs MMS colleagues as blameless victims who risk their lives for the sake of 
others.   
Villains: Workers on the Rig, Complex Systems 
In the main, experts do not construct causal agents as “villains.”  Yet, testimonies from 
both Dr. Beck and Mr. Danenberger implicate the workers either directly or indirectly for 
causing the spill.  Consistent with the “manager’s version” of the inadvertent narrative of 
carelessness, both Dr. Beck and Mr. Danenberger suggest that workers did not follow 
procedures, or did not respond to tests that may have alerted them to anomalous pressure 
readings.  Specifically, Dr. Beck, Associate Professor at Texas A&M University implied that 
workers failed to respond to alerts, “As we all know, we do not live in a perfect world, and there 
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remains the possibility that human error can create conditions whereby the design limits of a 
barrier are exceeded or where a barrier is not put in place correctly or in a timely manner” (p. 
7a). 
Again, implicating the workers as being inadvertently responsible, Dr. Beck, Associate 
Professor with Texas A&M University reported, “[W]hile it seems obvious the shear rams did 
not shear, they may have been asked to function on a piece of tubular in the well that they were 
never intended to function on to begin with” (p. 11a).  With “personification metaphors,” Dr. 
Beck suggested that the shear rams were asked to perform in a way not consistent with their 
design (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).  Implicitly, he suggested that the workers did not follow 
proper procedures.  But, Dr. Beck does not construct workers as intending harm.  Indeed, he 
rebutted the suggestion by one senator that the oil spill was intentional in an exchange with 
Senator Barrasso (R-Wyoming).  Specifically, Senator Barrasso asked… “[A]re these systems 
vulnerable to sabotage, to terrorist attack?  Are these systems vulnerable either prior to 
installation or by someone plotting against us who was working on the rig?” (p. 15a).   To which 
Dr. Beck replied, “The fact that…there are multiple people on the rig, multiple people, you can’t 
do any single operation on a rig like this single-handedly…It would take a lot of people…I think 
that the risk of terrorism on a rig like this would be extremely minimal” (p. 16a).  In short, Dr. 
Beck constructs the cause of the problem to be human error within complex technological 
systems which complicates the assignment of blame and responsibility.  Stone (1997:195) 
argues: 
In …complex interactive systems, it is impossible to anticipate all possible events and 
effects, so failure or accident is inevitable.  Failures also involve so many components 
and people that it is impossible to attribute blame in any fashion consistent with our 
cultural norm that responsibility presupposes control. 
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 In summary, Dr. Beck and Mr. Danenberger construct the oil spill as a complex problem 
that was largely due to human error.  Invoking the “manager’s version” of inadvertent 
carelessness, experts imply that workers, trained in drilling procedures, failed in the execution of 
the multiple barrier strategy.  Additionally, expert witnesses suggest that workers were 
embedded in a complex technological system that complicated the assignment of responsibility.  
Mostly, testimony by Dr. Beck and Mr. Danenberger was focused on the future with suggestions 
for how to prevent oil spills like the Deepwater Horizon.   
Solutions: Learn Lessons, Investigate Technologies, Improve Regulations, Hold Workers 
Accountable 
Predictably, experts construct solutions consistent with their interests.  Dr. Beck, 
Associate Professor of Texas A&M also argued, “Now that the unthinkable has happened, the 
industry will now need to take the lessons to be learned from the Deepwater Horizon and move 
forward to ensure that an accident such as this never happens again” (p. 8a).  In other words, 
through rational scientific study and investigation, future oil spills can be prevented.  The 
assumption in proposing study and investigation is that the oil spill as an entity can be quantified 
and predicted.  And, as Stone (1997:305) argues, the “rational ideal” is “based on rational 
persuasion and voluntary behavior change.”  There is no need for force when there is reason. 
Other expert testimony illustrates the “rational ideal” in prescriptions to investigate 
specific technologies.  Expressly, Mr. Danenberger (Former Chief of Offshore Regulatory 
Program of the MMS) suggested that the committee “conduct a thorough review of blowout 
preventer performance considerations…”(p. 9a).  Related to stories that assign blame and 
responsibility to failed technologies are stories that blame the tests for failing to properly assess 
the effectiveness of protective barriers (like the BOP, for example).  In other words, some 
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constructions suggest that it is not that the equipment failed, but that the tests that were to alert 
workers about pressure anomalies were invalid.  For example, Senator Murkowski (R- Alaska) 
asks “But what about the test itself?  Is there a way to fully execute the shearing of a pipe each 
time that a BOP test is done without cutting off the well entirely?  Are we testing what we need 
to test to give us the certainty then that we need” (p. 12a)?  To which Mr. Danenberger of the 
MMS replied, “I think there probably needs to be a better program” (p. 12a).  The implication 
being that perhaps the tests that are part of safety practices and procedures designed by the MMS 
are themselves unreliable.  Together, expert testimonies construct solutions to the oil spill using 
the persuasive language of rational science and investigation.  In short, future oil spills can be 
prevented with further study. 
Mr. Danenberger constructed a need for more stringent regulations for offshore drilling.  
“[T]here should be a separate set of regulations…for deep water” (p. 21a).    The implication is 
that offshore drilling is different from onshore, deep water is different from shallow water.  With 
this testimony, Mr. Danenberger constructs offshore drilling as an activity that contains different 
substances than onshore drilling.  As Lakoff and Johnson (1980:31) argue: “[A]ctivities are 
viewed as containers for the actions and other activities that make them up.”  Actions and 
activities that make up offshore oil drilling are constructed as controllable with and through 
regulations.   
Finally, causal stories that implicate worker negligence are linked with prescriptions to 
focus on individual responsibility.  Mr. Danenberger former chief of the MMS argued, “[W]e 
can’t accomplish everything with prescriptive rules.  There’s no number of volumes that’s going 
to tell people precisely what they have to do in every situation.  So it really has to fall back to the 
operator responsibility” (p. 10a).  This testimony can be read as a “blame the victim” narrative 
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which Stone (1997) argues is another take on “the control story.”  According to Stone 
(1997:144), the way the “blame the victim” narrative works is to shift the oil spill problem “from 
the realm of fate to the realm of control, but locates control in the very people who suffer the 
problem.”  In other words, workers need to follow the rules.  
 In summary, expert testimony constructs the oil spill problem as complex, but 
controllable.  Testimony that constructs the cause of the spill as human failure in complex 
technological systems is linked with testimony that constructs the solution to understand 
complex systems and enforce worker responsibility.  All in all, the oil spill is constructed as a 
contained and calculable event that can be redressed with the rational pursuit of “facts.” 
Oil Industry Representatives: Accidental Cause/Complex Systems 
 Last to testify at the first Senate hearing to address the Deepwater Horizon oil spill were 
three representatives from oil companies implicated in the oil spill event.  Lamar McKay 
represented B.P., the principal operator in the offshore oil drilling contract along with Steven 
Newman of Transocean Limited and Tim Probert of Halliburton who were subcontractors to B.P.  
Predictably, industry representatives construct the oil spill event as a tragic accident due to 
complex systems.  As Stone (1997) notes, accidental causal narratives suggest that the event was 
due to circumstances beyond control.  Complex technological systems narratives work the same 
way.  Responsibilities are so diffuse so as to complicate the assignment of blame and 
responsibility to any one actor or group of actors (Stone 1997).  Additionally, like experts who 
testified in the first panel, industry representatives also construct the causal story of worker 
negligence, or “blame the victim.”  Finally, industry representatives shape their interests in 
deflections of blame and responsibility by pointing fingers at each other and at the MMS.  In the 
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end, they were just following orders stipulated by the Minerals Management Service of the 
Department of the Interior.   
Problem Definition: Tragic Series of Events, Accident 
Testimonies by industry representatives construct the Deepwater Horizon oil spill as a 
complex problem, or “tragic series of events.”  Implicitly, the oil spill was not just one entity, but 
a series of interrelated entities.  For example, Mr. McKay of B.P. America testified, “We have 
experienced a tragic series of events.  Three weeks ago tonight, 11 people were lost in an 
explosion and a fire aboard the Transocean Deepwater Horizon, and 17 others were injured” (p. 
3b).  Mr. Probert of Halliburton stated, “The catastrophic blowout and the spread of oil in the 
Gulf of Mexico are tragic events for everyone” (p. 7b).  Finally, Mr. Newman of Transocean 
testified about committing a team to investigate what caused “these tragic events” (p. 6b).   
The implication in constructing the oil spill as a series of events can be read as deflecting 
any potential assignment of personal blame and responsibility.  Following Stone (1997), when 
problems are constructed as due to failures in complex systems, it is difficult to hold one 
individual or organization responsible.  Metaphorically, constructing the oil spill as a “tragic 
series of events” places boundaries around or isolates events as discrete objects (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980).  This is predictable as observers have pointed out that managers of companies 
implicated in Federal hearings are likely to downplay notions of culpability to protect their 
interests (Stone 1997, Button 2010).   
Despite the “tragedy,” Mr. McKay of B.P. shapes his interest in profit growth and 
expansion when he uses the event as a justification to continue oil production in the United 
States.  “Tragic and unforeseen as this accident was, we must not lose sight of why B.P. and 
other energy companies are operating in the offshore…the Gulf provides 1 in 4 barrels of oil 
 184
produced in the United States, a resource our economy requires” (p. 5b).  Implicitly, Mr. McKay 
constructs the oil spill as a mandate for business expansion.  The Gulf is oil abundant, and oil is 
important for our national economy.   
In short, industry representatives construct the oil spill as a tragic accident portraying the 
oil spill as a complex set of problems that was “tragic” because of human casualties and injuries.  
As expected, senior executives of the three companies construct causal narratives about the spill 
that work to protect the interests of their respective companies by deflecting blame and 
responsibility.  Testimonies illustrate what one senator on the committee called “the liability 
chase.”  But, as Stone’s theory (1997) suggests, this is expected given the interests of oil 
companies to avoid or minimize responsibility for the spill. 
Victims: Workers Killed/Injured, Family and Friends of Dead/Injured Workers, Gulf Coast 
Residents, Subcontractors (Transocean and Halliburton) 
Constructing the problem and its causes simultaneously constructs victims (those who 
were harmed) and villains (those who are responsible for causing harm).  Principally, industry 
representatives construct families and friends of the dead and injured workers as the primary 
victims of the oil spill event along with residents in communities affected by the spill.  Mr. 
McKay, President and Chairman of B.P. America expressed, “My deepest sympathies go out to 
the families and friends who have suffered such a terrible loss and to those in the Gulf Coast 
communities whose lives and livelihoods are being impacted” (p. 3b).   
Similarly, Mr. Newman, President and Chief Executive Officer of Transocean Limited 
stated, “And our hearts ache for the widows, parents and children of the 11 crew members, 
including nine Transocean employees, who died in the Deepwater Horizon explosion” (p. 5b).  
And Mr. Probert of Halliburton testified, “On behalf of the entire Halliburton family, we extend 
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our heartfelt sympathy to the families, the friends, the colleagues of the 11 people who lost their 
lives and those workers who were injured in the tragedy” (p. 7b).  Constructing victims as the 
family and friends of workers and Gulf Coast community residents creates boundaries around 
who/what is included as well as who/what is excluded.   
Testimonies also construct the subcontracting oil companies as victims with suggestions 
that Transocean and Halliburton were just following the orders of the primary contractor (B.P.).  
Regarding the implementation of proper tests to ensure the oil extraction procedure was running 
smoothly, there were questions as to who authorized the use of a lighter material to replace the 
mud that was necessary for the final step in the procedure -- plugging the well.  Senator Sessions 
(R-Alabama) asks Mr. Newman of Transocean.  “Do you know whether B.P. made that decision 
or did Transocean?”  Mr. Newman’s response suggests that the decision was between the lease 
holder (B.P.) and the Federal Government. “Because B.P. or the permit holder has the 
relationship with the MMS, if there was a discussion between somebody and the MMS about 
whether or not it was appropriate to proceed in a particular fashion, that conversation would have 
taken place between B.P. and the MMS” (p.17b).  And likewise, Mr. Probert of Halliburton 
testified “I need to emphasize that Halliburton as a service provider to the well owner is 
contractually bound to comply with the well owner’s instructions on all matters relating to the 
performance of all work-related activities.”  In sum, Transocean and Halliburton were just 
following orders.  Testimony constructs the subcontractors as victims of decisions made between 
B.P. and the MMS. 
Given that oil company representatives were being charged with responsibility in this 
event, much of their testimony can be read as deflections of blame and responsibility.  That is, 
each representative attempts to push causal explanations away from intent or willful neglect to 
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accident or to show the event was someone else’s fault.  Constructing workers and machines that 
inadvertently cause harm, industry representatives construct oil companies as victims of 
unfortunate circumstances. 
Villains: Workers on the Rig, BOPs, Principal Contractor (B.P.) and the Minerals Management 
Service (MMS). 
As has been previously discussed, Stone (1997) argues that causal stories that blame 
human error or carelessness in hazardous occupations such as offshore oil drilling are often 
constructed from two distinct perspectives: management and labor.  From the management’s 
perspectives, workers do not follow safety procedures and protocols because they are tedious and 
uncomfortable.  From worker’s perspective management fails to inspect or monitor safety 
protocols so as not to interfere with productivity.  Like testimony from expert witnesses in the 
first panel, chief executives from B.P. and Halliburton point fingers at the Transocean workers 
who were on the rig.  For example, Mr. McKay (President and Chairman of B.P. America) 
suggested that Transocean’s drill crew did not respond to “anomalous pressure test readings.”  
“These [readings] could have raised concerns about well control prior to the operation to replace 
the mud with seawater in the well in preparation for setting the cement plug” (p. 4b).   
Likewise, Mr. Probert, (President, Global Business Lines, Chief Health, Safety and 
Environmental Officer, Halliburton) implicated the Transocean crew.  “We understand that the 
drilling contractor replaced the dense drilling fluid in the riser with a lighter seawater prior to the 
planned placement of the final cement plug” (p. 8b). The implication according to some 
witnesses is that in the case of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill drill crews did not follow best 
practices to test the effectiveness of barriers that were in place to prevent the well from blowing 
out.  Mr. McKay (B.P.) and Mr. Probert (Halliburton) construct cause as “inadvertent” (Stone 
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1997).  That is, they blame Mr. Newman’s (Transocean) workers acted with purpose by 
neglecting pressure readings, and/or used seawater in the cementing process which resulted in 
consequences that were not intended (well blowout).   
However, Mr. Newman attempted to shift blame away from his company and/or his 
workers when he testified.  “It is…clear that the drill crew had very little, if any, time to react.  
The initial indications of trouble and the subsequent explosions were almost instantaneous” (p. 
7b).  In accordance with Stone’s (1997) ideas, these storylines are anticipated.  It is not 
surprising that managers attempt to construct cause as due to worker incompetence to deflect 
responsibility, and in scenarios involving multiple managers, to implicate the other company’s 
workers.  As theorized, those charged with responsibility will construct the cause as someone 
else’s fault (Stone 1997). 
In addition to human failure, industry witnesses suggest other factors including 
mechanical causes or equipment failure as causing the blowout.  Stone (1997) argues that stories 
that construct equipment failure as the cause of the problem are “accidental” in that machines 
that “run amok” is understood to be an accident of fate.  “These phenomena are devoid of 
purpose, either in their actions or consequences” (Stone 1997:191).  That is, blow-out-preventers 
(BOPs) cannot act with purpose.  That the equipment did not work as designed is of no fault of 
the oil executives or their workers.  The villains in this narrative include shear rams, blowout 
preventers (BOPs), the cement casing materials and the well itself.  Specifically, Mr. McKay of 
B.P. America pointed out that the blowout preventer owned by Transocean did not function 
properly.  “Apart from looking at the causes of the explosion, we are also examining why the 
blowout preventer – the BOP, as it’s called – did not work as the ultimate failsafe to seal the well 
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an prevent an oil spill” (p. 4b).  Mr. Probert of Halliburton also pointed to the failed BOP.  
“[H]ad the BOP functioned as expected, this catastrophe may well not have occurred” (p. 7b).    
However, Mr. Newman of Tansocean implicitly holds Halliburton’s cementing 
technologies responsible when he claimed that either the cementing procedure or the casing itself 
was to blame for the well explosion.  “[T]he one thing we do know is that, on the evening of 
April 20th, there was a sudden catastrophic failure of the cement, the casing or both.  Without a 
failure of one of those elements, the explosion could not have occurred” (p. 6b).  Indeed, Mr. 
Newman constructs an inadvertent causal story of negligence on the part of B.P. and Halliburton 
in a series of “critical questions” that he said “need to be answered in the coming weeks and 
months.”  Specifically: “What caused that sudden violent failure?  Was the well properly 
designed?  Where there problems with the casing, with the full assembly?  Was the casing 
properly cemented and the well effectively sealed?  Were all appropriate tests run on the cement 
and the casing?  Were the blowout preventers damaged by the surge that emanated from the 
well?  Did the surge blow debris into the BOPs, which prevented them from squeezing, crushing, 
or shearing the pipe” (p.7b)?   
Importantly, causal narratives that implicate inanimate objects construct the cause as 
accidental due to failed machines and processes.  It is no one’s fault if the BOP, the well and/or 
the cementing system malfunction.  As Stone (1997) argues, these types of stories are not 
necessarily about actions as they are about unforeseen consequences.  She suggests that this 
strategy is effective in stories such as the ones constructed in Deepwater Horizon oil spill in that 
it deflects blame from operators and puts it on the inanimate, unpredictable machine.   
Finally, oil industry executives construct the government agency charged with industry 
oversight as inadvertently responsible for the spill.  From the perspective of oil industry 
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executives, industry practices are defended on the basis that they were in keeping with 
regulations stipulated by the Minerals Management Service of the Department of the Interior.  
Testimony attempts to deflect blame away from the companies onto the government agency by 
suggesting that industry executives were just following federally regulated protocols.  Mr. 
Probert of Halliburton (provider of cementing services, casing programs) said, “Everything was 
done in accordance with accepted industry practice and as required by MMS and as directed by 
the well owner [B.P.]” (p. 8b).  Furthermore, Mr.McKay of B.P. testified that he was just 
following common industry practice that he described as “MMS regulated.” 
In short, stories by industry executives construct the cause of the oil spill to be due to 
incompetent workers, unpredictable machines and mechanisms, and the negligent oversight of 
the lead government agency.  Predictably, fingers are pointed in several directions.  Constructing 
the “liability chase,” industry executives struggle to frame the oil spill as an accidental problem 
beyond their control, or as someone else’s fault.   
Solutions: Learn from Event, Improve Safety Regulations, Compensate “Legitimate Claims” 
Like other testimony analyzed in this report, testimony by industry representatives 
construct solutions that are linked with causal stories.  In brief, industry representatives construct 
the need to learn from the event, improve safety regulations and compensate victims.  
Principally, industry operators construct the mandate to learn from the Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill to be better able to respond to a future spill, or prevent them from happening again. For 
example, Mr. McKay of BP mentioned, “I think what we’re learning here is subsea intervention 
capability is something that needs to be looked at further” (p. 14b).  Mr. Newman of Transocean 
said, “[I]t behooves us to share everything we can with respect to understanding exactly what 
happened so that we can prevent it from ever happening again” (p. 25b).  And Mr. Probert of 
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Halliburton opined, “And it’s certainly our expectation that, as we learn from this incident, there 
may well be some changes in process, procedures, or other approaches, which we would then 
implement as part of our global standard” (p. 30b).  Constructing the event as something that can 
be prevented with more knowledge development is supported with metaphors of containment 
and controllability (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).  Consistent with Stone’s (1997) notion of the 
rational ideal, oil spills are constructed as preventable with new technological capabilities and 
with knowledge sharing among industry operators. 
Other solutions recommended by industry witnesses include a focus on safety 
regulations.  Consistent with causal narratives that suggested it was the worker’s fault for not 
following safety protocols; witnesses construct the need to “put safety first.”  In these 
testimonies, industry representatives propose “rules” which simultaneously constructs 
expectations for who is expected to follow them (Stone 1997).  For example, Mr. Newman of 
Transocean Limited said “[R]egardless of what the investigations uncover, ours is an industry 
that must put safety first….for the sake of our employees…their families and…the people all 
over the world who use and enjoy and rely on our oceans and waterways for their sustenance” (p. 
7b).  And Mr. McKay of BP testified “[C]ompanies should be made to adhere to those 
performance standards” (p.10b).  The construction of rules is consistent with causal narratives 
that hold workers responsible for the spill and work to shift the blame and responsibility away 
from executives to the workers.  As Stone (1997) argues, rules are attempts to control the actions 
of individuals and/or organizations.  The implication is that if workers are better trained in safety 
protocols, then oil spills can be controlled and/or prevented. 
Finally, because B.P. was the lead contractor in the Deepwater Horizon drilling operation 
and was being held principally responsible for the damages, Mr. McKay was asked repeatedly 
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about the company’s intent to compensate victims.  For example, Mr. McKay was asked 
repeatedly about the intent of BP to pay claims to injured parties to which he responded: “I’m 
trying to give you as clear an answer as I possibly can.  We are…trying to be extremely 
responsive, expeditious, meet every responsibility we have as a responsible party, and that means 
pay all legitimate claims” (p. 36b).  Senator Sessions (R-Alaska) expressed concern about the 
possibility that industry would attempt to avoid financial responsibility and stated in an exchange 
with Mr. McKay, “I believe again your answer is you should do what’s right and compensate 
fully and not try to utilize technical defenses that are not legitimate” (p. 37b).  Using container 
metaphors, Mr. McKay constructs the intent for B.P. to compensate “legitimate claims.”  
Implicitly, Mr. McKay constructs “legitimate claims” as a discrete entity.  Following Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980), the entity “legitimate claims” is made up of substances and values that do not 
include illegitimate claims which portend future legal battles for legitimacy on the part of 
victims.  Indeed Senator Landrieu (D-Louisiana) asked, “[D]efine legitimate, please for us” (p. 
18b).  To which Mr. McKay responded, “Substantiated claims.  I – I can’t define the term” (p. 
19b).  Constructing the intent to compensate victims in ambiguous terms suggests that 
“legitimate claims” has more than one meaning and that meaning will have to be determined on a 
case-by-case basis.  In short, Mr. McKay implies that victims will have to sue B.P. 
All in all, causal stories are constructed from diverse perspectives to understand how the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill happened.  Senators construct the event as intentionally caused due 
to neglect and carelessness on the part of oil companies and the government agency tasked with 
industry oversight.  And predictably, agency representatives and oil company representatives 
construct the event as accidental deflecting blame and responsibility.  In short, like previous 
cases analyzed in this work, senators and witnesses construct causal stories consistent with 
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particular interests using symbolic representations of horror stories, ambiguity, rational 
persuasion and metaphors of containment and control. (See Table 10).  Taken together, diverse 
stories are held together by taken-for-granted assumptions.  In what follows, I discuss findings in 
terms of how narratives reveal “covert underlying presuppositions” (Hill 2005). 
Table 10: Summary of Causal Stories by Diverse Storytellers in Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill 
 
 Senators Experts Oil Industry 
Causal 
Story(ies) 
Reckless Industry/Minerals 
Management Services, 
Complex Systems 
Avoidable Ignorance/Worker 
Negligence, Complex 
Systems 
Accidental Cause/Complex 
Systems 
Problem 
Definition 
Horrible Disaster, 
Catastrophe, Tragedy 
Accident, Rare Event Tragic Series of Events, 
Accident 
Victims Workers Killed/Injured, 
Commercial Fishermen, 
Nation’s Food Supply, Boat 
Captains, Tourism, 
State/Local Revenue, Shipping 
Impacts, Oil Industry Impacts, 
Pristine Beaches 
Workers Killed/Injured, 
Minerals Management 
Service Employees 
Workers Killed/Injured, 
Family and Friends of 
Dead/Injured, Gulf Coast 
Residents, Subcontractors 
(Transocean and Halliburton) 
Villains Reckless Oil Companies, 
Minerals Management 
Services, Complex 
Technologies 
Workers on the Rig, 
Complex Systems 
Workers on the Rig, Blowout 
Preventers (BOPs), Principal 
Operator (B.P.) and the 
Minerals Management Service 
Solutions Continue Offshore Oil 
Development, Diversify 
Energy Portfolio, Learn from 
Mistakes, More Stringent 
Regulations, Change 
Regulatory Agency, and Fine 
Operators 
Learn Lessons, Investigate 
New Technologies, Improve 
Regulations, and Hold 
Workers Accountable 
Learn from Event, Improve 
Safety Regulations, and 
Compensate “Legitimate 
Claims.” 
 
Discussion of Findings 
Like previous oil spill cases, I explored stories about the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 
congressional testimony.  Similar to the Santa Barbara and Exxon Valdez oil spills, testimony 
constructs multiple causal stories from multiple perspectives.  The main plot was that something 
went wrong in drilling processes aboard the Deepwater Horizon rig that led to the largest oil spill 
in the U.S. to date.  At 205,000,000 gallons, it is nearly 20 times the size of Exxon Valdez and is 
more than 1,000 times as large as Santa Barbara.  Some blamed the workers for failing to follow 
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proper procedures and best practices.  Others held the operators responsible.  The operators 
themselves engaged in what one senator referred to as “the liability chase.”  Several comments 
by chief executives blamed each other for respective failures in technologies (like the Blowout 
Preventer or BOP) and in procedures (like plugging the well).   
Other witnesses pointed the finger at the lead government agency tasked with oil industry 
oversight and regulation (MMS). MMS was blamed for having too cozy a relationship with the 
oil industry.  Because MMS stood to gain monetarily from oil lease negotiations, the implication 
was that they turned a blind eye; they allowed oil industry operators to cut corners in order to 
maximize profits.  Finally, the oil industry is blamed for lacking clean up and response 
technology.  Some senators commented that it was incredulous that with previous events such as 
the Exxon Valdez oil spill, that oil companies would not have more sophisticated response 
practices.  Constructing what Stone (1997) refers to as a story of helplessness and control, the 
implication is that we should definitely know better by now. 
Predictably, the prescriptions for redress line up with problem definitions.  First and 
foremost in the Deepwater Horizon event is that despite the oil spill and loss to life and natural 
environment, testimony constructs the imperative that we must continue to drill for oil.  Oil is 
constructed as necessary and mandatory for life and economic well-being. Furthermore, unlike 
the Santa Barbara story in which emphasis was placed on importing oil from foreign producers 
to save our domestic shores, both the Exxon and Deepwater stories denigrate foreign capabilities 
constructing the U.S. as morally superior in its ability to produce and distribute oil for energy.  In 
the Exxon Valdez event, foreign carriers would likely lack the necessary financial wherewithal to 
pay for pollution resulting from an oil spill.  In the Deepwater Horizon hearing, foreign 
producers lack technological sophistication and environmental conscientiousness.  Constructing 
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a story of decline, senators and witnesses use the oil spill as a synecdoche for other policy issues 
– namely fear of dependence on foreign oil.  Thus, the emphasis in Deepwater Horizon 
testimony is on domestic oil extraction and production because countries like Azerbaijan, 
Nigeria and Venezuela are ill equipped to produce and distribute oil as efficiently and safely as 
the United States can.   
In addition to prescriptions to continue oil development processes, testimony points to the 
need for more legislation and regulation and to “learn from this incident so that it doesn’t happen 
again.”  Testimony suggests that there should be some emphasis in studying blowout preventers 
and well completion processes to improve oil extraction practices.  And witnesses agree that 
there is obviously a need for more stringent safety regulations.  Furthermore, because of the 
conflict of interest between the MMS and the oil industry, testimony constructs the prescription 
that the MMS be split into two agencies: one tasked with oversight and regulation and the other 
tasked with lease negotiation logistics.  Finally, senators argued for a need to compensate 
victims.  And here the exchanges in testimony between the chief executive of B.P. America and 
various senators are to establish under oath that B.P. will compensate “all legitimate claims.” 
In general, the storytellers include the senators, the experts and the industry 
representatives.  Diverse testimonies throughout the hearing construct the problem, the causes 
and the prescribed solutions from particular perspectives that are linked with objective interests.  
That is, senators tell stories consistent with interests to assign moral and fiscal responsibility for 
the spill and also to engender support for continued domestic exploration and development of oil.  
Experts tell stories consistent with interests to render the oil phenomenon as a quantifiable and 
controllable entity that can be understood with more study and investigation.  And oil company 
representatives tell stories consistent with respective interests to continue oil development and to 
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avoid blame and responsibility for the oil spill by pointing fingers at each other and the Minerals 
Management Service for dereliction of duty.   
Underlying Morals 
Despite the diversity in interests and causal narratives, testimonies are undergirded by 
taken-for-granted assumptions that shape the stories told.  The underlying morals of stories told 
in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill hearing emphasize that we should continue to drill for oil in 
the Gulf of Mexico and in the United States more generally.  Most important is to not lose focus 
on domestic oil extraction and production.  Following the pattern of stories of decline, the 
implication is that there will be worse human, social and natural consequences if we import oil 
from foreign producers who are less conscientious about human safety and the environment.  
Following the pattern of stories of control, testimonies suggest that we should invest in research 
and development to improve our technological capabilities in oil extraction processes as well as 
in clean up technologies.  Related to emphasis on technological and procedural advancements 
(innovations) is the cultural belief in American exceptionalism.  The United States is constructed 
as superior to foreign nations with regard to oil development processes and environmental 
stewardship. 
In the final paragraphs, I review and summarize the way the oil spill was storied in verbal 
testimony and consider the way representations illuminate taken-for-granted assumptions.  
Indeed analysis reveals underlying moral notions about maintaining and improving domestic oil 
extraction and production despite the risks to human life and the environment.  Secondly, 
testimony that suggests that a change in decision-making structures will result in fewer oil spills 
is undergirded by assumptions that constitutional re-organization is possible and effective.  
Finally, testimony that constructs the solution to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill problem as one 
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of compensating victims for losses and consequences is undergirded by assumptions that money 
can buy forgiveness. 
United States Oil Producers are Superior to Foreign Oil Producers  
The moral importance of domestic oil development in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
story is constructed in testimony that emphasizes the prescription to continue extracting and 
producing oil domestically in oil rich areas, the Gulf Coast region in particular despite the loss of 
human life.  Fundamentally, the oil spill is used as a synecdoche of larger problem of 
dependence on foreign oil.  While previous cases reveal sentiments that oil extraction and 
production should occur in other less beautiful, less ecologically productive places, testimony in 
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill hearing prioritizes the need to continue domestic oil extraction 
and production in the Gulf of Mexico in spite of the “tragic loss of life.”  Testimony that 
emphasizes continuing to develop domestic oil resources reflects a widely shared moral notion 
that the U.S. has superior practices, processes, technologies and is more conscientious toward the 
environment than other careless and rogue nations. Following Lakoff and Johnson, (1980), 
constructing the U.S. as distinct from foreign nations creates discrete entities that are identifiable 
by unique substances and values.  The U.S. is understood as an object that contains substances 
and values such as superior development capabilities and respect for the natural environment.  In 
contrast, foreign nations are constructed as containers that lack such values and substances.  All 
in all, testimonies construct a narrative of control that depicts oil spills as preventable so long as 
the United States is in charge. 
Testimony that emphasizes continuing domestic production is undergirded by 
assumptions that with rational study and investigation, practices and processes can be improved 
to eliminate future oil spills.  Consistent with previous cases, testimony emphasizes the need to 
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learn from the mistakes that led to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.  Following the narrative 
pattern that suggests oil spills are rational, controllable entities, testimony in the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill hearing implies a moral importance of science and technology.  Specifically, the 
emphasis is to improve technological capacities in order to keep drilling for oil despite the risks 
to the environment and to human life.  This is not surprising as Stone (1997) documents the 
tendency for policy problems to be storied in ways that make them amenable to “rational” study 
and response.   
Consistent across all oil spill stories is the widely held belief that we can avoid another 
disastrous, catastrophic, and tragic oil spill with more study and investigation that will lead to 
improvements to technological processes and procedures.  But it should be noted that the 
emphasis on technological advancement is placed on oil extraction and development practices, 
not clean up and response.  Obvious by omission are prescriptions that we prepare for the next 
spill with more sophisticated response capabilities.  Emphasis in oil spill stories is the idea that 
oil drilling practices can be perfected so as to avoid future oil spills. That is narratives of control 
in Santa Barbara, Exxon Valdez, and Deepwater Horizon suggest that so advanced and 
sophisticated are U.S. capabilities that we can drill for oil and not spill it. 
Research and development prescriptions construct a rational and thoughtful pursuit of 
knowledge in the wake of disaster.  Normative assumptions in stories that emphasize learning 
from mistakes to improve include the notion that it is possible.  The underlying belief is that oil 
drilling processes and technologies can be improved and perfected to ensure that oil spills do not 
happen again.   
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Changes in Structure Leads to Changes in Behavior of Actors 
Stone (1997) argues that blaming the worker is customary in hazardous disaster stories.  
She identifies two contrasting storylines, the management perspective and the worker 
perspective.  From management’s perspective, worker incompetence leads to disasters.  From 
worker’s perspective, management greed for profits leads to shortcuts in safety practices.  In the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill hearing, both storylines are constructed from different perspectives 
and lead to prescriptions to change protocols, decision-making structures or “constitutional re-
engineering.”  That is, there is a taken-for-granted assumption that changes in laws, protocols, 
decision making structures can and will change the behavior of actors (Stone 1997). 
Causal stories blaming worker incompetence are linked with prescriptions for developing 
more stringent protocols and procedures and for creating and enforcing laws to hold individuals 
and groups accountable.  Following what Stone (1997:143) regards as a variant on the story of 
control is the “blame the victim story” in which the dead workers on the rig are charged with not 
following best practices.  Representations of people held accountable for the spill construct 
moral notions of both innocence and guilt.  That is there was an implied expectation that with all 
the previous experience with drilling in the outer continental shelf and related consequences, 
industry and government should have known better and had been better prepared.  Workers 
should be and can be better trained to follow safety practices.  The implication is that oil spills 
can be prevented if workers act in accordance with the rules. 
Testimony also paints members of the MMS as villains who had a conflict of interest 
with the industry they were charged with monitoring.  The bureau not only was tasked with 
oversight of industry operations, but also benefited from revenues collected from the oil and gas 
industry.  The implication is that the MMS was equipped with knowledge about oil drilling 
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processes and potential consequences, but did not hold industry operators accountable for 
following necessary protocols.  According to Stone, another variant of the control story is the 
conspiracy story.  Again, this narrative moves the explanation of the oil spill from “the realm of 
fate to the realm of control” but does so with claims that suggest “control has been in the hands 
of a few who have used it to their benefit and concealed it from the rest of us” (Stone 1997:143).  
This dereliction was constructed as a consequence of a poorly designed decision-making 
arrangement between the oil industry and the agency charged with its oversight. 
Constructions of the oil spill problem as a result of conflicts in decision-making 
structures are linked with prescriptions to change decision-making structures. There is an implied 
imperative to strengthen safety procedures and mechanisms for enforcing important laws and 
regulations.  For example, several witnesses called for re-organization of the agency tasked with 
monitoring offshore oil drilling processes.  Stone (1997) argues that prescriptions for 
restructuring groups and processes have deep roots in American culture: “The American 
constitutional debates were about how to prevent tyranny and oppression by designing a system 
for political decisions” (1997:352).  Arguably, these ideas underlie debates about how to prevent 
another oil spill.  The tendency to promote changes in structures suggests an underlying belief 
that structures are not fixed, but are changeable.  Perhaps for witnesses who think the oil spill 
was caused by a lack of oversight that the solution is to change structures tasked with this 
responsibility.   Again the underlying assumption is one that suggests oil spills are controllable 
by fixing broken decision-making structures.  By splitting up the agency tasked with monitoring 
and oversight we can avoid conflicts of interest that lead to poor decision making that contributes 
to oil spills. The underlying moral belief is that structures can change and that with changes, oil 
spills can be prevented from happening again.  
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Polluters Can and Must Pay “Legitimate” Claims 
According to Stone (1997), a closely related strategy to establishing rules is to apply 
inducements as a punishment for non-compliance.  Consistent with overarching narratives of 
control, this strategy aims to prevent behavior that may result in catastrophic loss by threatening 
wrong behavior with fines and penalties.  In testimony about the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, 
witnesses construct types of punishments that should be applied to workers and operators who 
violate the rules and regulations.  In short, testimony suggests that people should be held 
accountable for adhering to protocols, for sharing information, and for paying damages to injured 
parties. 
The definition of rules and inducements simultaneously defines categories of people as 
responsible for adhering to rules (workers) and for paying damages (executives).  But, in stories 
about the Deepwater Horizon, absolute responsibility for the event was complicated by 
alternative explanations and complex technological systems.  Stories imply that Mr. McKay of 
B.P. America should “do what’s right” and “not try to utilize technical defenses.”  In short, 
testimony attempts to lay moral responsibility at the feet of B.P. despite complications in the 
assignment of blame.  There is an implied assumption that oil executives might try to cut corners, 
to avoid time-consuming safety measures in order to maximize profits and to define claims as 
“not legitimate” to avoid financial responsibility.   
Prescriptions in Deepwater Horizon testimonies emphasize that we not only learn from 
the spill and re-organize decision-making structures, but that those deemed responsible will 
honor legitimate claims.  That is, witnesses constructed the imperative for the oil companies to 
pay penance to all individuals and groups deemed harmed by the oil spill.  There was an 
extensive exchange toward the end of the second panel in which Mr. McKay of B.P. was asked 
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repeatedly if he would ensure that the company would honor all legitimate claims.   The 
expectation is that the oil company should ‘do the right thing’ and compensate all victims fully.  
But, from the perspective of Mr. McKay, the emphasis was on paying “legitimate” claims 
simultaneously constructing a category of illegitimate claims. In other words, the oil company 
agreed to honor claims that were deemed legitimate laying the foundation for future proofs of 
legitimacy.  Principally, constructing the mandate for oil companies to pay claims reflects an 
underlying belief that oil spill damages can be fixed with money.  Again, illuminating the 
broader narrative of stories of control, testimonies that suggest damages and harms from the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill can be recompensed. 
Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, Deepwater Horizon testimony constructs multiple stories that define the oil 
spill problem, victims and villains as well as proposed solutions as controllable, calculable and 
financially redeemable.  This event was constructed as the most tragic among cases reviewed in 
this report due to the loss of human life.  Yet, testimony is undergirded by assumptions that death 
is bad, but lack of domestically produced oil is worse.  Within stories, there is an ideal that oil 
spills should not happen, but also an expectation that they will.  Further, testimonies largely 
construct the oil spill phenomenon as controllable and preventable with and through human 
agency.  Emphasis on maintaining domestic oil production suggests that risks to human life and 
the environment are ultimately worth the value that oil provides for national energy and security 
interests.  With prescriptions to study and learn from mistakes, re-organize decision-making 
structures and compensate victims, stories about Deepwater Horizon are similar to stories about 
Exxon and Santa Barbara.  We should continue to improve oil production.  Obvious by omission 
are stories that suggest we evaluate oil consumption. 
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In the final chapter, I synthesize the stories told about three different oil spill events.  I 
consider similarities and differences and theorize about taken-for-granted widely held beliefs that 
underlie stories told about the events.  By exploring the way actors make sense of oil spills in 
policymaking narratives, I aim to shed light on how culture works. What comes into view is that 
culture works in policymaking by providing the preamble or scaffolding of sorts that enables 
and/or constrains stories told in congressional hearings about oil spills.  That is, culture is visible 
in the rhetorical devices and narrative strategies used by storytellers.  Stories within rule-bound 
institutional contexts such as Senate hearings illuminate the ways in which interests and ideas are 
linked.  In all oil spill hearings in this report, each respective event was storied from multiple and 
conflicting perspectives: elected officials, experts and environmental advocates, and oil industry 
executives who push and pull the causal definition of the event from intentional to accidental 
consistent with interests to assign blame or to avoid it.  While multiple stories were told, they all 
reveal taken-for-granted assumptions about what is deemed problematic, what is valued, who or 
what is guilty, who or what is innocent, and what should be done in the future to avoid problems 
like oil spills with symbolic representations.  All in all, stories construct the oil spill problem as 
amenable to human control. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
I began my research with an interest in how culture works in policymaking.  Informed by 
debates in policy studies that seek to identify mechanisms that influence policy design, 
implementation and change, I used a fairly broad conception of culture.  That is, following 
Schudson (1989) I regarded culture as a set of tools that actors use to construct meaning and 
culture as ideational force (Padamsee 2009) that enables and constrains meaning making.  To 
accomplish my investigation, I reviewed diverse arguments from across disciplines that have 
contributed to the wider mosaic of theoretical and methodological approaches, and grounded my 
work within the constructionist paradigm.  Works in phenomenology (Berger and Luckmann 
1966, Schutz 1945), narratology (Fisher 1985, Ewick and Silbey 1995, Atkinson and Delamont 
2006, Gubrium and Holstein 2009), social problems construction (Best 2008, Loseke 2003, 
Spector and Kitsuse 2009 [1977]) cultural sociology (Alexander 2003, Geertz 1973, Griswold 
2013, Padamsee 2009, Smith 2005, Swidler 1986), public policy (Stone 1997, Hajer 1995, 
Fischer 2003, Jones and McBeth 2010) and disaster studies (Clarke 2006, Steinberg 2006, 
Stallings 1995, Tierney 2007) were synthesized to build my theoretical, methodological and 
analytical frameworks.   
In short, this study contributes to the conversation about cultural influence on problem 
and solution definition within public policy debates with a focus on narratives in policymaking.  
I argue that this study makes three major contributions to studies in public policy.  First, by 
conceptualizing culture as both tool kit and ideational force this analysis provides “variables” to 
colleagues who seek to create comprehensive models of policy processes.  Second, this study 
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exemplifies a systematic, narrative comparison that addresses calls for more rigor in qualitative 
work.  It illustrates the use of congressional testimony as narrative data that is organized 
according to narrative structures as an analytical comparative framework.  I used a narrative 
comparative approach to execute a systematic exploration of cultural meanings that are visible 
within social processes such as policymaking, which also informs our understanding of world 
making in general.  Following scholars who suggest that narratives are reflexive (Ewick and 
Silbey 1995, Loseke 2007), I argue that examining stories within a particular social process that 
seeks to make sense of a “breach to the canonical script” (Bruner 1991), analysts can observe the 
taken-for-granted assumptions that contribute to story coherence in general (Rideout 2013).  
Finally, this study makes practical contributions that include illuminating the taken-for-granted.  
I call attention to the unquestioned assumptions in oil spill stories that can be linked with the 
wider social order.   
Synthesis 
In this chapter I synthesize the analysis of causal stories about oil spills to highlight the 
way culture works in policymaking.  First, I discuss the way actors use narrative strategies to 
define the oil spill problem and its redress consistent with particular interests.  Here, I summarize 
how narratives in policymaking illuminate the way actors use “culture as tools” (Schudson 1989, 
Swidler 1986).  In short, I argue that actors use narrative strategies in predictable ways.  Second, 
I reflect on how diverse stories reveal taken-for-granted ideas and underlying morals that hold 
stories together.  I assert that different stories are undergirded by shared beliefs regarding the 
purity and preciousness of the natural environment, the power and potential of knowledge and 
learning as well as the unquestioned expansion of innovations and technological advancements 
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in pursuit of resource development.  Here, I comment on how culture works as a force that 
shapes the types of stories told (Schudson 1989).   
In my concluding paragraphs, I discuss how this analysis elucidates the way culture 
works in policymaking with the application of a narrative comparative approach.  In my view, 
beliefs not only shape and influence diverse representations of policy problems and their redress 
in policymaking, but are also linked to “reality” or the wider social order in general.  
Specifically, I argue that culture provides for and perpetuates what Stone (1997) refers to as 
paradoxes in policymaking.  Indeed, causal stories “do more than convincingly demonstrate the 
possibility of human control over bad conditions,” as Stone (1997:204) argues.  They work to 
perpetuate the social order.  While stories reveal “ideal” cultural beliefs and ideas, they also 
make what some social scientists refer to as “real culture” visible as well (Montague 1950, 
Myrdal 1945).  By organizing my conclusion around these paradoxes I attempt to answer the call 
by Gubrium and Holstein (1997) to illuminate the links between representations or ideas and 
reality or material interests.  In so doing, I engage with the possibilities that this awareness 
creates for positive social change.  In the end, I acknowledge the limitations of this work as well 
as future applications and directions. 
 Stone (1997) argues that stories in policymaking are strategic.  Political actors represent 
various interests with symbols, numbers, drama, poetry, metaphor, and synecdoche.   In this 
work, I have argued so far that strategies for constructing versions of truth are visible in stories 
told about oil spill events.  Furthermore, I argue that observing narrative strategies by diverse 
storytellers illuminates links between objective interests and symbolic ideas.  Observing this link 
provides evidence of how storytellers use culture as a “tool box” to make sense of events such as 
oil spills (Schudson 1989, Swidler 1986).  In this section, I synthesize stories told in three 
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different institutional contexts, about three different oil spills that occurred in different places 
and times: the Santa Barbara Oil Spill (1969), the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (1989), and the 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (2010).  Despite vast differences, I note enduring similarities that 
provide support for Stone’s (1997) theories regarding the subjective constructions of policy 
problems.  In the main, Stone (1997) argues that policymaking is anything but an objective, 
rational reduction of costs and benefits.  Indeed, she argues it is a struggle.  Specifically, she 
writes (1997:202):  “In the polis, causal stories need to be fought for, defended, and sustained.  
There is always someone to tell a competing story…”   
Who Constructs Oil Spill Problems? 
 In the three cases I observed, storytellers in Senate hearings about oil spills include the 
senators on the committee or subcommittee which organized the hearing and witnesses from the 
oil companies implicated in the oil spill events.  Additionally, other interests were represented in 
each case. (See Table 11).  For example, in the Santa Barbara hearing, representatives from 
Santa Barbara County spoke as did a panel of environmental conservationists.  In the Exxon 
Valdez hearing, representatives from the U.S. Coast Guard and other governmental agencies 
(Environmental Protection Agency, Fish and Wildlife, etc.) testified.  And in the Deepwater 
Horizon hearing, “experts” including an associate professor in petroleum engineering from Texas 
A&M University, and a retired chief of the government agency charged with industry monitoring 
and oversight both offered testimony.  These witnesses were invited to present testimony before 
senators and offered stories consistent with their interests. 
How Do Storytellers Construct the Oil Spill Problem? 
Predictably, storytellers in oil spill hearings construct stories that are consistent with 
particular interests.  For example, senators construct the oil spill problem consistent with their 
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Table 11: Storytellers in Oil Spill Hearings 
Santa Barbara 
Subcommittee on Air and Water 
Pollution of the Committee on 
Public Works 
Exxon Valdez  
Committee on Commerce, Science 
and Transportation 
Deepwater Horizon  
Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources 
Senators (Committee Members) Senators (Committee Members) Senators (Committee Members) 
Oil Industry (Union Oil Company) Oil Industry (Exxon Corporation) Oil Industry (British Petroleum 
[B.P.], Transocean and Halliburton) 
Environmental Point of View/ 
Conservationists (Wildlife 
Federation, Sierra club, American 
Forestry Association, Wilderness 
Society, Wildlife Management 
Institute, Izaak Walton League, 
Citizens Committee on Natural 
Resources) 
Environmental Point of View 
Government Agencies (EPA, 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, Office of 
Oceanography and Marine 
Assessment, Fish and Wildlife 
Service) 
 
Local officials (Santa Barbara 
County) 
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), 
Department of Transportation 
“Technical Experts” Retired expert 
from Minerals Management Service 
and Associate Professor of 
Petroleum Engineering at Texas 
A&M University 
 
interests in legislation and constituent support.  They tell what Stone (1997) refers to as an 
inadvertent causal story of avoidable ignorance on the part of the oil companies that were 
charged with responsibility.  In the Santa Barbara case, Union oil was constructed as “reckless” 
and should have known better than to drill in a geologically unstable area.  They should have 
been more prepared for a spill.  In the Exxon Valdez case, the Exxon Corporation is constructed 
as the “double cross boys,” traitorous with its disregard for valuable natural resources.  The U.S. 
Coast Guard is also blamed for dereliction of duty letting a “convicted drunk” pilot a barge full 
of oil through one of the most ecologically vulnerable places – Prince William Sound.  And in 
Deepwater Horizon, oil companies are constructed as reckless and potentially criminal with their 
“too cozy relationship” with the Minerals Management Service, a bureau within the Department 
of the Interior tasked with the management of “ocean energy and mineral resources on the Outer 
Continental Shelf” (http://www.mms.gov/aboutmms/).   
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That is, senators attempt to “show that the low-probability effects of an action were 
accepted as a calculated risk by the actor” (Stone 1997:203).  In other words, senators construct 
oil companies as reckless risk takers.  Principally, senators construct citizens, residents, tourists 
as well as beaches, coastlines, marine and wildlife as victims harmed by oil spill events in 
economic terms.  With this narrative strategy, senators attempt to push the definition of the 
problem into the realm of intent in order to assign moral and fiscal responsibility with policy 
instruments such as fines and penalties as well as laws and regulations (Stone 1997).  (See Table 
12). 
Witnesses representing environmental interests tell similar stories as senators consistent 
with their special interests to protect the environment.  Attempting to define the problem as one 
of human control, environmental agents construct an inadvertent causal narrative that explains 
the oil spill as a consequence of avoidable ignorance.  That is, environmental agents suggest that 
the oil spill could have been avoided if it were not for conflicts of interest between government 
and industry and if industry did not place profits ahead of resource protection.  For example, in 
Santa Barbara, the spill is constructed as an example of a larger problem of environmental 
neglect.  In Exxon Valdez, the spill is described as the “San Francisco Earthquake of ecological 
catastrophes.”  Exxon Oil is constructed as “complacent in a very risky process” and 
inadequately prepared.  Predictably, victims are constructed as sea birds, marine mammals, 
coasts and rivers.  Like senators, environmentalists attempt to show that industry was negligent 
and assumed that the risks associated with drilling and transporting oil were acceptable (See 
Table 13). 
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Table 12: Summary of Causal Stories by Senators 
 Santa Barbara Exxon Valdez Deepwater Horizon 
Causal Story Avoidable 
Ignorance/Complex 
Systems 
Avoidable Ignorance, 
Reckless Operator, 
complacent 
Industry/Government 
Reckless Industry/Minerals 
Management Services, Complex 
Systems 
Problem Disaster, Accident Disaster, Tragedy Horrible Disaster, Catastrophe, 
Tragedy 
Victims Californians, Business 
Owners, Coastlines 
Prince William Sound, 
Marine Life, tourists, 
Residents 
Workers Killed/Injured, Commercial 
Fishermen, Nation’s Food Supply, 
Boat Captains, Tourism, State/Local 
Revenue, Shipping Impacts, Oil 
Industry Impacts, Pristine Beaches 
Villains Careless Industry, 
Complex Systems 
Exxon Corporation, U.S. 
Coast Guard, Captain 
Hazelwood, Government, 
Industry 
Reckless Oil Companies (British 
Petroleum in particular), Minerals 
Management Services, Complex 
Technologies 
Solutions Study and Investigation, 
Legislation 
Protect Coastal 
Environment, Fine Exxon 
Corporation, Federalize 
Response, Ban Supertankers 
Continue Offshore Oil Development, 
Diversify Energy Portfolio, Learn 
from Mistakes, More Stringent 
Regulations, Change Regulatory 
Agency, and Fine Operators 
 
In contrast, industry representatives (and others charged with responsibility) construct 
competing narratives consistent with their interests to deflect blame and accountability for the 
event.  Predictably, industry representatives were interested in minimizing damages and 
liabilities associated with the oil spill.  For each event, oil company chief executives attempt to 
Table 13: Summary of Causal Stories by Environmentalists 
 Santa Barbara Exxon Valdez Deepwater Horizon 
Causal Story Avoidable Ignorance/Complex 
Systems 
Avoidable Ignorance, Reckless 
Operators, Complex Systems 
NA 
Problem Catastrophe, Synecdoche 
(symptom of larger problems) 
Catastrophe, Tragedy, Disaster NA 
Victims Wildlife, Beaches, Birds Fish and Wildlife, Coasts and Rivers NA 
Villains Careless Federal Government, 
Industry 
Exxon Corporation, Federal 
Government, Captain Hazelwood 
NA 
Solutions Investigation, Organizational 
Change, Operator Fines, Stop 
Domestic Drilling and Import 
Oil from Abroad 
Improve Captain Certification 
Processes, Create Oil Spill Liability, 
Assess Environmental 
Consequences, Improve Contingency 
Planning 
NA 
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 “show that the problem is caused by an accident of nature” (Stone 1997:203).  That is, industry 
representatives construct accidental causal stories and/or complex systems stories to explain the 
spills.  Accidental stories include forces of nature or acts of God (geological faults in the Santa 
Barbara case) and unpredictable aspects of personal health (alcoholic captain in the Exxon Case).  
Complex systems stories are about the complexity of technological systems that involve multiple 
parts and functions such as unforeseeable failures of blowout preventers, cementing procedures, 
and the failure of “multiple redundancies” in the Deepwater Horizon case.  (See Table 14). 
Table 14: Summary of Causal Stories by Oil Industry Representatives 
 Santa Barbara Exxon Valdez Deepwater Horizon 
Causal Story Accident of 
Fate/Unavoidable 
Ignorance 
Accident (Alcoholic captain), 
Unavoidable Ignorance, 
Inadvertent (Reckless captain), and 
Complex Systems 
Accidental Cause/Complex 
Systems 
Problem Accident, “not a 
disaster” 
Disaster, Accident Tragic Series of Events 
Victims Union Oil Alaskans, Exxon Corporation Workers Killed/Injured, Family 
and Friends of Dead/Injured, Gulf 
Coast Residents, Subcontractors 
(Transocean and Halliburton) 
Villains Federal Government Reckless Captain, Alyeska Oil 
Spill Contingency Plan/Federal 
Government 
Workers on the Rig, Blowout 
Preventers (BOPs), Principal 
Operator (B.P. and the Minerals 
Management Service (Federal 
Government) 
Solutions Improve Cleanup 
Technologies, Learn 
from Experience 
Learn from Event, Improve 
Company (alcohol and drug 
testing) Policies, Continue 
Domestic Exploration of Oil 
Learn from Event, Improve Safety 
Regu7lations, and Compensate 
“Legitimate Claims.” 
 
Other stories were told from various perspectives: For example, Santa Barbara County 
representatives (in Santa Barbara) constructed an inadvertent causal story that blamed the 
reckless oil industry and the Federal government for being “hellbent to lease the channel.”  In 
Exxon Valdez, The U.S. Coast Guard rebuts charges of irresponsibility by suggesting it was the 
government’s fault for not providing an adequate budget to do the job right.  And in Deepwater 
Horizon, the retired MMS chief rebuts the charge of impropriety by arguing that workers 
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“[W]on’t take a donut from the industry.”  Instead, Mr. Danenberger of the MMS suggested it 
was the workers on the rig who failed and did not follow proper safety protocols.  Indeed, the 
story constructed from the perspective of the Minerals Management Service attempts to explain 
the event as being caused by complex technological failures.  This is not surprising as the MMS 
was partly charged with responsibility for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.  As Stone (1997:203) 
theorizes, some parties use causal strategies to “show that the cause of the problem is so complex 
that only large-scale policy changes at the social level can alter the cause.”  (See Table 5).  This 
narrative strategy is similar to constructing the event as accidental in that responsibility is 
diffuse, blame is difficult to assign.  
Table 15: Summary of Other Causal Stories 
 Santa Barbara 
(Santa Barbara 
County 
Representatives) 
Exxon Valdez (U.S. Coast 
Guard and Department of 
Transportation) 
Deepwater Horizon (Associate Professor, 
Texas A&M, and Retired Chief of 
Minerals Management Services) 
Causal Story Avoidable 
Ignorance 
Carelessness, Avoidable 
Ignorance 
Accidental Cause, Complex Systems 
Problem Tragedy Disaster Accident, Rare Event 
Victims Santa Barbarans, 
Residents, Tourists, 
Businesses, 
Aesthetic Beauty 
Coasts and rivers, U.S. Coast 
Guard (lacks budget support) 
Family and Friends of 11Workers who were 
Killed/Injured.  Minerals Management 
Service Employees  
Villains Careless Industry, 
Federal 
Government 
Exxon Corporation, 
Complacency, Captain 
Hazelwood 
Human Error (Workers on the Rig), 
Complex technologies (Multiple Barriers, 
Blowout Preventers, Shear Rams, etc.) 
Solutions Stop Drilling, 
Protect Beauty 
Learn from Situation, Assess 
Contingency Plans, Transport 
Oil more Safely, Avoid 
Foreign Carriers, Improve 
Legislation, Create Oil Spill 
Liability Fund. 
Lean from Event, More Technical and 
Regulatory Experts, Streamline Outer 
Continental Shelf Regulatory Regime, 
Expand Role of Coast Guard, Collect 
Failure Data, Develop Best Practices, 
Publish Safety Rules.  Focus on Operator 
Responsibility.  Share Knowledge 
 
In summary, my data shows that political actors construct causal stories that are 
consistent with their individual/group interests using narrative strategies and rhetorical devices.  
Inadvertent causal stories are predictable in that assigning blame or “intentional cause” is 
difficult given all the alternative explanations that are possible in accidental causal stories.  It is 
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difficult to cast oil companies and government, as willfully or knowingly causing a spill to 
happen which inevitably challenges the assignment of blame and responsibility – a fundamental 
goal in policymaking (Stone 1997).   
While stories are diverse, all are told with symbolic devices including stories (stories of 
decline and stories of control), metaphors, numbers, synecdoche and ambiguity (Stone 1997).  
These devices can be understood as “cultural tools” that actors use to make sense of oil spills 
(Schudson 1989 and Swidler 1986) and can be captured as evidence of how actors are “agentic” 
in their use of culture.  In the main, political actors construct the oil spill problem as something 
amenable to human control and fixable through human agency.  Using container metaphors 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980) or “containment metaphors” (Stone 1997), storytellers construct oil 
spills as distinct entities that happen in discrete places, with finite and countable consequences.   
Using synecdoche, storytellers, construct the oil spill as symptomatic or indicative of 
larger more important problems such as general environmental neglect, and reliance on foreign 
oil producers.  Using numbers, storytellers quantify the scope of the oil spill problem in terms of 
volume of oil, and victims harmed in terms of millions and billions of dollars.  These data show 
how culture works in policymaking as a box of tools to accomplish a “definition of the situation” 
(Goffman 1959) consistent with particular interests and goals.  As Schudson (1989:155) writes, 
“Individuals select the meanings they need for particular purposes and occasions from the 
limited but nonetheless varied cultural menu a given society provides.”  Thus, in response to my 
initial research question, I learned that culture works as a set of tools that actors use to make 
sense of oil spill events. 
 I also learned that culture works as an ideational force (Padamsee 2009).  Following 
Vaughan (2004:322), who argues “What matters is going beyond the obvious and dealing with 
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the contradictions produced by going below the platform and the elephant,”  I wanted to go 
beyond what seemed to me to be “the obvious” that actors tell stories in pursuit of self/group 
interest.  As Schudson (1989) argues, culture does not only work as a set of tools that actors use 
to accomplish aims.  Indeed, in policymaking, actors must tell stories that are believable (Stone 
1997).  So, I analyzed all stories together to capture the influence of culture as ideational force 
on stories told about oil spills (Padamsee 2009).  I asked how do these stories make sense?  What 
are the taken-for-granted assumptions that provide for story coherence? 
What is Taken-For-Granted or Assumed in Stories that Define Oil Spill Problems and 
Solutions? 
Stories about the Santa Barbara, the Exxon Valdez and the Deepwater Horizon oil spills 
reveal particularities that set them apart from each other.  Yet, despite different contexts, times, 
scope, and consequences, there are important similarities.  In the main, stories reveal taken-for-
granted assumptions about how the world should work that can be understood as cultural 
influence on policymaking.  In oral testimony in three oil spill hearings I observe taken-for-
granted assumptions about beauty and nature, knowledge and learning as well as innovation and 
technology.  
Following Shudson (1989:154), I explored policy narratives about oil spills for how they 
reveal culture as “ideas, symbols or propaganda” that can be “manipulative” or causal.  
Importantly, the tools that policy actors use to construct stories about oil spills make sense in 
context (read: institutional, political, economic, social and technological).  The analytical choice 
that enabled me to see cultural influence this way was to conceptualize oil spills as cultural 
objects in and of themselves.  Arguing with Schudson (1989:154), “culture…comes embodied 
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both in some kind of material form [oil spills] and some kind of social practice [storytelling in 
congressional hearings].”   
So, what do diverse stories told from diverse perspectives assume or encourage audience 
members to assume in their telling?  In the main, the use of metaphors of containment, machines 
and mechanisms and organisms in diverse causal stories assume that places can be 
compartmentalized and assessed in terms of economic value and importance; they assume that 
knowledge hierarchies can categorize people in terms of guilt and innocence, as well as 
credibility and ignorance; and they assume that bureaucratic structures and technological 
processes and practices can be diagnosed, dissected and improved.  (See Table 6).  All in all, 
stories assume that oil spills can be fixed, controlled and prevented with and through human 
agency…(American agency in particular). 
Beauty is Precious 
 First, diverse stories across all cases suggest that nature and beauty are precious and 
valuable.  Evident in testimony that constructs settings of oil spills as discrete entities, 
“containers” of economic value, diverse stories across all cases suggest that nature and beauty 
are precious.  Undergirded by metaphors of containment (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), stories 
construct settings of oil spills as unique places that contain substances that are valued (tourism, 
recreation, wildlife, fisheries).  Consistent across cases are stories that construct oil spills as 
“disasters” or “catastrophes” in unique settings.  Santa Barbara was constructed as the “Riviera 
of the West,” “One of the most beautiful areas in the country.”  In Exxon Valdez, Prince William 
Sound is constructed as ecologically unique,” with “mountainous coastlines overlooking gravel 
beaches.”  In Deepwater Horizon which lacked witnesses speaking on behalf of environmental 
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interests, a senator constructed the “pristine beaches” of Destin Florida among the many 
potential victims of the oil spill.   
  Table 16: Taken-For-Granted Assumptions that Shape Oil Spill Stories  
 Beauty is Precious Knowledge is Power Innovation is Progress 
Santa Barbara 
1969 
“Buffer zones,” “residential 
zoning controls,” “Riviera of 
the West.”  Linked with “60% 
of our basic income…is derived 
from these sources 
(recreation/tourism)…20% 
comes from research and 
development industries 
attracted by our environmental 
assets.” 
More study to “take into 
account the geological 
history, likelihood of 
seismic accidents,” “learn 
from mistakes,” “provide 
full disclosure of all info 
relevant to public 
understanding of disaster 
recovery,” “study feasibility 
of marine sanctuaries.”  
Testimony also suggests 
that lay people are not 
expected to know, but 
experts, high level officials, 
executives are. 
More proactive 
policymaking, regulations 
and fines to prevent future oil 
spills, oil industry should 
cooperate to “clean things 
up,” “investigate new oil 
processing technologies that 
do not require ‘unsightly 
platforms’ that harms the 
‘esthetic environment,’ “save 
domestic oil, import from 
abroad,” “create “new 
theories of liability.” 
Exxon Valdez 
1989 
“Ecological uniqueness,” 
“wildlife refuge,” 
“mountainous coastline 
overlooking sandy beaches, and 
pine forests sheltering 
productive marshlands.”  
Linked with economic 
estimates: “$100 million local 
fishing industry,” “$10 million 
herring,” “$160 million in 
fish,” and the prescription to 
create a “cleanup fund.” 
“Assess…contingency 
plans…ensure they are 
updated accordingly,” 
“learn from mistakes,” 
“improve random testing for 
drugs and alcohol,” “long 
term analysis of ecological 
effects…to present a bill to 
Exxon,” “find out size of 
disaster,” “revise policies 
and procedures.” 
Create “emergency group,” 
“Federalize” spill clean-up, 
“continue domestic 
transportation of oil,” 
“improve “oil 
transportation…Do not 
minimize reliance on oil 
shipments,” “avoid foreign 
carriers,” “we do not want to 
go to smaller tankers.” 
Deepwater 
Horizon 2010 
“Environmental impacts” 
“Pristine beaches,” “depleted 
fisheries,” “further drilling 
operations.” Linked with “cost 
estimates by experts now say 
that it could be as high as $14 
billion,” $3.4 billion seafood 
industry,” Gulf of Mexico 
harvested 1.27 million pounds 
of fish and shellfish, generated 
$659 million in revenue,” long 
term damages to Louisiana 
fishing industry and its brand,” 
“shipping impacts” liabilities 
tied to “normal trespass and 
pollution laws of the state. 
“Look at revenue sharing 
agreements,” “learned from 
mistakes,” “share [industry] 
knowledge,” Oil executives 
claim ignorance about 
cleanup technology in 
situations  like this.  “We’ve 
not dealt with a situation 
like this.”  “Take lessons 
learned and move forward 
to…ensure this never 
happens again.”  “[N]eed 
technical and regulatory 
experts on committee,” 
“collect failure data,” 
“prompts publication of 
safety rules.” 
Continue domestic 
production.  “Our nation will 
need a lot of oil for a 
longtime to come.”  Diversify 
off of oil into nuclear energy 
resources, change corporate 
(oil) culture, create new 
private agency to oversee oil 
lease negotiations, create new 
regulations, safety standards, 
“streamline OCS regulatory 
regime…Expand role of 
Coast guard Offshore 
Advisory Committee. 
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These representations of environmental damages are linked with economic estimates and 
evaluations.  For example, in Santa Barbara County, the “beautiful coast” is constructed as 
providing 80% of revenues in tourism, recreation, property values and taxes.  In Exxon Valdez, 
the setting translates into a “$100 million local fishing industry, $10 million herring,” “$160 
million in fish.”  And in Deepwater Horizon, environmental impacts are constructed as potential 
liabilities that could be as high as “$14 billion.”  From these data, I conclude that policy stories 
reveal widely held beliefs that particular places are economically valued and commoditized for 
natural beauty and resource abundance.  There is an underlying belief that with money we can 
restore nature.  With money we can fix oil spills. 
Knowledge is Power 
 Another taken-for-granted assumption regards the power of knowledge in assignments of 
blame and responsibility.  For example, testimonies extol the virtue of knowledge and expertise 
that are visible in prescriptions for more study and investigation, to learn from mistakes, to 
improve plans and protocols, to share knowledge between industry operators and with concerned 
citizens.  In Santa Barbara, witnesses prescribe “more study to take into account the geological 
history, likelihood of seismic accidents,” and “study the feasibility of marine sanctuaries.”  In 
Exxon Valdez, witnesses construct the necessity first to “assess the size of the spill,” to “conduct 
random testing for drugs and alcohol,” and to “conduct long term analysis of ecological effects.”  
In Deepwater Horizon, witnesses say we should “collect failure data,” and publish “safety rules” 
to “learn from mistakes.” 
 I also observed a lack of knowledge as a form of power in deflecting blame and 
responsibility.  Some people should know better, and only some people have access to 
knowledge.  In Santa Barbara, county officials testified that they were not given an opportunity 
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to protest lease negotiations; that as “laypeople” they lack technical knowledge.  Further 
testimony suggests that reports about geological vulnerability were proprietary and meant only 
for some audiences.  In Exxon Valdez, the oil company representative claimed ignorance about 
the mundane practices of licensing captains as a way to deflect blame and responsibility.  And in 
Deepwater Horizon, industry representatives claimed ignorance about data that may have been 
collected to help determine the cause of the event.  Further, they constructed inexperience as a 
warrant for absolution with the claim “We have never dealt with a situation like this before.”  I 
conclude from these data that knowledge is assumed to be powerful.  There is an underlying 
belief that knowledge development makes problems controllable through rational assignments of 
blame and responsibility.  With knowledge we can control oil spills. 
Innovation is Progress 
 Finally, testimony reveals assumptions about growth and innovation.  The development 
of new practices and products is tantamount to progress.  In Santa Barbara, witnesses prescribe 
the creation of government agencies, new laws and regulations, even “new theories of liability” 
as solutions to fix broken agencies, laws and regulations.  Similarly, in Exxon Valdez, witnesses 
prescribe the creation of an “emergency group” to respond to future oil spills and to avoid 
foreign carriers, improve domestic oil transportation.  Finally, in Deepwater, testimony 
emphasizes the need to continue domestic production of oil despite risks to life and nature.  
Witnesses recommend creating a private agency to eliminate conflict of interest between industry 
and government.  From these data, I conclude widely held beliefs about innovation and progress.  
There is an underlying belief that change is good for the sake of change in bureaucratic policies 
and procedures, as well as technological capabilities.  And, that change will lead to better 
practices and behaviors.  With innovation we can prevent oil spills. 
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 In sum, my analysis supports Stone’s (1997) assertion that causal theories work to 
“demonstrate the possibility of human control over bad conditions.”  Further, it shows that 
assumptions about the ability to control places, people and processes shape the stories told in 
congressional hearings by diverse actors.  But, following Stone (1997) causal stories reveal more 
than the cultural tools used to represent problems, and cultural forces that provide for the use of 
cultural tools to construct coherence, they work to perpetuate or challenge the status quo.  In 
what follows, I launch from observations of how culture works in policymaking to theorize about 
how culture works in worldmaking. 
Linking Representations with Realities 
 
Synthesizing analyses enabled me to draw some preliminary conclusions about how 
representations in causal narratives about oil spills are linked with realities or the wider social 
order.  Following Vaughan (2004, 2008), I reflect on my analysis by way of “analogical 
comparison” in order to theorize about how culture works in general.  As Vaughan (2008:66) 
writes:  
By analogical theorizing, I mean developing theoretical explanations by cross case 
analysis that compares similar phenomena in different social forms that vary in size, 
complexity, and function.  Shifting the unit of analysis from one social form to another is 
the essence of developing theory by analogical comparison.   
 
In my analysis of different congressional hearings about oil spills across time, I have already 
argued that culture works as a set of tools and resources that actors use to make sense of oil  
spills.  I have also argued that culture works as a force that shapes and constrains stories told.  In 
what follows, I triangulate my analysis with the literature to argue that widely held beliefs 
evident in policy stories are linked with dominant ideologies regarding cost, efficiency, and 
quantification (Vaughan 2004), the “rational ideal” (Stone 1997), and continuous growth in 
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production and consumption (Vaughan 2004) via American innovation.  As Stone (1997:204) 
argues: 
Causal theories…do more than convincingly demonstrate the possibility of human 
control over bad conditions.  [T]hey can either challenge of protect an existing social 
order…[T]hey can assign responsibility to particular political actors…[and] [They] can 
legitimize and empower particular actors as ‘fixers’ of the problem. 
 
Beliefs about Beauty and Nature Protect Capitalist Economic Order 
  Taken together, oil spill stories construct a widely held belief that we should protect our 
natural environment from natural, technological and man-made “disasters.”  In oil spill stories, 
testimonies construct the oil spill problem as disastrous because they occurred in unique and 
precious spaces.  Lakoff and Johnson (1980) theorize that “territoriality” is a basic human 
instinct.  Accordingly, we define territories according to the values and substances that they 
contain.  As Grieder and Garkovich (1994:1) have argued landscapes are “the symbolic 
environments created by human acts of conferring meaning to nature and the environment.”  It 
has also been argued that constructing a place as “unique” distinguishes it from other places that 
are not considered unique (Sagoff 1974). As Sagoff (1974:206) argues, “It is the demand for the 
unique or scarce that makes it valuable.”  Writing about the rationale for environmental 
protection, Sagoff provides a theoretical account for the paradox observed in testimonies about 
oil spills.  That is, unique natural environments are not constructed as valuable for their own 
sake, but for the utility natural environments can provide in terms of economic and recreational 
benefits.  In short, the natural environment is precious and valuable especially in the cultural 
context of a capitalist society that relies on exploitation and use in goals for growth and 
advancement.   
Controlling the natural environment has been according to Drake (1992) a Western 
cultural theme since the 19th century.  And as the work of Mary Douglas (2003) suggests, it is 
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pollution and uncleanliness from oil spills that creates necessity to control.  While Douglas 
discusses control rituals as they pertain to human practices associated with personal hygiene and 
health, her insights are relevant to the present work as well.  Policy stories about oil spills reveal 
beliefs and ritual practices as they pertain to our ability and necessity to control the natural 
environment.  And controlling our natural environment is not only about compartmentalizing it 
into parts for recreation, residence and resource extraction, but in maintaining the visual aesthetic 
of cleanliness.  Following Douglas (2003) if our environment is perceived to be unclean, it is 
perceived to be disordered.  By extension, if it is perceived to be clean, it is perceived to be 
ordered. 
Moral values related to the beauty of our natural environment are upheld by beliefs in 
what constitutes contagion and pollution or environmental disaster.  As has been argued in this 
study, we label events as disasters when they are large, visible and ugly especially when they 
occur in contexts labeled beautiful, unique, or pristine (Beamish 2002, Button 2010).  Labeling 
something a disaster renders it something that is objective and can be controlled (Stone 1997).  
As Douglas points out, labeling reduces ambiguity about what an event or condition is.  It seems 
most vexing for us are visible, acute disasters such as oil spills that defile our beautiful beaches, 
pristine waters and precious wildlife with black goo.   As Douglas (2003:7) writes: “For us, 
sacred things and places are to be protected from defilement.”  Beautiful places are tantamount to 
sacred places.  Beautiful coastlines are rare and unique and contain substances we value.  
However, the implied importance is to maintain and protect unique places for future productive 
use by government, industry, urban and suburban development and individual residents and 
tourists. 
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What oil spill stories suggest is that visible contamination is most problematic.  We are 
not inclined to treat as pollution or disaster those things we cannot see (Beamish 2002, Button 
2010, Giddens 2011).  If the visible evidence of oil spills is out of sight, then oil spills are out of 
mind.  The perception of order is linked to visible aesthetics.  Actions are called for and justified 
by our collective fear of danger that the black goo causes to our sanctuaries, wildlife refuges, 
food supplies and coastlines.  Order is brought about through efforts to clean and restore that 
which has been defiled.  Evidence of this restoration must be visible.  Washing pelicans, cleaning 
beaches and coastlines, removing visible oil slicks from the water all constitute evidence that we 
have eliminated toxins due to oil spills.  Consequently, we do not see a need to act toward or 
control that which is not visible.  Throughout hearing testimony, there is an obvious lack of 
suggestion that we pursue different ways to provide for national energy, security and economic 
comfort that would be more consistent with an ideal to protect the natural environment.  But that 
is not surprising as Stone (1997:203) notes “One major causal story – that the capitalist 
economic and political system is the cause of innumerable social ills – is consistently shut out.” 
This lack of comment about changing or modifying consumption of natural resources 
illuminates a contradiction between ideal beliefs in environmental stewardship as noted in 
prescriptive statements in policy stories about oil spills and real practices of environmental 
dominion or control.  Unintended consequences of this belief are that we tend to continue 
practices and neglect conditions that may be problematic, but are not perceived as defilement, 
pollution, contamination or something that we can restore or control because we cannot see them 
(Beamish 2002, Birkland 1997) or because we do not expect them to happen in certain places 
(Stallings 1995).  
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We pursue economic valuation of nature with the idea that we can hold the polluter 
financially accountable for restoring polluted environments back to normal (Fourcade 2011).  As 
observers have noted that “the wonders of nature, once destroyed, cannot be reproduced.  But 
many things can be replaced.  Natural environments are among them” (Sagoff 1974:206).  
Neglected is the possibility that we cannot recompense nature, which is made abundantly clear in 
the literatures that address problematic conditions related to biodiversity losses and other non-
visible microbiological threats to our shared ecosystem (O ‘Riordan and Stoll-Kleeman 2002).  
Policy stories about oil spills suggest that they are destructive to our perceptions of order and 
beauty, but they also represent the potential for order in that we believe we can clean it up and 
restore pattern/order and beauty.  Furthermore, by visibly restoring beaches back to “normal” 
aesthetics we believe we are protecting nature and by extension ourselves. 
Beliefs in the Power of Knowledge Assigns Blame and Responsibility for Fixing Problems 
and Compensating Victims 
 Another widely held belief that is illuminated in policy stories about oil spills concerns 
the ideal that we learn from oil spill events so that we can avoid another one in the future.  In 
policy stories about oil spills, we see evidence of the widely held belief in our ability to 
investigate, study and learn from events so that we can avoid future disastrous conditions.  
According to Stone (1997:305) the commitment to knowledge development is consistent with the 
“rational ideal” which portrays “a vision of society where conflict is temporary and unnecessary, 
where force is replaced by discussion, and where individual actions are brought into harmony 
through the persuasive power of logic and evidence.”  Prescriptions for more study and 
investigation are consistent with what Hajer (1995) refers to as the ecological modernization 
thesis.  Hajer (1995:25) defines ecological modernization as a discourse that “recognizes the 
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structural character of the environmental problematique but none the less assumes that existing 
political, economic, and social institutions can internalize the care for the environment.”  That is 
oil spill damages are calculable.  Not only do we think we must protect and control nature, but 
that with linear, empirical study…we can. 
Whether it is to pursue a project of investigating geological conditions and technological 
processes as in the Santa Barbara case, environmental impact and evaluation studies as in the 
Exxon Valdez case, or sophisticated technological capabilities as in the Deepwater Horizon case 
scientific study and investigation was proffered as a way to respond to the spill and avoid oil 
spills in the future.  Principally, in the policy arena, the actors who can create and distribute 
knowledge are those authorities vested with the power to investigate – “experts.”  Stone 
(1997:28) argues, “Much of what we ‘know’ is what we believe to be true.  And what we believe 
about information depends on who tells us (the source) and how it is presented (the medium, the 
choice of language, the context).”   
 Many scholars have written about the authority of science and scientists in policy 
making (Collingridge and Reeve 1986, Fischer 2000, 2003, Hilgartner 2000, Jasanoff 2009).  In 
particular, Fischer (2000) comments on what he refers to as the “age of expertise” for how it 
stymies democratic participation in policymaking about issues affecting our shared environment.   
In short, only some people can create knowledge in policymaking which constructs a hierarchy 
of credibility (Loseke 2003).  My analysis also directs attention to the possibility that beliefs 
shaping the production of knowledge create a hierarchy of liability in which actors are 
exonerated from responsibility because of presumed ignorance.  I argue that ignorance is a form 
of power that is used to deflect blame and responsibility.   
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 Implicit in the ideal of knowledge production to respond to and solve oil spill problems is 
the ideal that it be shared.  Comparing stories across time, testimony suggests that we should 
create more knowledge about the natural environment, and technological capabilities to produce 
oil and respond to oil spills and that such knowledge should be shared between government and 
the lay public, and between oil companies.  In short, the ideal in knowledge production is for 
transparency.  Yet, oil spill stories suggest that institutional barriers, privileges and protections, 
proprietary rights to specialized knowledge, obstruct knowledge sharing and transparency.  Not 
everyone can participate in knowledge production or knowledge apprehension regarding 
geological conditions, oil extraction and production technologies, or oil spill clean-up practices 
and procedures as is argued by Fischer (2000) and others.  So, while testimony is predicated on a 
belief in the ability to learn from past mistakes and to chart a more proactive course for the 
future, this study is consistent with other investigations that suggest knowledge is often 
specialized for specific audiences (Collingridge and Reeve 1986, Fischer 2000, 2003, Jasanoff 
2009).  Access to knowledge is privileged.   
As Weiland, Weiss and Turnpenny (2013) recently argue, the link between knowledge 
making and implementation in policymaking is inconsistent with stated ideals.  Often the 
rationalistic, linear model of knowledge making creates boundaries between experts and 
laypeople, “science and non-science” which has consequences for policy events and conditions 
that adversely affect our shared natural world.  Their work introduces a collection of articles that 
consider issues related to science in policymaking especially as they pertain to ecological 
challenges and political efforts to address them.   
 Similarly, Button (2010) writes at length regarding the obfuscation of knowledge in the 
wake of disaster and catastrophe.  He analyzes several “disaster” cases and notes themes and 
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patterns that illustrate a profound contradiction between ideals for knowledge transparency and 
real processes of “withholding, sequestering, privatization and colonization” of knowledge.  
First, due to our cultural commitment to rational scientific investigation, lay knowledge and/or 
qualitative science is considered irrational and idiosyncratic.  Button (2010) argues that instead 
of producing knowledge about disaster from experience and investigation, knowledge makers, 
brokers, etc. produce uncertainty and doubt.  Specifically, policy stories reveal uncertainties 
regarding clean-up methods and remediation, immediate and long term impacts for environment 
and public health and accurate cost accounting for losses to environment and communities.   
Second, following divisions between what is considered science and non-science are divisions 
between who is considered knowledgeable and who is considered ignorant.  Button writes 
(2010:167): 
In our highly professionalized culture, the public debate over controversial topics is 
overwhelmed by privileged arguments.  Lay questions, objections, and attempts to 
resolve uncertainty are often dismissed as uninformed, lacking in scientific vigor, 
irrational and at times almost hysteric. 
  
Indeed, in stories about oil spills testimony suggests that lessons are not learned and 
knowledge is not shared.  As Button’s analysis of disaster construction illustrates there are 
complex historical, political and corporate interests in “shaping, hiding, attacking, packaging and 
spinning” knowledge in favor or maintaining the status quo.  Stone (1997:318) too observes that 
“secrecy is integral to both markets and governments.”  So the paradox is clear: ideals for 
democratic participation in knowledge making and sharing are contradicted by the mandate for 
secrecy in government and industry.  Indeed, from a market perspective, competitiveness 
depends on keeping trade secrets close to the vest. 
Obfuscation of knowledge is a prevailing theme in many recent government attempts to 
cover up knowledge, or strategically erase hard drives when the public demands access to what is 
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considered “public record.”  The analysis of oil spill stories as told in congressional hearings 
supports Button’s (2010) findings that there are tensions between our taken-for-granted support 
for knowledge and learning and the institutional processes and tactics that create and maintain 
barriers to know.  But, as this analysis reflects, knowledge is linked to evaluations of culpability 
and innocence.  Those accorded authority to know are expected to take responsibility whereas 
actors presumed ignorant are not.  Related to our commitment to rational science in 
policymaking is what Button (2010) refers to as our “cultural focus on technological fixes” in the 
wake of disaster.  A theme I also observe in oil spill testimony from 1969 to 2010.  In short, the 
cultural influence of ideas related to growth and expansion shapes policy stories. 
Beliefs in Innovation and Technological Advancement Legitimize American Expansion of 
Authority, Power and Resources  
The final widely held belief that emerges in all oil spill stories is unquestioned support 
for fixing what is constructed as broken to prevent future oil spill problems through American 
led changes in bureaucratic structures and technological capabilities.  Related to the widely 
shared belief in the ability to calculate risks, damages, and assessments by labeling and defining 
problems through linear scientific investigation is the belief that we [read: United States] can 
build a better oil trap to prevent another spill from happening in the future.  In addition to 
assumptions that new technologies can prevent oil spills are assumptions that new bureaucratic 
structures can produce more efficient and safe decisions, regulations, actions (Stone 1997).  
Recommended changes in decision making structures reflect what Stone refers to as 
“constitutional engineering.”  These solutions presume that change in membership in an 
organization or group dynamics will produce better policy.  I conclude that widely held beliefs 
about innovation and change is consistent with what Vaughan (2004:331) regards as dominant 
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ideologies linked to continuous growth in production and consumption or what she calls the 
“culture of production.”  There is consistency in testimony for maintaining supply of oil whether 
it is foreign, or domestic through improvements in oil drilling and transportation.  And the way 
to accomplish steady production is via changes in bureaucratic structures, and American 
technological expansion. 
Reliance on oil for energy is largely unquestioned throughout testimonies.  While some 
senators in the Deepwater Horizon hearing may have said we need to diversify off of oil, no one 
suggests constriction.  We live in what Beck (1992) calls a “risk culture” or what Harbers (2005) 
calls a “technology culture.”  In short, we believe that we have the technology, if it is not broken, 
do not fix it.  And if it is broken, build a new one.  Ultimately, beliefs in innovations have 
implications for our globally shared reliance on scarce resources including air, land, water and 
oil.  We cannot build another Earth (but, perhaps we can colonize the moon). 
Testimonies that prescribe the creation of new agencies, new regulatory regimes, 
emergency groups, and changes to existing agencies advocate for innovations in bureaucratic 
structures that are linked with the assignment of “authorities, powers and resources” to prevent 
future oil spills (Stone 1997).  Importantly, prescriptions emphasize the power of the United 
States as “fixers” of the oil spill problem and by implication the reliance on foreign oil problem.  
What becomes vivid are deeply held values related to American production and distribution of 
oil resources. 
According to beliefs in American exceptionalism, the United States is cast as innovative 
leaders in prescriptions for bureaucratic and technological change.  We can design “fool proof” 
technology, multiple redundancies, shutoff devices, blow-out preventers and impervious tankers 
that will ensure that there will be no more oil spills that is linked to our shared tolerance for risk.  
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Risk taking is part of culturally shared ideals as has been argued by several scholars (Beck 1992, 
Fischer 2000, Giddens 2011, Hood, Rothsetin and Baldwin 2001).  Recently, Rosa, Renn and 
McCright (2013) argued that in our quest for advancements to improve circumstances and 
quality of life, we have developed a shared tolerance for risk that has inevitable implications for 
environmental sustainability.   
Paradoxically, in all oil spill stories analyzed in this work, technology is constructed as 
both contributing to the problem as well as the solution.  Specifically, technology is implicated in 
oil spill problems with regard to clean up and mitigation.  In the Santa Barbara case, witnesses 
lamented a lack of knowledge and capacity to deal with the spill and not surprisingly prescribed 
the development of more sophisticated technologies to prevent or at least respond to future oil 
spills.  Similarly, in the Exxon Valdez case, stories highlighted the need to focus on clean-up 
technologies due to a gross lack of planning and preparation caused by faulty protocols.  In stark 
contrast, the Deepwater Horizon case comprises stories that implicate a number of inter-related 
technological processes as potential causes of the oil spill that eventuated in prescriptions to 
improve designs and capabilities.  Indeed, witnesses in Deepwater expressed concern that not 
more progress has been made in clean-up and mitigation given the precedents of other 
catastrophic oil spills.  Unmasked by this frustration is the belief that perfection is possible.  Or 
at least that we can “tame” uncertainty (Rosa, Renn and McCright 2013). 
 The emphasis on technology as the problem and technological innovation as the solution 
is explored in the vast sociological examinations of science and technology (STS).  From a 
political science perspective, isolating the cause of problems as a result of human agency is 
necessary in order to obtain recourse (Stone 1997).  Complex causes such as the failure of 
multiple redundancies as in Deepwater Horizon, or a lack of technical capacity to handle oil 
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spills as in Santa Barbara and Exxon Valdez are frustrating in that no clear responsibility can be 
assigned.  BOPS cannot pay.  We are left with the prescription that we “learn lessons,” tweak 
processes, re-engineer decision making, eliminate conflicts of interest, fix widgets and then back 
to business as usual.  Yet, this reduced conception of policy problems and solutions inevitably 
leaves out the social and natural complexities that provide for the hegemonic power of sci-tech 
that has inspired a turn to “radical constructivist” studies of the inter-relations between human 
and non-human agents implicated in complex policy problems such as oil spills (Harbers 2005).   
The ideals expressed with regard to the potentials of technology are connected to what 
Harbers (2005) regards as the optimistic view of technological advancement in general.  
According to Harbers, such conception is historically rooted in the “scientistic world view” that 
is part of our “technology culture” or what Fischer (1990) refers to as “technocracy.”  Perhaps it 
is useful in a policymaking context to blame the machine when it is taken-for-granted that 
machines cannot act, or more importantly, they cannot pay damages.  Only humans can be fined.  
Harbers (2005) along with the contributors to his edited work advance a sociological research 
agenda that seeks to flesh out the inter-dependence between science, technology and society.  
Specifically, he points to works that help to reconsider the concepts of agency and normativity.  
As Harbers argues (2005:257), perhaps complex systems, artifacts, standards and regulations can 
be held accountable as causal agents as they enable the acts of human others.   
Scientific knowledge and technological systems on the one hand and social, political and 
moral relations on the other hand are mutually constituted in one and the same historical 
process…Following the principle of radical symmetry, both humans and non humans are 
granted agency. 
 
 Embedded in our shared commitment to technological advancement is a taken-for-
granted moral normativity for all things technical…including prescriptions for turning to 
renewable technologies as an alternative to oil dependence for life as Giddens (2011) suggests.  
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Giddens takes technological advancement as an inevitable aspect of modern life: “As a result of 
the advance of science and technology, we have long since crossed the boundaries which used to 
separate us from the natural world (2011:21).”  
 Whether innovations in bureaucratic structures and technological developments are the 
answer to policy problems such as oil spills or climate change, they will be co-produced in 
similar ways as all innovations throughout history via the complex interactions between ideas 
and practices, theoretical concepts and empirical operationalizations.  Giddens (2011) posits a 
host of catalysts that might bring about awareness and innovation toward abating or at least 
adapting to consequences stemming from our reliance on oil for energy, economy and security.  
However, pessimistically, he suggests that any efforts may be stymied by our instantiate belief 
that there is no problem unless it is visible, tangible and acute.  That is, we have to see it to 
believe it and we have to believe it to act.  Alternatively, it may be more productive to re-
consider the boundaries that separate us from the natural world as is suggested by the works of 
scholars who advocate a radical constructivist examination of the interplay between the moral 
and the normative, the ideal and the real (Harbers 2005). We may believe in the power of 
multiple redundancies to prevent disasters.  But we may also forget just how dependent we are 
on something as small as the honey bee for our mere existence. 
Conclusions 
How does culture work in policymaking?  This work suggests that culture provides ideals 
or widely shared beliefs about how the world should work.  In this study, I set out to investigate 
the cultural influence in policymaking by pursuing an interpretive analysis of stories told within 
the policymaking context of congressional hearings about oil spills.  By beginning with a 
focusing event, I was able to define my sampling frame and the selection of my data in a 
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systematic way providing for rigor in my qualitative analysis of stories.   Further, by pursuing a 
narrative analytic approach, I was able to document explicit descriptions of settings, plots, 
characters and morals to facilitate comparisons across time.   Scholars have shown that policy 
issues and solutions are storied (Stone 1997, Fischer 2003, Jones and McBeth 2010), so 
examining policymaking with emphasis on stories told is analytically useful.  Stories have 
beginnings, middles and ends providing for analogical comparison both within cases and 
between (Vaughan 2004). 
By comparing stories told in congressional hearing by similar actors (government 
officials, experts and scientists, and industry professionals), interests are visible in that all 
witnesses represented particular organizational and institutional interests.  My study provides 
support for arguments that suggest culture is a set of tools that actors use (Schudson 1989, 
Swidler 1986) through social processes such as policymaking.  Furthermore, this analysis 
provides support for theoretical ideas that suggest that culture is a causal ideational influence on 
stories told (Schudson 1989, Padamsee 2009).  Via analogical comparison of diverse stories 
across time, I was able to link representations with realities by focusing on taken-for-granted 
assumptions that undergird or hold stories together.  In the end, I compared stories within cases 
and between cases to illuminate widely shared beliefs that constitute “cultural influence” on 
policymaking.  In so doing, I shed light on the way culture shapes or influences the wider social 
world in general.   
Cultural influence applies to the wider social order in that while we may share and 
support similar moral ideals about the sanctity of nature, knowledge sharing and innovation and 
growth, particular accounts in congressional hearings reveal “real” tensions that can be linked 
with systems of inequality.  We do not protect, we control nature.  As such we divide nature into 
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categories of worth – valuable, not valuable, beautiful, not beautiful.  These proverbial lines in 
the sand are linked with social division more generally.  For example, within particular oil spill 
stories, I note the way speakers describe the problem as a disaster for the “natural beauty” of the 
Santa Barbara coast, or a disastrous contaminant for the “pristine waters” of Prince William 
Sound that is linked to the real practices of the development of protective sanctuaries or for 
moratoriums on drilling and shipping practices.  Implicit moral evaluations of types of places are 
inevitably linked to moral evaluations of individuals who reside there or do not, as the case may 
be.  Furthermore, implicit in the idea that we can reduce nature to price tags suggests that we 
prioritize the ability to control rather than protect nature.  We can pollute all we want, as long as 
we have the ability to pay “legitimate claims.” 
With knowledge and learning the ideal is to share and to be transparent, but the practice 
is to keep it under wraps for competitive advantage or protection.   Compartmentalization of 
knowledge into types of expertise (science and non-science; sense and nonsense) inevitably 
divides people and has implications for democratic participation (Fischer 2000).  Some people 
have knowledge and are expected to know better, while others do not and are not.  Particularly I 
observe the way speakers refer to particular groups and individuals in terms of assumptions 
about knowledge and credibility that suggests to some extent who has authority to speak or 
describe oil spill events and to propose solutions.  Arguably, in institutionally bound spaces such 
as a Federal Senate hearing, there are rules about who can say what, when and for how long – 
that counts as “credible” testimony. 
Finally, innovations and technological advancements are ideally understood as the sine 
qua non of growth and progress.  This widely held belief guides support for government 
investment into research and development to advance technologies, which is observed in the 
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emphasis on science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) at all levels of education 
(Breiner, Harkness, Johnson and Koehler 2010).  So influential is the belief in innovation and 
expansion, that a narrative of constriction of consumption, limiting growth, or rethinking, 
retooling the capitalist economic order is what can be called a nonstarter, or a proposal that has 
no chance of acceptance in a cultural context that assumes growth is good.   
While, stories suggest that multiple barriers and multiple redundancies lead to multiple 
explanations of multiple failures, I observe the way technological advancement, additional 
research and development are often offered as the prescription to address oil spills and clean-up 
efforts.  Innovations are also prescribed to avoid another oil spill event in the future that assumes 
change is good for change sake.  And American led technological developments in oil 
development and transport are assumed to be superior to foreign innovations.  Critically, our 
shared reliance on oil is unquestioned.  That is attention is aimed at innovations to advance oil 
production and not to constrict oil consumption. 
Additionally, our commitment to technology is linked with our collective tolerance for 
risk (Beck 1992, Giddens 2011).  Constructing oil spills as rare has implications for investing in 
clean-up technologies.  The rarity of oil spills (acceptable risk) justifies a lack of investment in 
clean-up technologies directing more attention to perfecting extraction and distribution 
technologies (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011, 2012).  With multiple barriers and redundancies 
in oil production processes perhaps it does not make sense to invest in spill technologies when 
we can just improve our capabilities to eliminate the possibility for error akin to organizational 
quality management practices known as “Six Sigma” (Pyzdek and Keller 2003).  In the Six 
Sigma approach to quality management, it is believed that the potential for error can be reduced 
to zero.  The belief that technology can be perfected assumes the possibility of perfection among 
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human operators.  Similarly, the belief in a change in decision making structures assumes that a 
change in membership, or size of agency or committee leads to better policies.   
Despite the ways cultural beliefs in policy stories about oil spills shape and maintain 
differences and divisions in the wider social order, one thing unites all characters in all stories: a 
shared need for food and shelter; oxygen and water.  While this study calls attention to the power 
of widely held beliefs in shaping policymaking, it also points to possibilities in attending to the 
paradoxes between the ideal and the real or what is said and what is done.  All in all, oil spill 
stories might come across as the “same ole song and dance,” – that greedy oil producers and the 
Federal Government run rough shod over our shared natural environment for economic gain, that 
they say the same old thing over and over, we will fix it, we will pay for it, we will develop more 
sophisticated technologies.  Oil spill stories can be taken together as cautionary tales.  That is, no 
amount of money in the “superfund” is going to enable us to buy more water, more air.  Despite 
all innovative advancements, all the King’s horses and all the King’s men cannot put a broken 
Earth back together again.   
Importantly, this study of policy stories about oil spills should not be read as an 
indictment against the oil industry or the Federal Government or individual culprits named in 
particular oil spill disasters.  Arguing that culture works as a set of tools and ideational force 
suggests that we are all share responsibility for the production of oil spills whether we are 
driving the boat or not.  It is not oil producers and governmental supports that are to blame for oil 
spills.  We are all complicit as we are all socially and naturally embedded.  We are producers of 
our culture as much as we are produced by it.  We maintain and perpetuate demand for oil for 
our lives and thereby legitimize the existing social order.  But, this study also should not be read 
as an indictment on our individual practices either.  We use and rely on oil to create, sustain and 
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perpetuate important social bonds with and through others.  As sociologists have long argued, 
human survival is a group project.  However, I think it should be read as evidence that beliefs are 
powerful and shape what we do or what we can and cannot do.  Further they are enduring.  In the 
end, I hope the study inspires further exploration of the beliefs that collectively shape our social 
and natural worlds.  I hope it encourages us to consider ways we can collaborate across natural, 
social and biological divides to critically imagine possibilities for global stewardship of our 
shared environment.  While oil is important and necessary, water is arguably more so.  No water, 
no life. 
That said, I must acknowledge the limitations of my study.  First, I am one reader of 
hearing testimony.  My interpretation of statements is influenced by my positionality as a white, 
married, middle class, middle aged, mother who resides in a rural community.  I am interested in 
my own influences on the natural environment and engage in practices to minimize what is 
referred to as my “carbon footprint.”  However, I also recognize my complicity as I am also a 
consumer of oil in my “going concerns” (Gubrium and Holstein 2000).  Second, I only examine 
one hearing per oil spill event.  And for each oil spill event there were several hearings held over 
the course of several years.  Furthermore, I privilege the “official narrative” by examining stories 
told by elite actors. My policy narratives are historical and archival and shaped by the 
institutional contexts in which they were told.   Other stories about oil spills should be examined 
to further investigate and compare how actors story events and how stories reveal underlying 
beliefs and values to illuminate the ways persistent social inequalities are supported by social 
processes.  
Finally, I argue that beliefs are influential in shaping policymaking and world making in 
general, but I do not account for specific causal linkages or what could be understood as “proof” 
 236
that beliefs do anything.  In the main, I argue from the social psychological position that human 
actors must first make sense of events in order to understand how to act toward them (Mead 
2009).  As the Thomas theorem asserts, what is constructed as real is real in consequence 
(Merton 1995).  I do not argue that beliefs are obdurate, static or unchanging things, however I 
do posit that with and through repetitive joint action of actors within complex systems and 
institutional arrangements they can appear to be (Blumer 1969).  Historically transmitted moral 
notions of how the world should work inform our interpretations.  As Swidler (1986) suggests, 
beliefs are among our cultural tools.  But as this study also suggests collective beliefs are among 
our governing constraints (Schudson 1989). In short, we socially shape our cultural context that 
shapes us. 
Future scholarship is needed to strengthen the research agenda established here.  
Particularly, more narrative comparative research can be applied to a variety of other narratives 
both within and without the policymaking arena to illuminate taken-for-granted assumptions 
about the social and natural worlds.  But to respond to calls for more rigor in qualitative analysis 
as suggested by Atkinson and Delamont (2006), empirical, interpretive studies must be 
systematic providing for “quasi inter coder reliability” checks.  That is, other investigators can 
assess my theoretical claims by examining the same or similar data with a structural narrative 
comparative framework to either support, refute or extend my findings.   
With respect to the current work, I feel that it is yet incomplete.  As I continue to develop 
this project with examinations of other oil spill stories, I will analyze more hearings from both 
the senate and the house as well stories about each spill reported in the mass media.  
Furthermore, I will continue to expand my research agenda beyond oil spills to investigate other 
types of events and conditions deemed problematic in society as exemplified by Button’s (2010) 
 237
and Smith’s (2005) work.   In short, I am interested in exploring diverse policy stories and asking 
counterfactual questions such as:  In what narratives can nature be public or shared?  Can ugly be 
precious or valuable?  Can “disaster” be positive?  In what narratives can ignorance be power?  
Can poetry be expertise?  In what narratives can fixity, or tradition be progress?  Can reduction 
be growth? Such investigation could provide more nuanced insight into the work of culture in 
social processes such as policymaking that inevitably lead to shared consequences and world 
making whether we participate or not in their social construction.  Nowhere is this investigation 
of more critical importance than with matters of sustainability pertaining to our shared planet.  
So far as we know…it is the only one we have. 
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